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COMPARABLE WORTH-THE 
THEORY, ITS LEGAL FOUNDATION, 
AND THE FEASIBILITY OF 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Carin Ann Clauss* 
County of Washington v. Gunther1 was decided by the Su-
preme Court over five years ago. In that case, the Court, resolv-
ing a conflict among the circuits,2 ruled that sex-based wage dis-
crimination claims could proceed under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 19643 without regard to the limiting "equal work" 
standard of the Equal Pay Act.• Following this decision, it was 
generally assumed that the courts would become the major fo-
rum for redressing sex-based wage discrimination. The antici-
pated litigation explosion never took place. Few wage discrimi-
nation suits have been filed, and even fewer have been 
• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School. A.B., 1960, Vas-
sar College; LL.B., 1963, Columbia University. The author was Vice-Chair of the Wiscon-
sin Task Force on Comparable Worth (1984-1986). She formerly served as Solicitor of 
the United States Department of Labor (1977-1981) and as Associate Solicitor for the 
Fair Labor Standards Division (1970-1976), where she supervised the federal govern-
ment's enforcement of the Equal Pay Act and the antidiscrimination and affirmative 
action provisions of Executive Order 11246. 
The author would like to thank Maria Makris-Gouvas, of the Wisconsin Law School 
Class of 1987, for her invaluable research and editorial assistance. She would also like to 
thank John A. Peters, Government Publications Librarian of the Wisconsin State Histor-
ical Library; and William Ebbott, Barbara Meyer, and Julie Blankenburg of the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin Law Library for their great resourcefulness in locating all manner of 
documents and historical materials. 
1. 452 U.S. 161 (1981). 
2. Compare, e.g., Lemons v. City & County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980) and Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579, 580 (4th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977) and Orr v. Frank R. MacNeill & Son, 511 F.2d 
166, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975) and Ammons v. Zia Co., 448 F.2d 
117 (10th Cir. 1971) (requiring showing of "equal work" in sex-based wage discrimination 
claims under Title VII) with International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 967 (1981) 
and Gunther v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d 882, 888-91 (9th Cir. 1979) (not limiting 
claims to "equal work" situations), aff'd on rehearing, 623 1".2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1980), 
aff'd, 452 U.S. 161 (1981). 
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982). 
4. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982); see Gunther, 452 U.S. at 168, 178-79. 
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successful. What progress has been made has been through the 
legislatures and private negotiation. 5 
In part, the paucity of litigation can be attributed to the enor-
mous expense of such suits and the withdrawal by the federal 
civil rights agencies of both financial and legal support.6 In part, 
however, the paucity of litigation stems from the inability of the 
courts-and counsel-to agree on a comprehensive legal theory 
for resolving wage discrimination claims based on pay disparities 
affecting dissimilar jobs. 7 Indeed, one jurist only recently re-
marked that "comparable worth is not a legal concept" but a 
political and economic movement. 8 
The purpose of this Article is to set forth what the author be-
lieves to be a viable approach to wage discrimination suits in-
volving dissimilar jobs. 9 Part I summarizes the development of 
legislation prohibiting sex-based wage discrimination. Part II(A) 
begins with a definition of the term "comparable worth." As 
noted there, comparable worth can never be an accurate short-
hand expression for the elimination of the wage gap between 
men and women workers.10 This is so because the reason for the 
wage gap is not just wage discrimination, nor even wage and job 
discrimination combined. It would thus be misleading to suggest 
that effective enforcement of the civil rights laws could ever 
eliminate this gap. Nor does the term comparable worth mean 
that every two jobs of equal value must be paid the same. This 
5. See, e.g., COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S., OPTIONS FOR CONDUCTING A PAY EQUITY 
STUDY OF FEDERAL PAY AND CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS 36-39 (1985). On November 4, 1986, 
San Francisco voters approved an amendment of the city's charter that requires the City 
Board of Supervisors to adhere to the concept of equal pay for jobs of comparable value. 
San Franciscans Vote Plan to Ease Pay Inequities, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1986, at 29, col. 
1. 
6. Newman, Newell & Kirkman, The Lessons of AFSCME v. State of Washington, 
13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 475, 493-96 (1984-1985). 
7. See, for example, the concurring opinion of Judge Schroeder in Spaulding v. Uni-
versity of Washington, 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984), where 
she noted that it was "not possible," in a suit tried before the Supreme Court's "historic 
decision" in Gunther, "for this court ... to render any definitive ruling on the validity 
of comparable worth as a tool in employment discrimination cases." Id. at 710. 
8. American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 719 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.). 
9. The Supreme Court in Gunther did "not decide . . . the precise contours of law-
suits challenging sex discrimination in compensation under Title VII." 452 U.S. at 181. 
10. The so-called wage gap refers to the difference in the earnings of full-time female 
and male employees. In 1984, the earnings of full-time female employees were 64% of 
the earnings of full-time male employees. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: MONEY INCOME OF HOUSEHOLDS, FAMILIES, AND 
PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1984, at 2 (1986); see also In Wages, Sexes May Be 
Forever Unequal, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1986, at E20, col. 3. The combination of factors 
resulting in the wage gap, including discrimination, are discussed infra note 68. See also 
B. BERGMANN, THE ECONOMIC EMERGENCE OF WOMEN 66-82 (1986). 
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usage of the term is to a type of pay system, similar to the one 
used in the federal service, 11 and not to any legal theory of dis-
crimination. But comparable worth can be used to ref er to a le-
gal theory of discrimination, and in this Article the term de-
scribes a wage discrimination claim based on the employer's use 
of different criteria in establishing the wage rates for male- and 
female-dominated jobs. 
Part II(B) of this Article compares equal work and compara-
ble worth cases and demonstrates how both fit within the dispa-
rate treatment model of discrimination. Part II(C) discusses the 
differences in the problems of proof between an equal work and 
a comparable worth case. This Part of the Article suggests a 
number of ways in which the required "intent" element might 
be established in a comparable worth case, including the use of 
job evaluation methods and statistical regression techniques. In 
this connection, the Article explores the difference between the 
a priori job evaluation method, which relies upon an outside ex-
pert's view of job worth, and the policy capturing job evaluation 
method, which relies upon the employer's own implicit criteria 
for establishing job worth. The Article concludes that the policy 
capturing method is more appropriate for establishing intent be-
cause it is based on the employer's own assessment of job worth 
and not on the court's or an outside expert's. 12 
Part II(C) discusses the defenses that are typically raised to 
comparable worth claims, including the assertion that the "mar-
ket" justifies disparate wage treatment. The Article distin-
guishes between a wage differential based on differences in the 
prevailing community wage rates for male and female labor, and 
wage differentials based on a shortage of available workers 
trained in a particular skill, or on some other factor unrelated to 
either sex or job worth. It concludes that differentials based on 
true labor shortages are lawful, whereas differentials based on 
the separate prevailing rates for male and female labor are not. 
Although it is the central thesis of this Article that Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act comfortably accommodates a comparable 
worth suit, the author recognizes that additional comparable 
worth legislation is probably inevitable. For that reason, Part III 
of the Article examines the objectives of this legislation, and the 
11. See D. TREIMAN, Joe EVALUATION: AN ANALYTIC REVIEW 17-21 (1979) (Interim Re-
port to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)). 
12. Both the courts and Congress have expressed a concern that judges and govern-
mental agencies not base a finding of intentional wage discrimination on their "own sub-
jective assessment of the value of the male and female ... jobs." Gunther, 452 U.S. at 
181; see also 109 CONG. REc. 9197-98 (1963) (statement of Rep. Goodell). 
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extent to which these objectives are consistent with the general 
aims of nondiscrimination. The author cautions against any ex-
clusive reliance on affirmative action, pointing out that it is a 
less appropriate response where the discrimination results from 
direct employer misconduct and not from the misconduct of 
some unrelated institution-such as society, the schools, unions, 
and family. 
Part IV of the Article concludes with a discussion of the meth-
ods for implementing comparable worth, whether through legis-
lation or some other voluntary pay plan, or through successful 
litigation. This Part of the Article also responds to the argu-
ments made by the critics of comparable worth that its imple-
mentation will result in lower wages for men and reduced em-
ployment for men and women, and that the burden of its costs 
will fall disproportionately on the unskilled and low-paid. 
I. AN HISTORIC PERSPECTIVE 
Sex-based wage discrimination has been a recognized problem 
in the United States and Europe for over a century.13 The 
13. See generally Equal Pay Act: Hearings on H.R. 3861 and Related Bills Before 
the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 88th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 6-57 (1963) [hereinafter 1963 Hearings on H.R. 3861). For an excellent 
discussion of the European response to sex-based wage discrimination, see Bellace, A 
Foreign Perspective, in COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 137 (E.R. Liver-
nash 2d ed. 1984). Bellace notes that the problem of women receiving unequal pay for 
equal work became an issue in Europe about the same time as in the United States. The 
Trade Union Congress in Great Britain, for example, made equal pay for equal work one 
of its issues in 1888. Id. at 145. No formal action was taken by the European govern-
ments, however, until the 1940's. In 1946, France adopted a new Constitution, which 
guaranteed equality between the sexes; later that year, it promulgated a decree eliminat-
ing "explicit sex-based differentials in basic wage rates as fixed by collective agree-
ments." Id. at 153. The 1948 Italian Constitution also provided that women are entitled 
to equal pay for equal work. Id. at 149. And Great Britain appointed a Royal Commis-
sion in 1944 to consider the issue of equal pay, although the government took no action 
on the Commission's report until 1955. Id. at 145-46; Equal Pay for Equal Work for 
Women: Hearings on S. 1178 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Education 
and Labor, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1945) [hereinafter 1945 Hearings on S. 1178). 
Two other developments should be noted. In 1951, the Conference of the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) adopted ILO Convention No. 100, which states that signatory 
nations shall "ensure the application to all workers of the principle of equal remunera-
tion for men and women workers for work of equal value." Equal Remuneration Conven-
tion, June 6, 1951, art. 2, para. 1, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS, 1919-1981, at 42 (1982); see Bellace, supra, at 140. Forty-three countries, 
including eight from Western Europe, had ratified this Convention by January 1, 1963. 
See 1963 Hearings on H.R. 3861, supra, at 54-55. Even prior to the adoption of Conven-
tion No. 100 and its ratification by a majority of members, the ILO had regarded equal 
pay as one of its basic principles. The Constitution of the ILO states as principle 7 that 
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United States government's interest dates back to at least 1867, 
when the Joint Select Committee on Retrenchment was estab-
lished by Congress to examine existing appointment procedures 
and salaries in the federal civil service. 14 In conducting this ex-
amination, the Joint Select Committee submitted thirty-seven 
"interrogatories" to various government officers. 111 One of these 
interrogatories specifically addressed the question of sex-based 
wage and employment practices, as follows: 
Are there any females among your subordinates? If so, 
state what proportion their compensation bears to that of 
males for the same service, [and] whether they compare 
favorably or not with males for diligence, attention and 
efficiency . . . .16 
"men and women should receive equal remuneration for work of equal value." Constitu-
tion of the International Labour Organisation, June 28, 1919, § II, art. 41, reprinted in 
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
1776-1949, at 241, 254 (C. Bevans ed. 1969); see 1945 Hearings on S. 1178, supra, at 32. 
The other major piece of legislation was the Treaty of Rome, which was signed in 1957 
by France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, and which estab-
lished the European Economic Community (EEC); the United Kingdom, Ireland, and 
Denmark joined the EEC in 1973. Article 119 of the Treaty states: "Each Member State 
shall . . . ensure and . . . maintain the application of the principle that men and women 
should receive equal pay for equal work." See Bellace, supra, at 141-43. 
Although this language would appear more restrictive than the language in the ILO 
Convention, the Council of the European Communities adopted an Equal Pay Directive 
on February 10, 1975, which construed the "equal work" language very broadly. Article 1 
of the Directive states that the principle of equal pay set out in the Treaty of Rome 
means equal pay 
for the same work or for work to which equal value is attributed .... In partic-
ular, where a job classification system is used for determining pay, it must be 
based on the same criteria for both men and women and so drawn up as to 
exclude any discrimination on grounds of sex. 
18 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 45) 19 (1975); see Bellace, supra, at 143. 
The United Kingdom maintained that the Directive's requirement of equal pay for 
equal value applied only to employers who had a job evaluation scheme in place. The 
European Commission (the EEC's secretariat) disagreed, and, in 1979, initiated infringe-
ment proceedings against the United Kingdom and others. Id. at 145. The dispute was 
heard by the European Court of Justice, which concluded, on July 6, 1982, that the 
United Kingdom had violated its obligations under the Directive "by failing to ... ap-
ply the principle of equal pay for men and women for work to which equal value is 
attributed and for which no system of job classification exists." Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities v. United Kingdom, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2601, 2617-18; see M. 
RUBENSTEIN, EQUAL PAY FOR WORK OF EQUAL VALUE 46 (1984). Following this decision, 
the British Parliament enacted the Equal Pay (Amendment) Regulations 1983, which 
went into effect on January 1, 1984. Id. at 46-49. 
14. JOINT SELECT COMM. ON RETRENCHMENT, CIVIL SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES, 
H.R. REP. No. 47, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1868) (report of Rep. Jenckes) [hereinafter 
JENCKES REPORT). 
15. Id. at 16-18. 
16. Id. at 18. 
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The responses to this interrogatory confirmed that women were 
paid less than men for equal work.I 7 Some of the reporting of-
ficers recommended that such wage differentials be eliminated. Is 
Others suggested that the men be replaced by women, who 
would work for lower wages, and thus reduce the cost of govern-
ment service. Is 
Following the Committee's report, Congress enacted legisla-
tion in 1870, which, among other things, adopted the principle of 
equal pay for equal work in the federal civil service.20 This prin-
ciple was not generally implemented, however, until the Classifi-
cation Act of 1923,21 when Congress established a uniform sys-
tem of job grades and salaries.22 This early legislative response 
to sex-based pay discrimination was largely limited to the fed-
eral sector, although two states, Michigan and Montana, enacted 
broad equal pay laws in 1919, which applied to private employ-
ers. 23 But the first major application in the private sector of the 
concept of equal pay for equal work did not occur until the war 
years.24 Although the wage and price controls then in effect gen-
17. Id. at 19, 23, 25, 29, 41. 
18. Id. at 23. 
19. Id. at 34. 
20. Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, § 2, 16 Stat. 230, 250. Under the terms of this 
statute, women could, "in the discretion of the head of any department, be appointed to 
any of the clerkships ... authorized by law, upon the same requisites and conditions, 
and with the same compensation, as are p~escribed for men." WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. 
DEP'T OF LABOR, BULLETIN No. 8: WOMEN IN THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE 9 (1920) [hereinaf-
ter WOMEN'S BUREAU, BULLETIN No. 8). 
21. Ch. 265, 42 Stat. 954 (repealed 1949). 
22. Subsequent legislation established for the federal civil service a General Schedule 
(GS) of 18 grades, with each grade representing increased levels of difficulty, responsibil-
ity, and qualification requirements. The salary range for any specific job is determined 
by its grade assignment. See Classification Act of 1949, ch. 782, 63 Stat. 954. Under this 
Act, which has remained virtually unchanged, grade assignments should be made on the 
basis of "equal pay for substantially equal work"; and pay variations should be "in pro-
portion to substantial differences in the difficulty, responsibility, and qualification re-
quirements of the work performed." 5 U.S.C. § 5101(1)(A)-(B) (1982). The Civil Service 
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111, specifies the "merit system princi-
ples" that are to govern federal personnel management, including the principle that 
"[e]qual pay should be provided for work of equal value." 5 U.S.C. § 2301(b)(3) (1982). 
See generally D. TREIMAN, supra note 11, at 15-17. 
23. 1963 Hearings on H.R. 3861, supra note 13, at 45; 1945 Hearings on S. 1178, 
supra note 13, at 39-40. 
24. Two government commissions had previously recommended that the principle of 
equal pay for equal work govern industrial relations in the United States-the Industrial 
Commission in 1898 and the Commission on Industrial Relations in 1915. 1945 Hearings 
on S. 1178, supra note 13, at 30. After the outbreak of World War I, the Chief of the 
Bureau of Ordinance of the War Department notified all manufacturers with war con-
tracts that "(t]he standards of wages hitherto prevailing for men in the process should 
not be lowered when women render equivalent service." Id. (quoting General Order No. 
13, Nov. 1917). 
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erally prohibited any wage increases, the War Labor Boards 
could and did approve wage increments that were designed to 
correct gross inequities based on sex, race, or age. 211 Their guid-
ing principle was that "[i]f it shall become necessary to employ 
women on work ordinarily performed by men, they must be al-
lowed equal pay for equal work."26 This principle was reaffirmed 
by the National War Labor Board on November 24, 1942, in 
General Order No. 16, which stated, "Increases which equalize 
the wage or salary rates paid to females with the rates paid to 
males for comparable quality and quantity of work on the same 
or similar operations . . . may be made without approval of the 
National War Labor Board .... "27 
Based on the experience of the War Labor Boards,28 a com-
prehensive federal equal pay bill was introduced in Congress in 
25. l NATIONAL WAR LABOR Bo .. THE TERMINATION REPORT 8-9 (1946). 
26. REPORT OF THE WAR LABOR CONFERENCE BOARD (Mar. 29, 1918), reprinted in 
1945 Hearings on S. 1178, supra note 13, at-30; see also WAGE STABILIZATION Div., NA-
TIONAL WAR LABOR Bo., INTRAPLANT WAGE RELATIONSHIPS (1945) (Research and Statistics 
Report No. 29), reprinted in 1945 Hearings on S. 1178, supra note 13, at 83, 88-89. 
27. PROGRAM APPRAISAL AND RESEARCH Div., NATIONAL WAR LABOR Bo., NATIONAL 
WAR LABOR BOARD POLICY ON EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK FOR WOMEN (1945) (Research 
and Statistics Report No. 32) (quoting General Order No. 16, as amended 1944), re-
printed in 1945 Hearings on S. 1178, supra note 13, at 41, 41-64; Williams & Bagby, The 
Legal Framework, in COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES, supra note 13, at 
197, 205-12. During the Korean War, the Wage Stabilization Board (WSB) similarly ap-
plied the principle of equal pay for equal work; under Resolution No. 69, the WSB would 
grant wage increases to equalize wages for comparable quality and quantity of work in 
the same or similar operations in the same establishment, without regard to sex, race, 
color, or national origin. Wage Stabilization Board Release No. 140 (Nov. 15, 1951). 
28. The War Labor Board summarized this experience in In re General Electric Co., 
28 War Lab. Rep. (BNA) 666, 677 (1945), as follows: 
l. Where women are working on the same jobs as men or on jobs formerly 
performed by men or on jobs performed interchangeably by men and women or 
on jobs which differ only inconsequentially and not in measurable job content 
from jobs performed by men, the women should receive the same rates of pay as 
the men unless (a) their output is less in quantity or quality than the output of 
men or (b) there are ascertainable and specific added costs to the company re-
sulting from the use of women, such as provision for extra helpers or for rest 
periods not provided in the case of men. In the case of (a) or (b), appropriate 
adjustment in rates may be made. 
2. Intangible alleged cost factors incident to the employment of women (such 
as absenteeism, lack of qualification for other work to which they are not as-
signed, relative impermanence in industry, legal restrictions, lack of prior train-
ing in industry, necessity of providing sanitary facilities, etc.) cannot legitimately 
[be used to reduce the rates to which the woman would otherwise] be entitled on 
the basis of job content. 
3. The rates for jobs which have historically been performed by women only 
and which differ measurably from the jobs performed by men are presumed to 
be correct in relation to the men's rates in the plant, especially where they are of 
long standing and have been accepted in collective bargaining. 
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1945. 29 There were then six states with similar legislation, 30 and 
. there was substantial support from both the government and the 
public for a federal bill. 31 As proposed, the 1945 bill, S. 1178, 
provided, "It shall be an unfair wage practice for any employer 
. . . to discriminate. between the sexes-(a) by paying wages to 
any female employee at a rate less than the rate at which he 
pays or has paid wages to male employees for work of compara-
ble quality and quantity .... "32 The 1945 legislative effort 
failed and, although similar bills were introduced in every subse-
quent session of Congress, it was not until 1963 that an equal 
pay bill was finally approved. 33 This approval was obtained 
when the sponsors of the legislation agreed to change the lan-
guage in the bill from "work of comparable character on jobs the 
performance of which requires comparable skills"34 to "equal 
work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skills."311 
4. This presumption can be overcome by affirmative evidence of the existence 
of an intra-plant inequity derived from a comparison of the content of the jobs 
in question with the content of the jobs performed by men. Some consideration, 
however, may be given in such cases, in modifying long established rate relation-
ships to the collective bargaining history. 
5. In particular cases, under a proper evaluation, there may be women's jobs 
which warrant a lower rate than the rate assigned to the lowest men's jobs, de-
pending entirely on the circumstances. 
6. The determination of proper rates for men's and women's jobs cannot be 
made by rule of thumb; it calls for judgment; and, wherever possible, it should 
be made through collective bargaining conducted in good faith. 
29. S. 1178, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945), reprinted in 1945 Hearings on S. 1178, 
supra note 13, at 1. 
30. 1945 Hearings on S. 1178, supra note 13, at 9, 39-40. The six states were Michi-
gan, Montana, Washington, Illinois, New York, and Massachusetts. Id. 
31. Moran, Reducing Discrimination: Role of the Equal Pay Act, MONTHLY LAB. 
REV., June 1970, at 30, 31. 
32. S. 1178, supra note 29, § 2(a), reprinted in 1945 Hearings on S. 1178, supra note 
13, at 1. 
33. By 1963, 22 states had enacted equal pay legislation. While the language of the 
state statutes varied considerably ("equal work," "same work," "work of like or compara-
ble character," "comparable work," same "type of work," "similarly employed," 
"equivalent service," "identical work," and "jobs requiring comparable skills"), it was 
generally assumed that the statutes were limited to an equal work standard. See, e.g., 1 
Equal Pay for Equal Work: Hearings on H.R. 8898 and H.R. 10226 Before the Select 
Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 
42-58 (1962) [hereinafter Equal Pay for Equal Work Hearings) (summarizing state court 
cases and state laws involving state "equal pay" laws). 
34. H.R. 8898, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4, reprinted in Equal Pay for Equal Work 
Hearings, supra note 33, at 2, 3; H.R. 10226, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4, reprinted in Equal 
Pay for Equal Work Hearings, supra note 33, at 6, 7. 
35. H.R. 3861, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4, reprinted in 1963 Hearings on H.R. 3861, 
supra note 13, at 2, 3; see also 108 CONG. REC. 14,771 (1962) (House discussion of pro-
posed amendments to Equal Pay Act). Several articles have examined the legislative his-
tory surrounding the substitution of the word "equal" for "comparable." See, e.g., Wil-
liams & Bagby, supra note 27, at 209-18; Vladeck, The Equal Pay Act of 1963, in 
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The amended bill was signed by the President on June 10, 
1963,36 and went into effect on June 11, 1964.37 
One year later, on July 2, 1964, Congress enacted Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act. 38 This Act was a broader statute than the 
Equal Pay Act and prohibited the "entire spectrum"39 of dis-
criminatory employment practices, including "discriminat[ion] 
against any individual with respect to his compensation . . . be-
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.""0 Although the original Title VII bill did not include 
"sex" as a protected class, "sex" was added during the last few 
days of the floor debate in the House.41 The Senate accepted the 
amendment, but, at the suggestion of Senator Bennett, added 
the following language: 
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under 
[Title VII] for any employer to differentiate upon the ba-
sis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or com-
pensation paid or to be paid to employees of such em-
PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 381 
(T. Christensen ed. 1966). 
36. 21 CONG. Q. 978 (1963). 
37. Equal Pay Act of 1~63, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 206(d) (1982)). The pertinent part of the Act provides as follows: 
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall 
discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, 
between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such 
establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of 
the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance 
of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed 
under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant 
to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earn-
ings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any 
other factor other than sex. 
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(l) (1982). 
38. Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982)). 
39. E.g., County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 180 (1981). 
40. Civil Rights Act § 703(a)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982). The full text of 
§ 703(a)( 1) reads: 
Id. 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(!) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin .... 
41. A summary of the legislative history relating to the addition of the word "sex" to 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act is set forth in the Supreme Court's decision in Gunther, 
452 U.S. at 171-76. See generally Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimina-
tion and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1971). 
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ployer if such differentiation is authorized by the 
provisions of [the Equal Pay Act].42 
For the first decade following the enactment of these two stat-
utes, all sex-based wage suits were brought under the Equal Pay 
Act. Not only were there procedural advantages to filing under 
the Equal Pay Act,"3 but the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission initially took the position that it would not accept 
any sex-based wage discrimination claims under Title VII unless 
they met "the standards of 'equal pay for equal work' set forth 
in the Equal Pay Act."44 (This restriction was subsequently de-
leted from the Guidelines in 1972.411 ) But the Equal Pay Act, no 
matter how broadly the courts construed the phrase "equal 
work," did not apply to jobs that were dissimilar from any of 
those performed by men. 46 Such jobs had no male counterpart to 
use for comparison in an Equal Pay Act case, even though the 
wage rates were demonstrably lower than they would have been 
if the jobs had been performed by men, as, for example, where 
the employer had a job evaluation plan in effect that rated the 
women's and men's jobs the same. Because the great majority of 
women were employed in female jobs, the Equal Pay Act had 
very little effect on the discriminatory undervaluation of 
women's work:" 
Because of the limited coverage of the Equal Pay Act, women 
began in the mid-1970's to file wage discrimination suits under 
Title VII, alleging disparate treatment in the wage rates estab-
lished for dissimilar male and female jobs. 48 Employers defended 
these suits under the Bennett Amendment, which they con-
strued as confining Title VII's application to sex-based wage 
claims that also met the "equal work" standard of the Equal 
Pay Act. Some courts allowed this defense, and others did not.49 
It was not until 1981, in County of Washington v. Gunther/'0 
42. The so-called Bennett Amendment is in § 703(h) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(h) (1982). 
43. See infra note 167. 
44. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 30 Fed. Reg. 14,926, 14,928 
(1965). 
45. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 37 Fed. Reg. 6835, 6837 
(1972) (currently codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1604 (1986)). 
46. See infra text accompanying notes 132-51; see also infra note 268. 
47. B. BERGMANN, supra note 10, at 186. 
48. Id. at 186-87; Newman & Vonhof, "Separate but Equal"-Job Segregation and 
Pay Equity in the Wake of Gunther, 1981 U. ILL. L. REv. 269; Williams & Bagby, supra 
note 27, at 201. 
49. See supra note 2. 
50. 452 U.S. 161 (1981). 
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that the Supreme Court resolved this conflict by firmly rejecting 
the employers' contentions. According to the Court, the purpose 
of the Bennett Amendment was not to restrict wage discrimina-
tion claims to those actionable under the Equal Pay Act, but to 
incorporate into Title VII the Equal Pay Act's four affirmative 
defenses. 111 
Except for this limited holding, the Court did not set forth 
any guidelines for allowable claims under Title VII. It concluded 
that because the plaintiffs in Gunther claimed that they had di-
rect evidence of intentional disparate treatment,112 it was unnec-
essary to decide "the precise contours of lawsuits challenging sex 
discrimination in compensation under Title VII"113 or to deal 
with the "controversial concept of 'comparable worth.' "11" Since 
. Gunther, the courts have offered little guidance in handling 
wage discrimination claims involving dissimilar jobs. 
The remainder of this Article explores the question of what 
those "precise contours" should be. 
II. THE THEORY OF COMPARABLE WORTH AND ITS LEGAL 
FOUNDATION 
The term "comparable worth" describes a class of wage dis-
crimination claims based on the employer's use of different cri-
teria in establishing the wage rates for male- and female-domi-
nated jobs. Like an equal work suit, a comparable worth claim is 
based on a disparate treatment model of discrimination, except 
that without the Equal Pay Act's presumption of discriminatory 
intent, based on the equal work requirement, a comparable 
worth claim may require somewhat more evidence for a prima 
facie case, and may allocate differently the parties' respective 
burdens of proof. Intent, however, does not have to be estab-
lished by direct evidence, but can be inferred from the em-
ployer's own wage structure; there is no requirement that the 
employer be motivated by a desire to benefit men at the expense 
of women. 
Finally, a defense based on the lower prevailing wage rates for 
women in the marketplace is no more valid in a comparable 
worth suit than it is in an Equal Pay Act suit. The only differ-
51. Id. at 168-80. 
52. Id. at 180-81. 
53. Id. at 181. 
54. Id. at 166. 
18 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 20:1 
ence is that, because a comparable worth suit involves dissimilar 
jobs, the courts will have to distinguish between wage disparities 
based on differences in the prevailing rates for men and women 
workers, which would be illegal,611 and those based on true skill 
shortages or other factors that legitimately result in wage dispar-
ities even among men's jobs, which would be legal. 
A. The Meaning of Comparable Worth 
A major difficulty in discussing the legal status of comparable 
worth, as well as its economic cost and administrative feasibility, 
is that the phrase "comparable worth" is used interchangeably 
to refer to many different concepts. Comparable worth may 
mean (1) a requirement that compensation be proportional to 
the intrinsic worth of the job,56 (2) a pay system under which all 
jobs of equal value are paid the same,57 (3) a procedure that per-
mits the comparison of job content and compensation across job 
families (i.e., work that is dissimilar),58 (4) evidence used in a 
wage discrimination case to demonstrate that the difference in 
wages is due to sex and not to any difference in job value, (5) a 
requirement that female-dominated jobs be paid the same as 
male-dominated jobs of equal value,59 (6) a requirement that the 
wage rates for female-dominated jobs be established using the 
same criteria as are used in establishing the wage rates for male-
dominated jobs, and (7) a requirement that wage disparities 
based on sex (or race) be eliminated.60 
55. This would be illegal under Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 
(1974). 
56. Williams, Comparable Worth: Legal Perspectives and Precedents, in 1 U.S. 
CoMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUE FOR THE 80's 148, 149 (1984). 
57. Scales-Trent, Comparable Worth: Is This a Theory for Black Workers?, 8 
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 51 (1984); see also COMMITTEE ON OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION 
AND ANALYSIS, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES at ix, 2, 69 
(1981) [hereinafter NRC REPORT). 
58. A. COOK, COMPARABLE WORTH: A CASE BOOK OF EXPERIENCES IN STATES AND LO-
CALITIES 1, 10 (1985). 
59. Hartmann, Comparable Worth: Where Do We Go from Here? Research Needs in 
Comparable Worth, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING 173, 174 
(B. Dennis ed. 1984) (Industrial Relations Research Ass'n Series) [hereinafter IRRA 
PROCEEDINGS l. 
60. Marshall & Paulin, The Employment and Earnings of Women: The Comparable 
Worth Debate, in 1 U.S. CoMM'N ON C1v1L RIGHTS, supra note 56, at 196, 206-07; New-
man & Owens, Race- and Sex-Based Wage Discrimination Is Illegal, in 1 U.S. CoMM'N 
ON C1v1L RIGHTS, supra note 56, at 131, 131-32; Statement of Winn Newman, 2 U.S. 
CoMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUE FOR THE 80's 86, 86-87 (1984). 
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The important distinction in these various meanings is be-
tween an equal value concept (items (1), (2), and (5) above), 
under which the employer is required to pay the same wage rate 
for all jobs of equal or comparable value, and a nondiscrimina-
tion concept (items (3), (4), (6), and (7)), under which the em-
ployer is prohibited from using different standards in establish-
ing the rates for male- and female-dominated jobs,61 or from 
otherwise basing wages on sex. Unlike an equal value concept, 
nondiscrimination does not mandate equal wages for work of 
equal value but instead prohibits disparate wage treatment on 
the basis of sex or race. 62 
The legal and moral justifications for these two distinct con-
cepts vary considerably. Most people would probably agree that 
wage discrimination off ends a basic civil liberty and is thus 
properly dealt with by our legal system-as witnessed by the 
widespread support for the Equal Pay Act63 and the nondiscrim-
61. Comparable worth, by requiring an employer to use the same standards in estab-
lishing wage rates for women as for men, falls within the disparate treatment model of 
discrimination, as does the Equal Pay Act. See infra text accompanying notes 124-59. It 
should be noted, however, that an employer who uses the exact same standard in estab-
lishing wage rates for both its men and women employees could still run afoul of Title 
VII if the particular standard selected-such as a head-of-household allowance or a fixed 
percent increase over the employee's prior salary-had a disproportionately adverse im-
pact on women and if the use of that standard could not be justified by any legitimate 
business reason. The Supreme Court has long held in nonpay cases that Title VII pro-
hibits both disparate treatment discrimination and disparate impact discrimination. See, 
e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 
401 U.S. 424 (1971). While some commentators have suggested that wage discrimination 
cannot 'be established under a disparate impact form of analysis, see, e.g., U.S. CoMM'N 
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, COMPARABLE WORTH: AN ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 70, 71 (1985) 
("Findings and Recommendations"); B. ScHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT D1sCRIMI-
NATION LAw 480 (2d ed. 1983); L. LORBER, J. KIRK, S. SAMUELS & D. SPELLMAN, SEX AND 
SALARY: A LEGAL AND PERSONNEL ANALYSIS OF COMPARABLE WORTH 26 (1985), such a con-
struction of Title VII would seem inconsistent both with the purpose and breadth of the 
Act, and with the developing case law. See Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873 (9th 
Cir. 1982); Bryant v, International Schools Servs., 675 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1982); 
Wambheim v. J.C. Penney Co., 642 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1981). 
62. Comparable worth, as a theory of discrimination, can also be used to prove dispa-
rate treatment in the establishment of wage rates for jobs dominated by particular eth-
nic, racial, and/or religious groups. International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers 
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094, 1096-97 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 
967 (1981). While there may be few, if any, occupations that are universally identified 
with any one racial, ethnic, or religious group, such occupations do exist in selected in-
dustries and geographic areas, at least for blacks and Hispanics. See Bazemore v. Friday, 
106 S. Ct. 3000 (1986); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 509-10 (E.D. Va. 
1968). Thus, while the references in this Article are to female-dominated jobs and to sex 
discrimination, the same principles would apply to jobs that are dominated by a racial, 
ethnic, or religious group, and that can be shown to have been undervalued in compari-
son with jobs dominated by whites. 
63. See infra text accompanying note 288. 
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ination in pay provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.64 
By the same token, there are probably very few people who 
would agree that equal pay for work of equal value (without re-
gard to discrimination) is a basic civil liberty-whatever their 
view might be as to the fairness of such a system. Indeed, there 
are a great many compensation systems in both the private and 
public sectors that do not pay all jobs of equal or comparable 
value at the same rate, regardless of whether those jobs are male 
or female. In these systems, male-dominated jobs are paid less 
than other male-dominated jobs even though the work content 
of the jobs might be of "equal" or "comparable" value. For ex-
ample, the average wage for architects is less than the average 
wage for engineers, although the educational and skill require-
ments for the two jobs are very much the same.65 Similar dispar-
ities also exist among female jobs. 66 
The reasons for such disparities could be several: individual 
employers, or society as a whole, may reward certain skills more 
than others (e.g., managerial skills over artistic skills, or techni-
cal skills over administrative skills); wages may be inflated by 
the unionization of specific occupations, or by restrictions on en-
try into particular occupations; or wages may be influenced by 
tradition and custom. Whatever the reason, such disparities are 
commonplace. It is not the wage disparity in jobs of equal value 
that invokes the charge of discrimination; rather, it is the use of 
different standards-i.e., disparate treatment-in establishing 
the wage rates for the male- and female-dominated jobs. 
This distinction between an equal value concept and a theory 
of nondiscrimination is critical, not only because it establishes 
the legal and moral justification for comparable worth, but also 
because it answers three of the more common criticisms directed 
at comparable worth. First, comparable worth does not mandate 
an "equality of results" for employees in male- and female-dom-
inated jobs. Those individuals who make this argument67 suggest 
that comparable worth proponents want to eliminate the earn-
64. Civil Rights Act § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982); see U.S. COMM'N ON 
C1v1L RIGHTS, supra note 61, at 71; Statement of Robert E. Williams, 2 U.S. CoMM'N ON 
C1v1L RIGHTS, supra note 60, at 90, 91. 
65. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, OCCUPATION Bv INDUSTRY, 1980 CENSUS 181, 184, Ta-
ble 2. 
66. See infra text accompanying note 201. 
67. Concurring Statement of Chairman Clarence M. Pendleton, Jr., U.S. CoMM'N ON 
C1v1L RIGHTS, supra note 61, at 73, 74; Statement of June O'Neill, 2 U.S. COMM'N ON 
C1v1L RIGHTS, supra note 60, at 111, 111; Rabkin, Comparable Worth as Civil Rights 
Policy: Potentials for Disaster, in 1 U.S. CoMM'N ON C1v1L RIGHTS, supra note 56, at 187, 
192. 
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ings gap between men and women by compelling employers to 
increase the wage rates for female-dominated jobs even if these 
jobs are less skilled or are located in the more marginal firms or 
industries68-what the chairman of the United States Civil 
Rights Commission calls "reparations for middle-class white 
women" or a "financial quota system."69 
But comparable worth, as defined here, and as used by liti-
gators and legislators, does not seek to raise the wage rates of 
less skilled or less productive female jobs to equal those of 
higher skilled or more productive male jobs, or to ensure that 
women obtain the same economic benefits from a day's labor as 
do men.70 It may be that the high concentration of women in 
less skilled and less productive jobs is the result of discrimina-
tion, but discrimination in employment, not pay.71 Comparable 
68. While pay discrimination substantially contributes to the earnings gap between 
men and women workers, there are other factors that account for a significant part of 
this gap: (1) differences in the human capital characteristics of men and women work-
ers-e.g., differences in types of job skills, total work experience, continuous job tenure, 
etc.; (2) the disproportionate concentration of women in unskilled and less productive 
jobs; and (3) the disproportionate concentration of women in low-paying industries or, 
even when employed in the same industry as men, in the more marginal and lower wage 
firms. 
An excellent discussion of the various factors that may explain some of the earnings 
gap between full-time male and female workers can be found in the papers prepared for 
the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights in 1984. These papers are published in 1 U.S. 
CoMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 56, and include: Goldin, The Earnings Gap in His-
torical Perspective, id. at 3; Beller, Occupational Segregation and the Earnings Gap, id. 
at 23; Polachek, Women in the Economy: Perspectives on Gender Inequality, id. at 34; 
England, Explanations of Job Segregation and the Sex Gap in Pay, id. at 54; and Ber-
ger, Comparable Worth at Odds with American Realities, id. at 65. See also B. BERG-
MANN, supra note 10, at 62-82; NRC REPORT, supra note 57, at 13-41; Weiler, The Wages 
of Sex: The Uses and Limits of Comparable Worth, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1728, 1779-93 
(1986). 
69. Question by Clarence Pendleton, 2 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 60, 
at 119, 127 (Statement of Ray Marshall). 
70. While the proponents of comparable worth do not propose a legal remedy that 
would require marginal firms or industries to match the wage scales of the better paying 
firms or industries, some have proposed legislation to improve the competitive position 
of these firms and industries, for the purpose of improving the conditions of the women 
and minorities who work in these industries. See, e.g., NRC REPORT, supra note 57, at 
107-13 (supplementary statement of Gus Tyler and Mary Dunlap). Such concerns are 
unrelated to any claim of discrimination. 
71. Obviously, this disproportionate concentration of women in lower paying jobs 
and industries and/or firms could be partly the result of discrimination in hiring, job 
assignment, promotion, and access to on-the-job training; it could also be partly the re-
sult of the employee's choice, although that choice may be influenced as much by institu-
tional socialization and the demands of family responsibilities as by personal preference. 
Job discrimination, including discrimination in training opportunities, is prohibited by 
Title VII. Other legislation prohibits discrimination in educational opportunities, Title 
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, § 901(a), 20 U.S.C. § 168l(a) (1982), provides 
counseling to overcome some of the more limiting effects of sex stereotyping socializa-
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worth is only concerned with pay discrimination. So, for exam-
ple, if it were shown that a publishing company had channeled 
women college graduates into clerical jobs and men college grad-
uates into editorial positions, or that a bank had assigned 
women applicants to teller positions and men with equivalent 
education and experience to officer trainee positions, the remedy 
would be to allow women to transfer into the "male" positions, 
not to increase the wage rates for clerical and teller positions to 
equal the wage rates for editorial assistants and officer train-
ees.72 On the other hand, if it were shown that the clerical jobs 
and teller positions were paid less than male-dominated jobs of 
comparable or lesser value, the remedy would be to reassess the 
wage rates for the female-dominated jobs using the same criteria 
as were used in establishing the wage rates for the male-domi-
nated jobs-i.e., equal treatment, not equal results.73 
Second, because comparable worth is based on a theory of dis-
crimination (disparate treatment) and not on some ill-defined 
notion of public justice, it does not attempt to eliminate all wage 
disparities existing within an employing unit, but only those re-
sulting from the application of different standards in establish-
ing the wage rates for female-dominated jobs. Thus, it would not 
affect any differentials existing between male-dominated jobs, 
where certain male-dominated jobs are paid more than others of 
tion, Women's Educational Equity Act of 1978, § 932(a)(l), 20 U.S.C. § 3342(a)(l) (1982 
& Supp. III 1985); Vocational Education Act of 1963, §§ 101(8), 121(g), 133(a)(2), 20 
U.S.C. §§ 2301(8), 2331(g), 2353(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) and attempts to minimize 
the restricting effects of family responsibilities-e.g., laws dealing with day care, preg-
nancy discrimination, and maternity leave, Title XX of the Social Security Act, § 2007, 
42 U.S.C. § 1397f (1982); Job Training Partnership Act of 1982, § 4(24), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1503(24) (1982); Vocational Education Act of 1963, §§ 101(7), 251(a)(19), 20 U.S.C. 
§§ 2301(7), 2341(a)(19) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982); CAL. Gov'T CooE § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980); CONN. GEN. 
STAT.§ 46a-60(a)(7) (1983); MoNT. CODE ANN. §§ 49-2-310 to -311 (1985); see also S. 249, 
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 925, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (proposed Parental 
and Medical Leave Act of 1987); WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE EMPLOY-
MENT OF WOMEN: GENERAL DIAGNOSIS OF DEVELOPMENTS AND ISSUES 17-27 (Apr. 1980) 
(United States Report for OECD High Level Conference on the Employment of 
Women). 
72. Of course, the difference in wages between the male and female jobs might be 
part of a damage award, just as it would be in a failure to hire case. See EEOC v. Ford 
Motor Co., 645 F.2d 183, 190 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 458 U.S. 219 
(1982); see also EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 688 F.2d 951, 952 (4th Cir. 1982); United 
Transp. Union Local No. 974 v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 532 F.2d 336, 341 (4th Cir. 1975), 
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976); OFFICE OF FED. CONTRACT COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, U.S. 
DEP'T OF LABOR, FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE MANUAL §§ 7-50, -50.2, -50.4h, -130 
(1979). But the remedy for employment discrimination would not include a change in the 
wage rates for the less skilled and less productive jobs. 
73. Hartmann, supra note 59, at 174. 
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comparable or equal value. Nor would comparable worth affect 
any disparities existing between female-dominated jobs of equal 
value. Such disparities may be the result of market forces or of 
long-standing custom, or they may just be the result of a ran-
dom wage structure. But they are not the result of prohibited 
disparate treatment. The fact that disparate treatment must be 
based on sex, race, color, religion, or national origin-and not 
just on custom or chance-should satisfy the frequently ex-
pressed concern that comparable worth will open the floodgates 
to large numbers of suits challenging the relative ranking of jobs. 
And finally, because comparable worth is not concerned with 
just any wage disparity, but only those disparities that are the 
result of sex-based wage discrimination, the degree of govern-
ment or judicial intervention into an employer's wage practice 
will be much more limited than the critics suggest. Bureaucrats 
and judges would not, for example, be authorized to determine 
what the fair wage should be for any male-dominated or inte-
grated job.7" These decisions would all be made by the employer. 
Nor would the government or courts be able to alter the ranking 
of these jobs. Comparable worth does not require an employer to 
pay more to those who perform work of greater value, or less to 
those who perform work of lesser value; the employer is free to 
pay all employees the same rate, or to pay different rates for 
work of equal value. The employer can choose to give greater 
monetary weight to artistic or creative skills than to managerial 
skills, or it can give little or no weight to such skills. Similarly, it 
can give greater weight to responsibility than to skill, or, alterna-
tively, greater weight to skill than to responsibility. 711 The only 
requirement of comparable worth is that the employer use the 
74. For this reason, the concern of the Chairman of the U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights, Clarence Pendleton, that comparable worth would "restructure our free enter-
prise system into a state-controlled economy" is totally unfounded. See Concurring 
Statement of Chairman Clarence M. Pendleton, Jr., supra note 67, at 74. 
75. Of course, it is also possible to challenge under Title VII the employer's selection 
of criteria for use in establishing wage rates. For example, an employer's decision to give 
significant wage credit for physical effort, but little or no credit for manual dexterity, 
total caloric output, or interpersonal skills, might reflect an intentional undervaluation of 
job characteristics that are commonly found in the employer's female-dominated jobs 
but not in any of its non-female-dominated jobs. Such cases would not be easy to prove, 
because there is no uniformly accepted ranking of skill, effort, and responsibility factors. 
Nonetheless, Title VII can in an appropriate case prevent a flagrant disregard of material 
job factors that are identified exclusively with female-dominated jobs. Fortunately, the 
male-dominated jobs for a large employer will typically cover the full range of job char-
acteristics, so that the employer cannot exclude or undervalue specific job characteristics 
when establishing the pay rates for male-dominated jobs without also adversely affecting 
the desired ranking for the male-dominated jobs. 
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same standards in establishing the pay rates for female-domi-
nated jobs, and for black and Hispanic jobs, as it uses in estab-
lishing the pay rates for male-dominated and integrated jobs. 
Where it can be shown that the employer has used different 
standards, the doctrine of comparable worth requires that the 
employer adjust the wage rates for the female-dominated jobs so 
that these jobs will occupy the same relative position that they 
would have occupied had they been male-dominated or inte-
grated jobs. 
There are those who argue that the term "comparable worth" 
should be abandoned because it "obfuscat[es] the real issue of 
discrimination."76 I agree that it has had this result. Because the 
concept has been portrayed as one that disregards legitimate 
market forces, and demands results for women that men do not 
have (see, for example, the wage rates of ministers and musi-
cians),77 comparable worth, like affirmative action, has been seen 
by many as "overreaching" on the part of the women's move-
76. Newman, Newell & Kirkman, supra note 6, at 484. 
77. Opponents of comparable worth often refer to the relatively low wages of certain 
male-dominated occupations (state governors or the President of the United States com-
pared to corporate presidents, musicians or ministers compared to skilled craftsmen, and 
surgeons compared to athletes) as exemplifying wage anomalies in the labor market that 
cannot be attributed to sex but that nonetheless ignore the comparability of skill, effort, 
and responsibility with higher paying occupations. Statement of Alvin Bellak, 2 U.S. 
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 60, at 47, 49; U.S. CoMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra 
note 61, at 34; O'Neill & Sider, The Pay Gap and Occupational Segregation: Implica-
tions for Comparable Worth, in IRRA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 59, at 190, 194. 
But comparable worth, as a theory of discrimination, see supra text accompanying 
notes 61-75, does not mandate the establishment of a "fair wage" for each occupation in 
the labor market; it is concerned only with the pay pr_actices of a single employer. The 
disparity between the wages of the President of the United States and the president of 
General Motors is not evidence of any discriminatory pay practices by the United States 
government. The President, consistent with the responsibility of the job, is paid more 
than any other employee in the federal service. Similarly, surgeons, while paid less than 
the highest paid athletes, are paid more than other hospital employees. Nor is it evi-
dence of sex-based pay discrimination that the government pays clerical workers more 
than the average salary of clerical workers in the private sector, see, e.g., Statement of 
Nina Rothchild, 2 U.S. CoMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 60, at 73, 78, but pays the 
chief executive less than the average salary of chief executives in the private sector. This 
kind of pay structure, which is typical of the public sector, simply reflects the difference 
in the wage objectives of a for-profit enterprise, which may seek to maximize the earn-
ings of its entrepreneurs or controlling managers, and a public enterprise, which typically 
does not pay any employee so little that he or she must depend on welfare for subsis-
tence, nor so much that he or she receives more than 8 or 10 times the average salary of 
those taxpayers who support the public payroll. But see Federal Equitable Pay Practices 
Act of 1985: Hearing on H.R. 3008 Before the Subcomm. on Compensation and Em-
ployee Benefits of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 99th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 11 (1985) [hereinafter Equitable Pay Practices Act Hearing] (statement of June 
O'Neill, Director, Women's and Family Policy Div., Urban Inst.), for an opposing point 
of view. 
FALL 1986) Theory, Foundation, and Feasibility 25 
ment, and as an attempt to redistribute income from male to 
female employees. 78 This is not the meaning or intent of the 
term. While it is highly unlikely that we can now change the 
vocabulary, which is deeply ingrained in both the literature and 
case law,79 it is important to define carefully the term to limit its 
application to a disparate treatment analysis that is fully com-
patible with Title VII's traditional definition of discrimination 
and with our own notion of what constitutes a civil liberty justi-
fying government intervention. 
Comparable worth is designed to deal with wage discrimina-
tion, not with some other social objective. It does not seek an 
advantage for women, but the elimination of a wage disadvan-
tage that results solely from sex. While many of the critics of 
comparable worth argue that women should simply take men's 
jobs, they seem to forget that when women did take men's jobs 
they were frequently paid substantially less than their male 
counterparts for no reason other than sex. In other words, their 
reduced wage rates were not the result of occupational choice, 
but of sex. This pernicious form of discrimination was so much 
part of our wage structure and constituted such an accepted em-
ployment practice that it required aggressive legislative inter-
vention at both the federal and state levels,80 and the full moral 
sanction of the nation's legal system,81 before even the most bla-
78. Statement of Jeremy Rabkin, 2 U.S. CoMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 60, at 
115, 117-18. 
79. One reason for the popularity of the term may be its nonpejorative nature. It is 
hard to imagine too many legislatures-or employers-asking a committee or task force 
to conduct a "discrimination" study, with all of its implications for potential back wage 
liability. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1841, 1855 (1986) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring). A "comparable worth" study, on the other hand, that focuses on whether 
there are any sex-based inequities in the classification system, can be viewed as a more 
typical personnel function. On the other hand, the absence of any finding of "discrimina-
tion" may make it more difficult at the time of implementation to persuade a legislature 
or employer to allocate monies for the necessary corrective changes in the classification 
and wage ranges for female-dominated jobs. 
80. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 206(d) (1982)). Prior to the enactment of the Equal Pay Act, 22 states had already 
adopted similar legislation. 1963 Hearings on H.R. 3861, supra note 13, at 39-51. There 
are currently 40 states with specific equal pay legislation; nine of the states without such 
legislation and the District of Columbia have general fair employment practice acts that 
prohibit sex-based pay discrimination. Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 451:101-:104 
(1986). 
81. The impact that a law has in changing public opinion is well illustrated by the 
Equal Pay Act. Although equal pay is now almost uniformly recognized as a fundamental 
civil right, and has been vigorously enforced by the courts, see Ross & McDermott, The 
Equal Pay Act of 1963: A Decade of Enforcement, 16 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 1, 6-17 
(1974), the Act's original enactment was greeted with a good deal of levity, as is illus-
trated by the following excerpt from Wirtz v. Basic Inc., 256 F. Supp. 786 (D. Nev. 1966), 
the first reported decision under the Equal Pay Act: 
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tant forms of pay discrimination-e.g., contracts establishing 
male and female rates for the same job-could be eliminated. 
Despite what this history tells us about systemic wage dis-
crimination against women, we have reached a point where a 
large number of policymakers and academics-if not the public 
at large82----:-believe that the only employment problem for 
women is job access, and not pay.83 Thus, in the 1984 "consulta-
tion on comparable worth," conducted by the United States 
Civil Rights Commission, one of the academic experts, in ques-
tioning whether comparable worth advocates are actually ad-
dressing a genuine problem, stated that he had "not yet seen a 
persuasive demonstration that wage rates based on private bar-
gaining and free competition are, in fact, 'unfair' to women. "8" 
Several other commentators have noted that there is "little di-
rect evidence" that women's jobs are paid less because they are 
performed by women. 8li Even comparable worth's more friendly 
This "foolish" law is now before the Court for interpretation, uninfluenced by 
the rightness or wrongness of the policy considerations which led to its enact-
ment. The case for the plaintiff was presented by a feminine attorney of the 
Department of Labor, resisted by a masculine attorney for the Nevada Bar, and 
considered by a Judge who, for the purposes of this case at least, must be 
sexless, a possibility not apparent when the oath of office was taken and one 
which may bespeak the appointment of older judges. 
Id. at 787. 
82. Public concern for sex-based pay discrimination is evidenced by a number of na-
tional and local polls. A 1985 national survey conducted by Marttila and Kiley, a Boston 
polling firm, found that 69% of U.S. workers think that women are not paid as fairly as 
men; the reason most frequently cited for this disparity was sex discrimination, and 80% 
of those surveyed supported the principle of pay equity. This survey was commissioned 
by the National Committee on Pay Equity and its results were released on February 12, 
1985. NATIONAL COMM. ON PAY EQUITY, A NATIONAL OPINION SURVEY: WORKING WOMEN 
AND PAY DISCRIMINATION (Feb. 1985). Similar results were reported in a subsequently 
released Harris Poll (Aug. 19, 1985), which found that 70';,, of those polled believed that 
women were not paid the same as men for comparable work. THE HARRIS SURVEY, 
WOMEN'S MOVEMENT ON VERGE OF MAJOR COMEBACK (Aug. 1985). A poll conducted by a 
Wisconsin newspaper, the Milwaukee Sentinel, was published on May 3, 1985, and 
found that 80% of those surveyed supported comparable worth for state employees. An 
interesting finding in the Milwaukee Sentinel poll was that 51 % of the corporate chief 
executive officers surveyed also supported comparable worth. A second Wisconsin poll 
was conducted by the St. Norbert College Survey Center, with almost identical results 
(80.5'J,, in favor of comparable worth for state employees). See Milwaukee Sentinel, May 
3, 1985, at 17, col. 3; Green Bay News-Chronicle, Mar. 28, 1985, at A-1, col. 2. Copies of 
these surveys are on file with the Journal of Law Reform. 
83. Concurring Statement of Chairman Clarence M. Pendleton, Jr., supra note 67, at 
74; Killingsworth, Economic Analysis of Comparable Worth and Its Consequences, in 
IRRA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 59, at 183, 188-89. 
84. Rabkin, supra note 67, at 195. 
85. NRC REPORT, supra note 57, at 56; M. RUBENSTEIN, supra note 13, at 4; Hart-
mann & O'Neill, The Comparable Worth Controversy, NEW PERSPECTIVES, Spring 1985, 
at 28, 31 (U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights); Statement of June O'Neill, 2 U.S. CoMM'N ON 
CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 60, at 113. 
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opponents view it not as a mechanism for ending wage discrimi-
nation, but as a mechanism for redistributing income to women 
workers that, however well-intentioned, will result in disemploy-
ment effects for women and a loss of income for the families of 
blue collar male workers.86 
These commonly expressed concerns underscore the impor-
tance of establishing four basic propositions both in the litera-
ture and in a court of law: (1) women have been paid less than 
they would have been paid had they been men; (2) such sex-
based wage discrimination is a separate and distinct problem 
from occupational segregation that cannot be addressed by re-
moving barriers to job access, but that must be specifically at-
tacked as a wage problem; (3) comparable worth will benefit the 
actual victims of wage discrimination; and (4) the cost of elimi-
nating sex-based wage discrimination will not be at the expense 
of minorities or blue collar workers. 
Is there in fact a problem of sex-based wage discrimination? 
Frankly, I find the reservations about the existence of wage dis-
crimination, or, at least, of any direct evidence of discrimination, 
puzzling. Surely, the existence of a dual wage structure prior to 
the Equal Pay Act of 1963 should be direct evidence that 
women's wages were depressed because of sex. In order to deny 
the empirical value of such evidence, one would have to demon-
strate (1) that women were Jess productive than men, and that 
the differences in wage rates, where men and women performed 
the exact same work, were based on differences in productivity; 
(2) that private bargaining and free competition undervalued 
women's work only when they performed work that was typi-
cally performed by men, and not when they performed work 
that was typically performed by women; or (3) that any under-
valuation of women's work that existed prior to 1963 has been· 
corrected. 
1. Evidence of a dual wage structure based on sex- The 
existence and prevalence of sex-based wage discrimination was 
extensively documented in evidence presented at the 1962 and 
1963 legislative hearings on the equal pay bills.87 This evidence 
86. G. JOHNSON & G. SOLON, PAY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WOMEN'S AND MEN'S JOBS: 
THE EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARABLE WORTH LEGISLATION 16 (Institute of Public 
Policy Studies, University of Mich., Discussion Paper No. 205, 1984); Killingsworth, 
supra note 83, at 187-88; Rabkin, supra note 67, at 192, 194; Statement of Brigitte Ber-
ger, 2 U.S. CoMM'N ON C1v1L RIGHTS, supra note 60, at 26, 28; Statement of Jeremy 
Rabkin, supra note 78, at 117-18. 
87. See 1963 Hearings on H.R. 3861, supra note 13, at 10-57 (statement and data 
presented by Esther Peterson, Assistant Secretary of Labor); Equal Pay for Equal Work 
Hearings, supra note 33, at 10-19, 28-35 (statements of Arthur Goldberg, Secretary of 
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demonstrated that it was a common practice to pay women less 
than men for the exact same job in the same establishment. For 
example, one-third of more than 1900 employers surveyed in 
1961 by the National Office Management Association admitted 
that they maintained a "double standard pay scale for male and 
female officeworkers. "88 In another private survey of salary prac-
tices affecting men and women in high-level positions in busi-
ness, industry, and education, seventeen percent of the respon-
dents admitted that they did not always pay women the same as 
men when they worked in the same position.89 The Women's 
Bureau reported on a 1963 review of job hiring orders in public 
employment offices in nine cities, which disclosed that a major-
ity of the job orders specified men or women only, and that, of 
those for either sex, ninety-one specified a lower wage rate for 
women.90 A 1962 survey of employment prospects prepared by 
the Wall Street Journal reported that "[s]tarting salaries for 
women will ... lag by $50 to $100 a month behind offers to men 
for equivalent positions."91 Union officers similarly testified as to 
the presence of sex-based wage practices in industries where 
they had collective bargaining agreements.92 
The prevalence of a dual wage structure based on sex was fur-
ther evidenced by the persistence of male and female rates even 
after the expiration of the Equal Pay Act's delayed effective 
date. The Department of Labor, in a 1966 Report to Congress, 
concluded that "continued aggressive ... enforcement" would 
be necessary to implement the Act's equal pay requirement.93 
Labor, and Esther Peterson, Assistant Secretary of Labor); cf. 1945 Hearings on S. 1178, 
supra note 13, at 9-28 (statements of Frieda Miller, Director, Women's Bureau, Depart-
ment of Labor); id. at 69-82, 100-03, 130-37 (testimony of Al. Philip Kane, General 
Counsel, National Fed'n of Tel. Workers). See also some of the early studies of the 
Women's Bureau documenting dual wage rates for men and women in the federal service 
and in the street car industry. WOMEN'S BUREAU, BULLETIN No. 8, supra note 20, at 7, 21· 
23, 28-36 ("old-time" women's rate for clerical service was at "a figure ... below that 
which any number of [the] men ... [would) accept," id. at 21, and, even after the 1870 
Act, women have continued to accept salaries that are substantially lower than the sala-
ries paid to the men); WoMEN's BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULLETIN No. 11, WOMEN 
STREET CAR CONDUCTORS AND TICKET AGENTS 13 (1921) (noting that women's wages in 
this industry were "not up to the current market price for male labor"). 
88. 1963 Hearings on H.R. 3861, supra note 13, at 16. 
89. Id. at 16-17. 
90. Id. at 13-15. 
91. Id. at 12. 
92. Id. at 113-15 (statement of James Carey, Secretary-Treasurer, Industrial Union 
Dep't, AFL-CIO); id. at 131 (statement of Ben Seligman, Education and Research Direc-
tor, Retail Clerks Int'! Ass'n). 
93. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MINIMUM WAGE AND MAXIMUM HOURS STANDARDS UNDER 
THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 10 (Report to Congress, Jan. 1966). 
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Specifically, the Department found in a study of some 2500 col-
lective bargaining agreements that 800 contained some provi-
sions differentiating between men and women employees, in-
cluding many provisions that at least "suggest discrimination 
strongly enough to warrant and require careful investigation,"94 
that more than 100 contracts explicitly provided different start-
ing rates for men and women, and that fifteen percent included 
provisions for different treatment with respect to pay.911 In addi-
tion, equal pay investigations by the government have disclosed 
violations affecting tens of thousands of employees each year 
and, although not every litigated case was successfully con-
cluded, approximately ninety-five percent of the investigations 
were resolved without litigation, and included increases in the 
wage rates for women, together with back pay.96 As an examina-
tion of the reported cases demonstrates, these violations have 
occurred in every type of business and occupation-further con-
firming the pervasiveness of the dual wage structure. 
Some commentators have suggested that the reason for the 
dual wage structure was that women were less productive. 97 
Nothing in the reported cases, or in the historical information 
concerning the employment of men and women in the United 
States government, supports this claim. Thus, although the 
Equal Pay Act provides a defense for higher rates based on the 
quality or quantity of production,98 not one reported case was 
successfully def ended on this ground. Moreover, the various 
94. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
95. Id. at 11. The Department's figures probably understate the extent to which une-
qual pay rates were contained in the collective bargaining agreements because there 
could have been a number of female jobs that, although titled differently, would be 
found on investigation to be "substantially equal" to higher paid male jobs. See, e.g., 
Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (cabin attendants classified as 
stewardesses (female) and pursers (male)), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); Shultz v. 
Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.) ("selector-packers" (female) and "selector-
packer-stackers" (male)), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970); Hodgson v. Allied Supermar-
kets, 20 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 616 (E.D. Okla. 1972) ("checkers" (female) and 
"checker-stockers" (male)), a/f'd, 22 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 1241 (10th Cir. 1973); 
Hodgson v. Square D Co., 19 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 752 (E.D. Ky. 1970) (class "B" 
machine operators and assemblers (female) and class "A" machine operators and assem-
blers (male)), rev'd on other grounds, 459 F.2d 805 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 967 
(1972). 
96. Ross & McDermott, supra note 81, at 10-11; see Margolin, Equal Pay and Equal 
Employment Opportunities for Women, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 
NINETEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 297, 309-12 (T. Christensen ed. 1967). 
97. See, e.g., Goldin, supra note 68, at 8-16. 
98. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(l)(iii) (1982). Of course, the fact that companies have been 
unable to explain differences in the base rates for male and female workers on the 
grounds of quantity or quality of production does not mean that employers could not 
explain variations for individual workers on those grounds, without regard to sex. 
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studies of women workers in the federal service, including stud-
ies dating back to the 1860's, reported that there were no differ-
ences in the productivity or performance of men and women 
workers in the same job. For example, a production sheet for 
February 1863, maintained by the Dead Letter Office of the Post 
Office Department, showed that the average production rates for 
male and female employees were the same, although the women 
received an annual salary of from $400 to $700, while the men 
received an annual salary of from $600 to $900.99 Similar infor-
mation was obtained from the Jenckes' interrogatories, with 
public officials responding that female clerks are "better 
adapted" to counting currency, notes, and bonds, and "in other 
employments compare favorably" with male clerks;100 that 
women "compare favorably" with men for "diligence, attention, 
and efficiency";101 that "it would take about the same number of 
males to do the work done" by female clerks;102 that females are 
"as diligent and efficient as males";103 that females "make better 
clerks" than males;10• and that women are "superior to the men 
in diligence, attention, and efficiency."105 Again, despite the view 
that women were performing the same work and were equal in 
terms of quality and quantity of production, the women were 
paid only sixty to seventy-five percent as much as the men.106 
2. The effect of a dual wage structure on all female-domi-
nated jobs- Everything we know about the dual wage structure 
for male and female employees, in effect at the time of the 1963 
Equal Pay Act, confirms that this same wage structure affected 
99. U.S. CIVIL SERV. CoMM'N, WOMEN IN THE FEDERAL SERVICE 6 (1938). The Civil 
Service Commission report notes that Congress had set up a separate classification for 
female clerks in 1853 and that women were to be employed in "subordinate" clerical 
work or "temporarily" in the duties of the clerk; in fact, however, female clerks were 
assigned to the same duties as the male clerks, but were paid substantially less. Id. at 4-
10. 
100. JENCKES REPORT, supra note 14, at 19 (response of J.F. Hartley, Assistant Secre-
tary of the Treasury). 
101. Id. at 23 (response of John Wilson, Third Auditor of the Treasury). 
102. Id. at 25 (response of C.M. Walker, Fifth Auditor of the Treasury). 
103. Id. at 30 (response of N.L. Jeffries, Register of the United States Treasury). 
104. Id. at 41 (response of Isaac W. Smith, Assessor of Internal Revenue). 
105. Id. at 41 (response of W.L. Burt, Postmaster). 
106. Id.; U.S. CIVIL SERV. CoMM'N, supra note 99, at 4. Similar examples are noted by 
Barbara Wertheimer, who points out that in 1898, New York City paid male school 
teachers $900 per year and female school teachers $600 per year, and that women who 
were employed as coremakers in the foundries were paid one-half as much as nonunion 
men and one-third as much as union men doing the same work. B. WERTHEIMER, WE 
WERE THERE: THE STORY OF WORKING WOMEN IN AMERICA 210, 246 (1977). Another ex-
ample from Wertheimer is that in 1870 male telephone operators (who were then a ma-
jority of the occupation) were paid $75-$100 per month while female telephone operators 
were paid $30-$50 per month. Id. at 235. 
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all female-dominated jobs and not just those where men and 
women were employed on equal work, either in the same job or 
in two segregated jobs that, although differently labeled, were 
substantially the same. This is so because the basis for the lower 
wages for women in equal work jobs was not any difference in 
the quality or quantity of production, but one of three other fac-
tors, or a combination of the three: (1) the lower prevailing wage 
rate for female unskilled labor; (2) an assumption that women 
are more costly to employ because of greater turnover, increased 
insurance rates, etc.; and (3) a belief that men should be paid 
more than women either because of their family responsibilities 
or simply because men should be paid more. 
As discussed in Part II(C) of this Article,107 wage rates for dif-
ferent jobs are typically set by the employer in relation to the 
unskilled labor rates prevailing in the community. In addition, 
jobs tend to be highly segregated into male and female jobs; in-
deed, prior to the enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 
jobs were frequently limited to one sex.108 Accordingly, when 
rates were set for the female or female-dominated jobs, they 
were set in reference to the unskilled female labor rate, with ap-
propriate increments for additional levels of skill, effort, and re-
sponsibility. The rates for the male or male-dominated jobs were 
established in the same way, using the unskilled male labor rate. 
Because the unskilled wage rate for men is higher than the un-
skilled wage rate for women, the rates for male-dominated jobs 
were proportionately higher than the rates for female-dominated 
jobs at comparable levels of skill, effort, and responsibility. 
This practice, which could have been either explicit or im-
plicit, is graphically illustrated in Corning Glass Works v. Bren-
nan, 109 where the company, in converting its job evaluation 
points for specific jobs into wage rates, used a different multi-
plier for male and female jobs, based on the difference in the 
prevailing wage rates for male and female unskilled labor; the 
resulting wage disparities between the male and female jobs 
were then maintained by periodic across-the-board wage in-
creases. 110 The impact of different unskilled wage rates for men 
and women was also reflected in a 1945 study conducted by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics of occupational wage relationships in 
107. See i11fra text accompanying notes 203, 209, 249-50 & 261-67. 
108. B. BERGMANN, supra note 10, at 67-71, 87-89; Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, 
Job Segregation, and Title ,VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 397, 
402-15 (1979). 
109. 417 U.S. 188 (1974). 
110. See infra note 203. 
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the machinery industries. m Using the average wage of an un-
skilled male occupation (janitor) for its base of 100, the Bureau 
found that the average wage in these industries for semiskilled 
male jobs ranged from 105 to 130, while the average wage for 
semiskilled female jobs ranged from 94 to 125.112 
Another factor that undoubtedly influenced the establishment 
and maintenance of a dual wage structure based on sex was the 
widely held belief that women cost more to employ than men. 
This was the claim made by the Westinghouse Corporation in an 
unsuccessful attempt to justify its practice of reducing wage 
rates for women's jobs by twenty percent because of women's 
"more transient character of ... service ... , the differences in 
environment required, the extra services that must be provided, 
. : . and the general sociological factors not requiring discus-
sion."113 Of course, under today's law, any disparate treatment 
based on group cost experience is banned by both the Equal Pay 
Actm and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 1111 But even without 
this restraint, there has not been a single reported Equal Pay 
Act case where the employer was able to show that the total cost 
of employing women was greater than the total cost of employ-
ing men.118 
The third factor that may explain the early development of a 
dual wage structure based on sex was the perception of the male 
role as that of family breadwinner. This factor was explicitly in-
corporated into the Australian wage-setting process, under 
which the federal and state wage tribunals based their "award" 
rates for male and female jobs on the assumption that men 
would have to support themselves, their wives, and their chil-
dren, whereas women would only have to support themselves.117 
Although no similar policy was ever legally endorsed in the 
111. WAGE STRUCTURE Div., BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, Occu-
PATIONAL WAGE RELATIONSHIPS (1945), reprinted in 1945 Hearings on S. 1178, supra note 
13, at 69. . 
112. 1945 Hearings on S. 1178, supra note 13, at 12-15. 
113. Newman & Vonhof, supra note 48, at 293 (quoting Westinghouse's Industrial 
Relations Manual); see infra note 204. 
114. Wirtz v. Midwest Mfg. Corp., 18 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 556, 560-61 (S.D. Ill. 
1968). 
115. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 
(1978). 
116. In the Midwest Manufacturing and Manhart cases, see supra notes 114-15, the 
employer established only that certain benefits cost more for women, without also show-
ing that these costs were not offset by other reduced costs for women, or by other addi-
tional costs for men. 
117. See i11fra note 205. 
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United States,118 it can be assumed that the belief that women 
worked only to support themselves, or to supplement the family 
income (i.e., "for pin money"), influenced the establishment of 
lower wage rates for women workers in this country as well.119 
The perceived male role unquestionably led to the use of "head 
of household" allowances, 120 and to the practice of paying men 
more than women for equal work. 121 Indeed, there is still sup-
port in this country for the principle of a family wage, as is ap-
parent from the Winter 1986 issue of Human Life Review, which 
cites the "collapse" of a de facto family wage system-under 
which men as heads of households were paid more than 
women-as a major reason for the breakdown of the traditional 
American family. 122 
A variation of this support for a family wage is the notion that 
men should be paid more than women simply because they are 
men. I suspect that this view was not uncommon prior to the 
ll8. See 1945 Hearings on S. 1178, supra note 13, at 5-6, 15-19. 
ll9. See, e.g., id. at 12-19 (statement of Frieda S. Miller, Director, Women's Bu-
reau); 1963 Hearings on H.R. 3861, supra note 13, at 7-11. In support of the Equal Pay 
Act, Representative Donohue stated: "We all realize that the origin of the wage rate 
differential for men and women performing comparable jobs is the false concept that a 
woman, because of her very nature, somehow or other should not be given as much 
money as a man for similar work." 109 CoNG. REC. 9212 (1963). 
120. See EEOC v. Fremont Christian School, 781 F.2d 1362, 1364-65 (9th Cir. 1986); 
Wambheim v. J.C. Penney Co., 642 F.2d 362, 364 (9th Cir. 1981); Lanegan-Grimm v. 
Library Ass'n, 560 F. Supp. 486, 494 (D. Or. 1983); EEOC v. Phosphate Rock Export 
Ass'n, 30 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 11 33,074 (M.D. Fla. 1982); EEOC v. Pacific Press Pub-
lishing Ass'n, 482 F. Supp. 1291, 1294, 1298-99 (N.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd, 676 F.2d 1272, 
1275 (9th Cir. 1981); Marshall v. A&M Consol. Indep. School Dist., 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 
(CCH) 11 7731 (S.D. Tex. 1977). 
121. See EEOC v. Kendon of Dallas, Inc., 34 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 11 34,393 (E.D. 
Tex. 1984); Scott v. Oce Indus., 536 F. Supp. 141, 145 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
122. Carlson, The Family in America, HUM. LIFE REV., Winter 1986, at 79, 81-83, 85. 
This concern for the restoration of the family wage is expressed against a background of 
major change in the wage-earning status of the male head of household. So, for example, 
in 1958, the male head of household was the sole provider in 52% of all husband-wife 
families; in 1986, however, the male head of household was the sole provider in only 25% 
of these families. Telephone conversation with Janet L. Norwood, Commissioner, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (Mar. 23, 1987). Stated differently, 70~,. of all mothers with children 
between the ages of six and 17 are in the labor force, and 62 ~;, of all mothers with chil-
dren under 18 are in the labor force. B. BERGMANN, supra note 10, at 25, Table 2-3. 
Carlson, in discussing these changes, states, "[T]he correlation of cultural and economic 
forces has turned against a family premised on differentiated sex roles, the centrality of 
children, and the preference for maternal care." Carlson, supra, at 88. This data may 
also explain the vigorous opposition to the concept of comparable worth by groups asso-
ciated with the profamily movement. See, e.g., Options for Conducting a Pay Equity 
Study of Federal Pay and Classification Systems: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Compensation and Employee Benefits of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil 
Service, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 453 (1985) (statement of Phyllis Schlafly, President of the 
Eagle Forum, a national profamily organization). 
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enactment of the Equal Pay Act, and, although it no longer con-
stitutes an acceptable basis for an employer's wage policies, 
there are still some employers who admit that they will never 
pay women as much as men. Thus, in one recent case, the em-
ployer told one of his women employees that he would never pay 
"a woman, any damned woman, the same money ... [as] a 
man."12s 
B. Comparable Worth as a Theory of Discrimination 
The "discrimination" claim in both an Equal Pay Act case 
and a comparable worth case is the same-the wage rates paid 
to women, or to predominantly women's jobs, have been de-
pressed because of sex, and if these jobs were performed by men 
or were male-dominated they would be paid more. In essence, 
what the plaintiffs in both these cases claim is that the criteria 
used in establishing the wage rates for the men or for the male-
dominated jobs are not applied equally in establishing the wage 
rates for the women or for the female-dominated jobs. Thus, the 
proper paradigm for analyzing either an Equal Pay Act case or a 
comparable worth claim is disparate treatment. From the per-
spective of wage discrimination theory, therefore, there is no 
reason to accord any special status to an Equal Pay Act case. 
Nonetheless, this special status exists and prominent opponents 
of comparable worth continue to voice strong support for the 
principle of equal pay for equal work while characterizing com-
parable worth as "the looniest idea since Looney Tunes came on 
the screen. "124 
Presumably, one reason for this special status is that when 
Congress enacted the Equal Pay Act of 1963, which prohibited 
employers from "discriminat[ing] on the basis of sex" by paying 
lower wages to women for "equal work,"1211 it specifically rejected 
language that would have extended this protection to "work of 
comparable character."126 Also, there appears to be a common 
123. Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 64 n.2 (5th Cir. 1980). 
124. U.S. Court Upsets Pay Equity Ruling for Women, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1985, at 
A25, cols. 1, 6 (statement of Clarence Pendleton, Chairman, U.S. Comm'n on Civil 
Rights). Both the Commission and Chairman Pendleton have repeatedly emphasized 
their support of the Equal Pay Act. See, e.g., U.S. CoMM'N ON C1v1L RIGHTS, supra note 
61, at 36; Concurring statement of Chairman Clarence M. Pendleton, Jr., supra note 67, 
at 75. 
125. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982). 
126. Equal Pay Act of 1963: Hearings on S. 882 and S. 910 Before the Subcomm. on 
Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1963) 
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misconception that equal work cases do not require the courts or 
others to make any "subjective judgments about the relative 
worth of different jobs or different job functions,,,. 27 and, more-
over, do not involve any substantial disruption to the employer's 
existing wage structure. While there may be more easy cases in-
volving "equal work" than "comparable worth," not all equal 
work cases are easy, and not all comparable worth or propor-
tional value cases are hard. In any event, the complexity of pro-
spective litigation hardly seems an adequate reason for exclud-
ing some cases from the law's protection. 
When one thinks of an equal pay case, one tends to think of 
an employer who employs men and women in the exact same job 
(often working side by side), and who, under the terms of a col-
lective bargaining agreement, pays a lower female rate to women 
and a higher male rate to men. In such a case, the only proof 
that a plaintiff would need to present would be (1) evidence es-
tablishing the existence and payment of a male and female 
rate-e.g., a copy of the contract and of the payroll slips for the 
men and women employees-and (2) testimony of the employees 
demonstrating that their work is exactly the same. 
But very few equal pay cases are ever this simple. Many em-
ployers do not have fixed wage scales for each job, with set in-
crements for seniority, prior experience, and merit. These em-
ployers pay a wide range of rates, often depending on the 
individual demands of each employee. Wage information is fre-
quently confidential, and employees are unaware of what others 
are paid. Such pay systems are commonly used for managerial 
and supervisory jobs, and are also typical for nonsupervisory 
employees in banking, retail, health care, and higher educa-
tion.128 Moreover, in any particular job, there may be some 
women who are paid more than some men, or at least as much as 
some men. 129 
When such a random wage structure exists, the plaintiff who 
asserts a violation of the Equal Pay Act will have to establish (1) 
(quoting S. 882, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963)). This reason hardly seems compelling in 
view of Congress' enactment one year later of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which 
contained a broad' prohibition against any discrimination in compensation because of 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Civil Rights Act § 703(a)(l), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(a)( 1) ( 1982). 
127. Statement of Robert E. Williams, 2 U.S. CoMM'N ON C1v1L RIGHTS, supra note 
60, at 90, 91. 
128. See, e.g., Brennan v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co., 493 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1974); 
Brennan v. City Stores, 479 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1973); Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen. 
Hosp., 436 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1970). 
129. Victoria Bank, 493 F.2d at 902. 
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that her rate is lower than it would have been had she been a 
man, and (2) the extent to which sex has depressed her wage 
rate. In addition, given the random nature of the employer's 
wage structure, it can no longer be presumed that any difference 
in pay is due to sex. There are now other factors that could ex-
plain the differential: (1) differences in the individual character-
istics of each employee, such as prior job experience, years with 
the employer, quality of performance, and previous education 
and training; (2) sheer chance given the randomness of the em-
ployer's pay structure; and (3) some unexplained factor other 
than sex, which is shared by all of the men but by none of the 
women. 
Our simple equal pay case now presents many of the same is-
sues raised by the comparable worth debate; the one distinction, 
at least on the basis of the instant hypothetical, is that none of 
the pay difference between men and women employees could be 
explained by a difference in job content because, by definition, 
all of the jobs are "equal." What the plaintiff can do in this kind 
of case is prepare a regression analysis of the men's and women's 
wages, which is controlled for sex, and for such individual char-
acteristics as prior job experience, years with the employer, 
etc.130 Information concerning these characteristics can be ob-
tained from the employer's personnel files. If the salary line for 
the women employees is the same as it is for the men employees, 
after adjusting for these individual characteristics, the plaintiff 
will be unable to establish the existence of a sex-based wage dis-
parity even if her own wage is unusually low; if, on the other 
hand, there are two salary lines, a higher one for men and a 
lower one for women, the plaintiff will have established the exis-
tence of a sex-based wage disparity even if her particular wage is 
130. Formal regression analyses are not always required. It is often sufficient to sum-
marize in chart form the wage histories, experience, and performance of randomly paid 
workers where such charts will graphically demonstrate the existence of sex-based wage 
disparities between male and female employees who are performing equal work. In such 
cases the district court will simply find an average sex-based wage differential for em-
ployees at each of different experience or performance levels (e.g., those with less than 
one year of experience, those with one to five years of experience, and those with over 
five years of experience) and order as relief that the wages of each female employee be 
increased by the amount of the relevant average differential. See, e.g., City Stores, 479 
F.2d at 242; Marshall v. J.C. Penney Co., 464 F. Supp. 1166, 1181-92 (N.D. Ohio 1979); 
Hodgson v. J.M. Fields, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 731, 734-737 (M.D. Fla. 1971), rev'd in part on 
other grounds sub nom. Brennan v. J.M. Fields, Inc., 488 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. 
denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974); see also Barnett, Comparable Worth and the Equal Pay 
Act-Proving Sex-Based Wage Discrimination Claims After County of Washington v. 
Gunther, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 1669, 1685-86 (1982). 
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relatively high. 131 In this connection, the plaintiff may want to 
introduce the testimony of a statistical expert that the disparity 
between the male and female lines is too substantial, or too con-
sistent, to have been caused by chance. She would not, however, 
be required to negate the existence of some unknown factor that 
might explain the differential, although the employer could of 
course raise some additional explanatory factor as part of his 
defense. 
Moreover, most equal pay suits do not involve men and 
women who work on the exact same job. Even where the pri-
mary duties of both men and women are the same, one or both 
may have additional tasks that the other sex does not perform. 
For example, both men and women may be employed as inspec-
tors on a production line, 132 or as machine operators, 133 but the 
men may spend ten to twenty percent of their time performing 
additional duties, such as routine maintenance work, mechanical 
repairs, or material handling, while the women continue their 
work on the line. Or, although both men and women spend most 
of their time on routine patient care duties, the women may 
work one day a week in the records room on clerical tasks, and 
the men may spend one day a week riding with the ambulance 
driver. 134 In other cases, men and women may wc,rk in jobs that 
have separate job titles, are performed in different locations, and 
involve duties that, although similar in kind-i.e., operating ma-
chinery, assembling parts, conducting tests, supervising employ-
ees, or teaching high school students-are not interchangeable 
and require their own individualized training and experience. 136 
Are the wage differentials that exist between men and women 
in these cases due to sex, or to the differences in their job du-
131. The method for computing an appropriate remedy in this kind of case is dis-
cussed infra text accompanying notes 320-26. It is sufficient to note here that the em-
ployer should not be required to pay the same rate to all employees performing equal 
work, with adjustments for experience, seniority, merit, etc. As in comparable worth, the 
Equal Pay Act does not fix a fair rate for any specific job, nor does it require the em-
ployer to pay all employees engaged in equal work the same; the only requirement is that 
any difference in pay may not be based on sex. Accordingly, the function of an appropri-
ate remedy would be to remove the sex bias and not the randomness of the employer's 
wage structure. 
132. See, e.g., Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974); Shultz v. Whea-
ton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970). 
133. See, e.g., Shultz v. American Can Co.-Dixie Prods., 424 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1970). 
134. See Marshall v. St. John Valley Sec. Home, 560 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1977). 
135. See Hodgson v. Square D Co., 459 F.2d 805, 807 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 
U.S. 967 (1972); Hodgson v. Miller Brewing Co., 457 F.2d 221, 225 n.8 (7th Cir. 1972); 
Hodgson v. Daisy Mfg. Co., 445 F.2d 823 (8th Cir. 1971); see also Usery v. Allegheny 
County Inst. Dist., 544 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946 (1977). 
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ties? This, of course, is the same question that must be an-
swered in a so-called comparable worth or proportional value 
case. And while conceptually it may be easier to answer that 
question where men and women are both performing work that 
has some basic similarity or identity in the underlying job tasks, 
the type of evidence needed to furnish that answer is fundamen-
tally the same. 
The approach developed by the courts in the Equal Pay Act 
cases for determining whether job differences, and not sex, ex-
plain a challenged wage differential is instructive of how the 
courts would approach a comparable worth case, and is fully re-
sponsive to the concerns of those who question the institutional 
competence of the courts to deal with these issues. In the sim-
plest type of equal work case it may be sufficient for the employ-
ees to describe in detail the core tasks performed by both the 
men and the women, as well as the secondary and tertiary tasks 
that are performed by only one sex; to testify as to how much 
training and experience is required for each task, how much ef-
fort is needed, and what the consequence would be of any errors; 
and to state how much time is spent on each of the various job 
tasks. In more difficult cases, the parties, and the courts, may 
want the help of an expert job evaluator who, after observing the 
jobs and interviewing the men and women employees, could tes-
tify as to the relative levels of skill, effort, and responsibility of 
the various job tasks under question, as well as to the similarity 
of working conditions.136 If the skill, effort, and responsibility 
levels of the core tasks and of the secondary and tertiary tasks 
are the same-or "substantially equal"137-the disparity be-
tween the wages of the men and women employees will not have 
been explained by the differences in job duties, and the plaintiff 
would prevail on her equal pay claim. 
But what about a case where the secondary or tertiary duties 
require a greater level of skill, effort, and/or responsibility? Be-
cause the language of the Equal Pay Act-"equal work on jobs 
the performance of which requires equal skill, effort and respon-
sibility"138-has been interpreted as requiring only "substan-
tially" equal skill, effort, and responsibility,139 this fact would 
136. See Square D Co., 459 F.2d at 807-08; Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, 326 
F. Supp. 1264 (D. Del. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 473 F.2d 589 (3d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973). 
137. E.g., Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 
U.S. 905 (1970). 
138. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(l) (1982). 
139. E.g., Wheaton Glass, 421 F.2d at 265; see supra text accompanying note 137. 
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not result in the automatic dismissal of the plaintiff's Equal Pay 
Act claim. 140 Its significance would depend on how much more 
skill, effort, and/or responsibility was required, how often, and 
whether the frequency and degree of increased amounts of skill, 
effort, and/or responsibility were sufficient to justify the higher 
male rate. 
We are now faced with the principal question that concerns 
the critics of comparable worth: Who determines what value, if 
any, should be attributed to specific increments in skill, effort, 
and/or responsibility? The courts' answer, at least in the Equal 
Pay Act cases, is that the employer's own wage structure does. 141 
So, for example, if some of the men in the job under comparison 
do not perform the secondary and tertiary duties, but still re-
ceive the higher male rate, the clear inference is that the higher 
rate is based on sex, and not on the additional duties. Or if em-
ployees in another job category, who perform the secondary du-
ties as their full time job, are paid significantly less than the 
men under comparison, the rate similarly could not be explained 
on the basis of the secondary and tertiary duties. 142 On the other 
hand, if the employer pays higher wages to those men who per-
form the secondary duties as their primary job-e.g., paramedic 
duties performed by the orderly on the one day during the week 
when he rides with the ambulance driver, or machine repairs by 
the production line employee-the pay differential for the male 
employees will be sustained. m 
These principles are well illustrated in a number of Equal Pay 
Act cases. In Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 144 the male glass bot-
tle inspectors (called "selector-packer-stackers") received $2.355 
per hour in contrast to the female glass bottle inspectors (called 
"selector-packers") who received $2.14 per hour. The women 
140. This assumes of course that the difference in duties is not enough to destroy the 
essential similarity of the two jobs-the "equal" work requirement of the Act-which 
requirement must be met in addition to establishing that the men's job and the women's 
job require substantially equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and are performed under 
similar working conditions. 
141. Brennan v. South Davis Community Hosp., 538 F.2d 859 (10th Cir. 1976); Bren-
nan v. Owensboro-Daviess County Hosp., 523 F.2d 1013 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 
.U.S. 973 (1976); Brennan v. Prince William Hosp. Corp., 503 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1974), 
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 972 (1975); Shultz v. American Can Co.-Dixie Prods., 424 F.2d 356 
(8th Cir. 1970); Wheaton Glass, 421 F.2d 259. 
142. See supra note 140; see also Freed & Polsby, Comparable Worth in the Equal 
Pay Act, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1078, 1085-90 (1984); Becker, Comparable Worth in Antidis-
crimination Legislation: A Reply to Freed and Polsby, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1112, 1113-17 
(1984). 
143. See .Marshall v. St. John Valley Sec. Home, 560 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1977). 
144. 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970). 
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spent 100% of their time on the assembly line performing in-
spector duties, while the men spent from ten to eighteen percent 
of their time on various utility tasks that required some addi-
tional amount of physical effort over the lifting and handling 
work required in the inspector job. In finding that the wage dif-
ferential between the male and female inspectors was based on 
sex, and not on any difference in job duties, the court empha-
sized that the men who did the utility work on a full-time basis 
(called "snap-up boys") were paid only $2.16 per hour-19.5 
cents per hour less than the rate paid to male inspectors. 1411 
Moreover, those male inspectors who did little or no utility work 
were also paid the full $2.355 per hour. 146 
Another case was Shultz v. American Can Co., 147 where the 
men and women operated a number of machines used to make 
paper cups; in addition, the men spent from two to seven per-
cent of their time lifting heavy paper rolls and inserting them 
into the machines. There was no question that the men exerted 
significantly greater effort for short periods of time (lifting paper 
rolls weighing several hundred pounds). But an examination of 
the employer's pay system showed that men who spent their en-
tire time performing such heavy work were paid significantly less 
than the machine operators whose primary duties were the same 
as the women's; it also showed that men machine operators who 
did none of the heavier work still received the higher rate.148 On 
the basis of this evidence, the court found that the wage dispar-
ity between the men and women machine operators was based 
on sex.149 
Of course, finding out that these employers placed greater 
weight on skill and responsibility than on effort would not have 
helped any women stenographers who might have been em-
ployed, uo even if they had been paid the same hourly rate as the 
women inspectors and women machine operators-which would 
have indicated that the employer valued the stenographer and 
inspector or machine operator jobs equally, and that their rela-
tive ranking below the lowest paid male (snap-up boy or utility 
worker) was because of sex and not because the employer placed 
greater value on the various job duties involved in the men's 
145. Id. at 261, 263. 
146. Id. at 263-64. 
147. Shultz v. American Can Co.-Dixie Prods., 424 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1970). 
148. Id. at 360-61. 
149. Id. at 360-62. 
150. The example here is purely hypothetical and not based on any reported facts 
about the Wheaton Glass Company or the American Can Company. 
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jobs. It would not have helped because the "equal work" limita-
tion requires a male comparator who is employed in the same 
kind of work. m The work of the male inspectors or male ma-
chine operators would have been too different to permit a com-
parison under the Equal Pay Act. As a result, the women stenog-
raphers would not have been able to protest their pay rates even 
though it had been demonstrated that the employer weighed 
skill and responsibility more highly than effort, and that the em-
ployer had previously valued the female inspector (or machine 
operator) job and the female stenographer job equally, having 
paid them the same. 
Title VII, on the other hand, contains no "equal work" limita-
tion and, if it can be demonstrated that an employer values a 
female job more highly or as highly as one performed by men, 
but pays the female job less, the employee affected should be 
able to establish that her wage rate has been depressed because 
of sex, and not because of any differences in the job content of 
her work. Consider for example the following hypothetical case. 
An employer has prepared a job evaluation plan for his employ-
ees, under which maintenance workers (all male) are awarded 
200 job worth points; production workers (predominantly male), 
250 points; clerical workers (all female), 250 points; industrial 
nurses '(all female), 300 points; auditors (predominantly male), 
300 points; lead foremen (all male), 300 points; and the produc-
tion supervisor (a male), 450 points. At the same time, the em-
ployer announces a new pay schedule under which maintenance 
workers receive $200 per week; production workers, $250 per 
week; clerical workers, $167 per week; industrial nurses, $200 per 
week; auditors, $300 per week; lead foremen, $300 per week; and 
the production supervisor, $450 per week. Under this schedule, 
the jobs that are male or predominantly male are paid $1 for 
every job worth point, whereas jobs that are female are paid 
$0.667 for every job worth point. 
Do we have wage discrimination? Yes. What if we added an-
other female job to our hypothetical, that of the personnel direc-
tor who, with job worth points of 350, is paid $233 per week? 
Does it matter that there is no male job rated at 350 points or, 
in other words, no male comparator-what I call a proportional 
151. As noted in the legislative hearings, the Equal Pay Act would not permit the 
comparison of wages paid to "the clerk-typist or the stenographer in the business office 
and the drill press operator in the shop." 1963 Hearings on H.R. 3861, supra note 13, at 
240 (statement of Rep. O'Hara). 
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value case?1112 Of course not. And, indeed, these hypotheticals 
follow very closely the fact patterns in County of Washington v. 
Gunther1113 and International Union of Electrical, Radio & Ma-
chine Workers v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,m where the Su-
preme Court and the Third Circuit, respectively, ruled that the 
plaintiffs, on the basis of similar allegations, had stated causes of 
action under Title VII and should be permitted to proceed with 
their proof. m Or what about a case where the employer tells a 
woman manager, who is paid less than any of the men who man-
age other departments, that if she had been a man she would 
have been paid $2000 a year more? 1118 Obviously, in a case of this 
type, a job evaluation of the several managerial jobs is unneces-
sary because the employer's own statement has established (1) 
that the woman was paid less because she was a woman and (2) 
152. Another kind of proportional value case would be where the higher paid male 
and the lower paid female perform "equal" work within the meaning of the Equal Pay 
Act, but the man has more seniority, or is required to work a less desirable shift. The 
woman can still establish a violation of the Act if she can demonstrate that only part of 
the wage disparity can be explained by these other factors-as, for example, where the 
employer has a companywide shift differential, or a well-established increment for each 
additional year of seniority, and the pay disparity between the male and female worker 
exceeds these amounts. See, e.g., Brennan v. Owensboro-Daviess County Hosp., 523 F.2d 
1013, 1030-31 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 973 (1976); Herman v. Roosevelt 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 432 F. Supp. 843, 851 (E.D. Mo. 1977), aff'd, 569 F.2d 1033 (8th 
Cir. 1978). 
153. 452 U.S. 161 (1981). In Gunther, the county had conducted an evaluation of the 
female and male prison guard positions, and a survey of wage rates, to determine what 
these positions should· be paid. According to the plaintiffs, the county adhered to the 
results of the survey in setting the wage rates for the male guard positions, but set the 
wage rates for the female guard positions at only 70~;, of the male rates, despite the fact 
that the job evaluation and survey indicated that female guard positions should be paid 
95°;, as much as the male guard positions. 
154. 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 967 (1981). In Westing-
house, the evidence established that prior to the enactment of Title VII, the company 
paid the female labor grades less than the corresponding male labor grades, even though 
the company's own job evaluation plan had rated the male and female jobs in each corre-
sponding grade the same. After Title VII, the company, rather than simply combining 
the five female labor grades with the five corresponding male labor grades and paying 
the same rates, expanded the number of labor grades from nine to thirteen, and placed 
the women's jobs at the bottom of the new scale, in grades one through five, and the old 
male jobs, which had been in male labor grades one through five, in new grades five 
through nine, thus perpetuating the historic wage disparity between the male and female 
jobs. 
155. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 168; Westinghouse, 631 F.2d at 1096-97. What the courts 
did not specifically decide (given the procedural posture of each case) was whether such 
facts, standing alone, could satisfy the "intent" requirement of Title VII. See infra text 
accompanying notes 210-33. 
156. See, e.g., Roesel v. Joliet Wrought Washer Co., 596 F.2d 183 (7th Cir. 1979) 
(comparing the pay and work of a woman manager with the pay and work of another 
woman manager whom the employer had previously admitted had been underpaid by a 
stated amount because of her sex). 
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the precise amount by which her wage rate was devalued be-
cause of her sex. 
Another more or less simple "comparable worth" case would 
be where the male and female jobs in question are closely similar 
although not equal. An example of such a case is Briggs u. City 
of Madison, 1117 where the city's public health nurses (all female) 
claimed that the difference between their salary and the salary 
of the health sanitarians (all male) was based on sex and not on 
any difference in job content. The jobs were not "equal" because 
the basic function of the health sanitarian was to use his knowl-
edge of science and disease to identify health hazards in public 
places, whereas the function of the public health nurse was to 
use her knowledge of science and disease to care for those who 
were ill, and to counsel members of the community in preventive 
health care. But the training and educational requirements for 
the two jobs were almost the same, and both involved similar 
degrees of responsibility; moreover, both the nurses and the in-
spectors regularly drove to several locations each day where they 
carried out their duties. The court held that the jobs were so 
similar in terms of skill, effort, responsibility, and working con-
ditions that the disparity in wages between the female nurses 
and male inspectors raised a prima facie case of disparate treat-
ment discrimination. 1118 
As we move away from these easy examples of disparate treat-
ment and attempt to show sex-based wage discrimination in the 
rates paid to female-dominated jobs by an employer who does 
not have a formal job evaluation plan, or who does not have a 
single plan covering both predominantly male and predomi-
nantly female jobs, we face additional problems of proof, but we 
do not in any way alter our theory of discrimination. That the-
ory remains the same: the employer is using different standards 
in establishing the wage rates for women or for women's jobs 
than it uses in establishing the wage rates for men or for men's 
jobs. 
157. 536 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Wis. 1982). 
158. Id. at 445. The court subsequently found that the city had articulated a legiti-
mate nondiscriminatory reason for the differential-based on the need to compete with 
the state for an inadequate number of health inspectors-which warranted the higher 
rate, and that the plaintiffs had failed to rebut that showing. Id. at 447-49. 
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C. Comparable Worth Under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act 
Although both the equal work and the comparable worth cases 
are based on a claim of disparate treatment, there are material 
differences in the way that these two types of cases are tried. An 
equal work case, if it involves sex-based wage disparities, would 
typically be tried under the Equal Pay Act. 1119 Unlike Title VII, 
the Equal Pay Act establishes a presumption of discrimination 
once the plaintiff has shown that (1) a man and a woman are 
employed in "equal work" (2) in the same establishment, and 
that (3) the woman is paid less. 160 The effect of this presumption 
is two-fold: first, it relieves the plaintiff of having to show dis-
criminatory intent; and second, it shifts to the employer the bur-
den of proving that the wage disparity is not due to sex,161 but to 
some "other factor other than sex."162 
A comparable worth case, or an equal work case involving 
wage disparities based on race, color, religion, or national origin, 
would be tried under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 163 Be-
cause Title VII creates no presumptions for wage discrimination, 
the plaintiff would have to establish the requisite "intent" to 
discriminate. A number of commentators have mistakenly as-
sumed that this intent requirement can only be established by 
some showing of malice or prejudice, or at least by a showing of 
a conscious decision to depress certain wage rates because of sex 
or race. In fact, Title VII does not require the plaintiff to 
unearth evidence of overt discrimination; it is enough to show 
that there is disparate treatment based on sex or race, and suffi-
cient circumstances from which "intent" can be inferred. 164 
159. See supra note 80. 
160. Of course, an employer could also challenge the plaintiff's prima facie case, con-
tending either that the jobs are not equal, are not performed under similar working con-
ditions, are performed in different establishments, or the women are not paid less than 
the men. If the employer simply contests the prima facie case, the burden of persuasion 
remains with the plaintiff. But if the employer attempts to justify the wage differential 
on some other ground, the burden of proof, including both the burden of production and 
of persuasion, shifts to the employer. 
161. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196-97 (1974); see also infra 
note 165. 
162. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(l) (1982). 
163. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982). 
164. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Segar v. Smith, 
738 F.2d 1249, 1265-66 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985); see also 
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). 
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In other words, the principal effect of the "intent" require-
ment is on the quantum of evidence required to establish a 
prima facie case. If the plaintiff has evidence of overt discrimi-
nation, very little other evidence need be introduced. On the 
other hand, if the plaintiff has no direct evidence of discrimina-
tion, he or she will have to make a stronger showing to establish 
a prima facie case based on circumstantial evidence. The "in-
tent" requirement in Title VII thus results in two differences 
from the Equal Pay Act litigation: (1) the plaintiff will, in cer-
tain types of cases, have to introduce considerably more evi-
dence to establish a prima facie case; and (2) where such a case 
has been established, the plaintiff will nonetheless retain the 
burden of persuasion if the employer asserts a nondiscrimina-
tory reason for the wage differential. 165 
The effect of the "intent" requirement on the plaintiff's prima 
facie case can be seen by examining a variety of different fact 
situations. For example, take an equal work case involving black 
employees, in which the plaintiffs establish that the blacks, al-
though employed under a different job title, perform work that 
is substantially equal in job content to work performed by white 
employees, and that the black employees are paid substantially 
less. While "intent" is required for Title VII, it seems clear from 
165. Because the Equal Pay Act creates a presumption that any pay differential be-
tween men and women performing equal work is discriminatory, an employer who dis-
putes the plaintiff's claim, not on grounds that the work is unequal, but on grounds that 
the differential is based on a factor other than sex, assumes both the burden of persua-
sion and production. This is so because the presumption of discrimination converts the 
employer's attempt to explain the disparate payment into an affirmative defense. See 
Corning Glass, 417 U.S. at 196-97; Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimi-
nation Cases: Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1250-52 
(1981). In a Title VII case, however, there is no presumption of discrimination. As a 
result, the employer's assertion of a nondiscriminatory explanation attacks the adequacy 
of the plaintiffs prima facie case; it is not an affirmative defense, and the burden of 
persuasion therefore stays with the plaintiff. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-56. 
While there is some language in County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 
(1981), that might suggest that the effect of the Bennett Amendment is to incorporate 
the Equal Pay Act's allocation of the burdens of proof into all Title VII sex-based wage 
cases, id. at 170-71, it is far more likely that the Court intended the burden of persuasion 
to shift to the employer only in those Title VII cases where the jobs were "equal" within 
the meaning of the Equal Pay Act. See, e.g., Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 875 
(9th Cir. 1982); Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435, 443-46 (W.D. Wis. 1982). 
But cf. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1329-32 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (find-
ing that the Bennett Amendment does not incorporate the Equal Pay Act analysis re-
garding the burden of proof into Title VII). Any other construction of the Bennett 
Amendment would mean that the allocations of the burden of proof would vary in a 
Title VII wage discrimination case depending upon whether the alleged discrimination 
was based on sex, or on race, color, religion, or national origin. It would seem quite obvi-
ous that Congress did not intend the Bennett Amendment to have any such effect. For 
the text of the Bennett Amendment, see supra text accompanying note 42. 
46 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 20:1 
the case law that a court would find that the black employees 
had made out a prima f acie case on the basis of these facts. 166 -
There would be no need for the plaintiffs to introduce any evi-
dence of employer malice, such as a statement by the employer 
that he would never pay blacks as much as whites, or a written 
instruction directing the reduction of wage rates of black em-
ployees by twenty percent because of their increased absentee-
ism rate, or because of a belief that blacks lack a proper work 
ethic. It is enough that the employer pays blacks less than 
whites for equal work. It is inconceivable that the courts would 
require more evidence in an unequal pay for equal work case 
simply because the blacks must file suit under Title VII whereas 
the women can file suit under the Equal Pay Act.167 Indeed, any 
suggestion that the black plaintiffs would have to show more 
than the equality of work and the disparity in pay is totally in-
consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. u. Green, 168 which held that a black plaintiff had 
made out a prima facie case of a discriminatory refusal to hire 
when he established that he had applied for the job, that he was 
qualified, and that he was rejected for the job, which was then 
left open until a white was subsequently hired. 
In both these cases-where the employer pays blacks less than 
whites for equal work, and where the employer refuses to hire a 
qualified black for an advertised job vacancy-it is reasonable to 
assume, absent some showing to the contrary, that the em-
ployer's behavior was motivated (even unconsciously) by race. 
For the same reason, the presumption created by the Equal Pay 
Act is entirely rational, and consistent with responsible legisla-
tive action. But how good would such a presumption or infer-
ence be if the claim of wage discrimination was based on the fact 
that the women were paid less than the men when employed in 
dissimilar jobs, or that four applicants with equivalent qualifica-
tions (one black and three whites) applied for a vacant job at the 
same time, and one of the whites was selected? Obviously, in 
these cases, more evidence is needed before any inference of a 
discriminatory intent can be made. 
166. See Bazemore v. Friday, 106 S. Ct. 3000, 3006-08 (1986); EEOC v. Inland 
Marine Indus., 729 F.2d 1229, 1230-31, 1234-36 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855 
(1984); Pittman v. Hattiesburg Mun. Separate School Dist., 644 F.2d 1071, 1074-76 (5th. 
Cir. Unit A May 1981). 
167. There are some procedural hurdles that must be met before suit can be filed 
under Title VII-deferral to any state fair employment agency, a prior notice to the 
EEOC, and the receipt of a right-to-sue letter-but these additional requirements do not 
in any way diminish the basic substantive protection against wage discrimination. 
168. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
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When women are paid less than men for equal or similar work 
the most obvious explanation for the difference is sex. But when 
women are paid less than men for dissimilar work there are 
other possible explanations that must be examined. One expla-
nation for the lower pay could be that the women are employed 
in less skilled or less productive jobs. The fact that these jobs 
are dominated by women, and that the more skilled or more 
productive jobs are dominated by men-particularly if combined 
with evidence that the women had the same qualifications as the 
men when first hired and were assigned to the lower paying 
jobs-may be very good evidence of discrimination in job assign-
ment. But it is not very good evidence of wage discrimination. 
There needs to be some evidence from which to infer that sex, 
and not the difference in job content, is the basis for the wage 
differential. This other evidence, in the most simple application 
of a comparable worth theory, would be testimony from the em-
ployees or from a job evaluation expert that the female-domi-
nated jobs are comparable in skill, effort, and responsibility to 
the male-dominated jobs. The difficulty with this evidence is 
that it fails to focus on the employer's disparate treatment be-
cause it only substantiates that this particular expert would 
value the jobs the same; it does not explain anything about the 
employer's standards. Evidence of how a third-party expert 
would value the female-dominated jobs is difficult to fit into a 
disparate treatment framework. But if job evaluation can be 
used, not to express the value system of a third party, but to 
expose the employer's own pay criteria, and to demonstrate that 
the employer has failed to apply the same criteria in establishing 
the pay rates for the female-dominated jobs, it will constitute 
very substantial evidence of discrimination. 
This distinction between the kind of evidence needed for an 
equal work case and for a Title VII disparate treatment case is 
reminiscent of a similar distinction recognized by the National 
War Labor Board in administering wage controls during World 
War 11.169 Typically, the Board granted wage increments if it 
were shown that such increments were necessary to eliminate 
sex-based wage differentials. 170 In deciding these cases, the 
169. The National War Labor Board was established in 1942 to administer the wage 
stabilization program imposed during World War II to minimize increases in wage rates. 
The guiding principle for the wage stabilization program was to maintain wages at the 
existing scale, except that wage increments could be awarded to eliminate "inequalities" 
and substandard living conditions. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT 
781-91 (H. Stein ed. 1952); see also supra text accompanying notes 25-28. 
170. In re General Elec. Co., 28 War Lab. Rep. (BNA) 666, 667 (1945). 
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Board carefully distinguished between two categories of cases: 
(1) "equal pay for equal work" cases where women worked 
"within the same occupations" as the men, either interchange-
ably or as replacements for men, 171 or where "women were per-
forming work of 'comparable quality and quantity' to work per-
formed by men on 'similar operations,' "172 and (2) "intra-plant 
inequality" cases where women did not work within the same or 
similar jobs or occupations as the men, but where "there may be 
a dispute over [the] correctness of [the job's] wage rate in rela-
tion to rates for other jobs in the same plant."173 
In the first category-"equal pay for equal work"-the mere 
existence of a wage differential established the discrimination.174 
But in the second category, the Board "presumed" that the rates 
for the women's jobs were correct in relation to the rates for the 
men's jobs, although "[this] presumption [could] be overcome by 
affirmative evidence of the existence of an intra-plant inequity 
derived from a comparison of the content of the jobs in question 
with the content of the jobs performed by men."1711 In other 
words, once it was established that women worked in the same 
jobs as men for lower wages, discrimination was presumed. But 
where women worked in different jobs, the Board asked the 
same question that the courts must ask in a Title VII case: If 
women were rated by the same standards as those used for men, 
where would they rank in the general wage schedule? If they 
would rank higher, their wage rates were adjusted upward to 
correct for the existing sex discrimination.176 
Although some critics have questioned the technical compe-
tence of the courts to decide discrimination claims involving dis-
similar jobs, it is clear that standard job evaluation and statisti-
cal regression techniques can be used to identify the criteria 
employed in establishing the pay rates for male-dominated and 
integrated jobs and, in addition, to determine whether the same 
criteria were applied in establishing the pay rates for female-
dominated jobs. In other words, by using these techniques, any 
final determination of discrimination is based on the employer's 
own value system and not on the court's or a third party 
expert's. 
/ 171. Id. at 668. 
1_72. Id. 
I? ~73. Id. at 669. 
174. Id. at 677. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. at 692. 
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Before examining how job evaluation can be used to demon-
strate disparate treatment, it is helpful to have some basic un-
derstanding of the job evaluation process. Job evaluation is a 
procedure that is used to rank groups of jobs on the basis of a 
common set of job factors. 177 These job factors describe the ge-
neric characteristics or dimensions of the work being compared. 
Although the actual factors used in any particular job evaluation 
may differ somewhat depending on the industry and the range 
of jobs being compared, and on the person or firm doing the 
evaluation, they will typically include some variant of skill, ef-
fort, responsibility, and working conditions.178 In the recently 
completed Wisconsin pay equity study, for example, the factors 
selected were: knowledge required, consequence of error, effect 
of action, job complexity, amount of discretion, contacts, 
hazards, time demands, physical effort, surroundings, personal 
authority, and personnel supervised. The first ten factors were 
common to all jobs; the last two were only used to measure su-
pervisory and managerial jobs.179 
Once the job factors have been selected, they are divided into 
a number of levels, with each level representing increased de-
grees of worth. The job evaluation instrument usually defines 
each of these factor levels, and often includes detailed guide lan-
guage identifying the factor level for particular occupations. 
Thus, in the Wisconsin study, the definition for "knowledge re-
quired, level 1" was "[l]anguage skills sufficient to follow oral 
instructions" and "[s]kills necessary to perform simple manual 
tasks or operate simple types of equipment in repetitive opera-
tions."180 The guide language for this level included the follow-
ing: "Performs general maintenance and custodial work. Loads 
and unloads and moves furniture and similar items."181 The def-
inition for "knowledge required, level 9" was "[m]astery of a 
field of work or study and sufficient comprehension to perform 
authoritative work in conceiving and implementing programs, or 
advancing new hypotheses or theories," and the guide language 
177. NRC REPORT, supra note 57, at 71;_0. TREIMAN, supra note 11, at 1. While job 
evaluations were not commonly used in the private sector until the 1940's, they were 
used by the United States Civil Service Commission prior to the turn of the 20th cen-
tury. Id. at 1, 17. It is now estimated that 75% of all major employers use a job evalua-
tion system. See COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S., supra note 5, at 26; NRC REPORT, supra 
note 57, at 71; D. TREIMAN, supra note 11, at 49-50. 
178. NRC REPORT. supra note 57, at 1; D. TREIMAN, supra note 11, at 6, 32. 
179. REPORT OF WISCONSIN'S TASK FORCE ON COMPARABLE WORTH 34, 179 (Jan. 1986) 
[hereinafter WISCONSIN TASK FORCE REPORT]. 
180. Id. at 196. 
181. Id. 
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included, as one example, "[p]hysicians responsible for perform-
ing highly specialized procedures or work requiring Board 
certification. "182 
The next step is to establish weights for each factor because 
not every factor contributes equally to the establishment of wage 
rates. 183 Some factors will be more valued than others, and this 
will vary from industry to industry. m It would, however, be 
fairly typical for increased levels of skill to receive greater mone-
tary recognition than increased levels of effort. Indeed, some in-
direct weighting occurs even in the selection of job factors and in 
the design of the levels for each factor, because factors with 
more subfactors, or with more levels, will generally receive more 
total points.1811 It is also at this point that appropriate distinc-
tions can be made between verbal and scientific skills. Thus, if 
scientific skills are valued more highly than artistic or manage-
rial skills, these skills will be assigned to higher levels in each of 
the relevant factors. 
The final step in the job evaluation process is to analyze the 
employer's jobs in terms of the selected factors, and to decide 
which factor level accurately describes each job. 186 This analysis 
is performed by the job evaluator, or personnel director, or by a 
job evaluation committee. 187 Information on the various jobs can 
be obtained through a variety of means, including position de-
182. Id. at 204. 
183. D. TREIMAN, supra note 11, at 6-7; WISCONSIN TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 
179, at 34, 48. 
184. NRC REPORT, supra note 57, at 73-74; D. TREIMAN, supra note 11, at 13-15. 
185. For example, in the Wisconsin study there were two factors associated with 
skill-knowledge required and job complexity-and only one factor associated with 
physical effort. Moreover, there were 10 levels for knowledge required and seven levels 
for job complexity, but only five levels for physical effort, which would mean that, even 
without any weights, skill would be three times more important than effort in establish-
ing the relative job rankings. See WISCONSIN TASK FoRCE REPORT, supra note 179, at 196-
210, 222-24. 
186. D. TREIMAN, supra note 11, at 1; WISCONSIN TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 
179, at 35, 41-44. 
187. It is not uncommon to use pay evaluation committees composed of labor and 
management employees for this stage of the evaluation process. As recognized in the 
Comptroller General's Report, their involvement can be important to the accurate evalu-
ation of the jobs. COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S., supra note 5, at 29. The Wisconsin 
study used three job evaluation committees, composed of six voting members and one 
nonvoting member. The voting members included two employees, two supervisors, a clas-
sification expert, and a union representative. The nonvoting member was an equal op-
portunity specialist. The individuals for these committees were selected from names rec-
ommended by both management and labor. The committees were trained in the job 
evaluation system by the consulting firm that had designed it, and representatives from 
that firm were available to assist the committees with their determinations. WISCONSIN 
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 179, at 41-45. 
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scriptions, written questionnaires, job interviews, and/or actual 
on-site inspections. The point total for each factor is multiplied 
by the applicable factor weight, after which the total points for 
each job would be recorded, and the jobs ranked in accordance 
with their point totals. 188 
If the job evaluation has been conducted by an employer for 
the purpose of establishing a uniform pay policy, there may need 
to be changes in the existing wage structure that would affect 
male-dominated jobs, integrated jobs, and female-dominated 
jobs. If, on the other hand, the sole purpose of the evaluation is 
to identify any disparities based on sex, the employer will not 
need to be concerned with the existence of varying wage rates 
for jobs of equal value, so long as those variations are not based 
on sex. To make that determination, the employer would typi-
cally plot the wage rates for male- and female-dominated jobs at 
each point level, and draw a line of best fit (using regression pro-
cedures) for the salaries paid to the male-dominated jobs and 
integrated jobs, and a line of best fit for the salaries paid to the 
female-dominated jobs. If the two salary lines overlap, there 
would not be any evidence of a sex bias. If, on the other hand, 
the two lines are separate and distinct, there is substantial evi-
dence that the existing pay structure is tainted by sex.189 
As is clear from this description, there are several points at 
which inaccuracies and individual biases could affect the validity 
of the job evaluation process: (1) relevant job factors could be 
omitted; (2) jobs could be inaccurately described; (3) jobs could 
be assigned to the wrong factor level; and ( 4) the selection of 
factor levels and weights might vary substantially from the em-
ployer's own determination of value, and thus falsely indicate a 
188. NRC REPORT, supra note 57, at 71; D. TREIMAN, supra note 11, at 1, 3-4; W1s-
CONSIN TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 179, at 35. 
189. See, e.g., COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S., supra note 5, at 45-46; WISCONSIN 
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 179, at 52-54. A typical pattern of the scatter diagram in 
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bias based on sex where no such bias exists. Item (2) should not 
be cause for any real concern. While it is certainly true that 
there can be inaccurate job descriptions, the legal system is well 
suited to resolving issues of this kind; courts can easily assess 
the accuracy of individual job descriptions through an examina-
tion of the employees and their supervisors, or through an actual 
visual inspection of the work in question. 
The other three items present more fundamental concerns and 
raise again the question of how value is to be determined and by 
whom. Standard job evaluation practices recognize two principal 
methods for selecting job factors and for developing factor levels 
and weights. One is the a priori method under which some-
one-job evaluator, consultant, expert, or employer-selects a 
set of factors and factor weights that reflect that person's con-
ception as to what factors should be remunerated and by how 
much. The second is the policy capturing method; this method 
uses the employer's current pay structure to determine, through 
multiple regression analysis, which factors will predict existing 
wage rates, and how much each factor contributes to explaining 
those rates. 190 
The only problem with this second method is that, without 
some adjustment, it would replicate any existing sex bias. There-
fore, to eliminate any such bias, the multiple regression analysis 
is used to relate factors only to those jobs that are either male-
dominated or integrated.191 Moreover, to avoid similar problems 
in defining each factor level, the definitions and guides are also 
based on examples of male-dominated jobs and integrated 
jobs.192 The "worth" of the female-dominated jobs is then deter-
mined by applying the same factors and factor-weights to the 
job content information collected for each of the female-domi-
nated jobs. 
Individuals on both sides of the comparable worth debate 
have expressed concern over this phase of the job evaluation 
process. 193 Those who support comparable worth believe that the 
selection of factor levels for each of the female-dominated jobs 
can be tainted by bias; those who oppose comparable worth ar-
gue that the selection of these factors is inherently subjective 
and therefore cannot serve as a reliable basis for pay deci-
190. WISCONSIN TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 179, at 51-54. 
191. Id. at 48; NRC REPORT, supra note 57, at 72, 80, 82-88; D. TREIMAN, supra note 
11, at 7, 25, 31. 
192. WISCONSIN TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 179, at 36. 
193. NRC REPORT, supra note 57, at 81, 88. 
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sions. 18" In fact, however, the assignment of factor levels to each 
individual job can be performed with a high degree of reliability, 
as had been demonstrated in a number of comparable worth 
studies.186 
For purposes of Title VII litigation, the advantage of the pol-
icy capturing method-at least in establishing pay rates for the 
male-dominated and integrated jobs-is that it is not based on 
some third person's notion of what would be a fair value for the 
different job factors, but on the employer's own determination of 
what should be paid for each job characteristic. In other words, 
the policy capturing method simply makes explicit what are al-
ready the employer's implicit criteria for establishing the wage 
rates for non-female-dominated jobs. 
194. M. GOLD, A DIALOGUE ON COMPARABLE WORTH 58-63 (1983); NRC REPORT, supra 
note 57, at 75-77; M. RUBENSTEIN, supra note 13, at 97-98; D. TREIMAN, supra note 11, at 
32-33, 48. 
195. In the Wisconsin study, for example, the factor level assignments were made by 
three job evaluation committees composed of two employees, two supervisors, a classifi-
cations expert, and a union representative. The committees were also assisted by an 
outside job evaluation expert and by an equal opportunities specialist. There were two 
ways in which the reliability of the committees' work was tested. In the pilot study, the 
jobs to be evaluated were divided among the three committees, but 33 jobs were inde-
pendently evaluated by all three committees and the results cross-checked. The different 
committees arrived at the same conclusions in applying the 12 factors on the average of 
95~,. of the time; within this overall reliability rating, however, there were three factors 
that were applied significantly less consistently: "stress," which had an overall reliability 
rating of only 72.5~,., and even lower reliability ratings-from 40% to 69%-for the 
male-dominated and integrated or balanced jobs; "physical effort," which, while it had 
an 89~,. reliability rating for male-dominated jobs and 95% reliability rating for bal-
anced jobs, had only a 31 ~;. reliability rating for female-dominated jobs; and "surround-
ings," which had an overall reliability rating of 82%, but only a 62% reliability rating for 
female-dominated jobs. See PRELIMINARY REPORT OF W1scONSIN's TASK FoRCE ON COMPA-
RABLE WORTH 16-17 (Dec. 14, 1984). 
As a result of these findings, the definitions and guidelines for several of the factors 
were revised and clarified prior to the final study. The factor of stress was replaced with 
the factor of "time demands," which more accurately defined the job information being 
sought, and the questionnaire was changed to use limited-choice questions, as opposed to 
open-ended questions, so as to enhance their ability to elicit precise, valid, and consis-
tent job information for six factors-contacts, hazards, time demands, surroundings, per-
sonnel authority, and personnel supervised. The revised definitions and new question-
naires were then field tested for reliability. Moreover, in the final study, each evaluation 
committee, instead of rating one-third of the jobs for all of the factors, rated all of the 
jobs for only two factors; in addition, each evaluation team member determined the 
proper factor levels independently of the other committee members. When the results of 
the committee members were compared, they had arrived at the same conclusions in 
applying the "knowledge required" factor 96% of the time, "job complexity" 94% of the 
time, "amount of discretion" 93~,, of the time, and "effect of action" 92% of the time. 
The other factors, "consequence of error (A)," "consequence of error (B)," and "physical 
effort," had reliability ratings of 81 ~;., 82~,,, and 86%, respectively. WISCONSIN TASK 
FORCE REPORT, supra note 179, at 34-46. 
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While the a priori method may be entirely appropriate when 
it is the employer who wishes to use it, the policy capturing ap-
proach is otherwise preferable for Title VII analysis. It identifies 
the criteria that are currently being used by the employer in es-
tablishing pay rates for the male-dominated and integrated jobs, 
and thus enables the court to determine whether these same cri-
teria are being consistently applied to female-dominated jobs. As 
a result, any final determination of sex-based wage disparities is 
based on the employer's own criteria and not on the court's. And 
finally, such an approach leaves in place the relative wage rank-
ings for male-dominated and integrated jobs, just as it does for 
female-dominated jobs. Male jobs that were paid more than 
other male jobs will continue to be paid more (whatever a third 
person might think), and female jobs that were paid more than 
other female jobs will likewise continue to be paid more, al-
though the female jobs as a group will receive higher wages as 
the result of the elimination of the sex-based wage disparity. 
Those who question the value of this kind of evidence make 
four arguments: (1) Title VII does not require employers to pay 
their employees in accordance with the comparable worth of 
their various jobs; (2) the resulting differential between the wage 
rates for male-dominated/integrated jobs and female-dominated 
jobs-what they refer to as the "unexplained" differential-may 
be based on something other than sex;196 (3) the regression anal-
ysis does not provide any evidence of direct discrimination, but 
only evidence of indirect discrimination, which is not the result 
of any employer practice, but of well-entrenched social customs 
that have resulted in the uniformly low ranking of female-domi-
nated jobs; and (4) the regression analysis disregards the mar-
ketplace, which is the only objective basis for establishing wage 
rates and which must be followed to avoid severe dislocations in 
the labor market and for employers. 
1. The requirement of comparable worth- There is abso-
lutely nothing in the foregoing disparate treatment analysis that 
requires employers to pay employees in accordance with the 
comparable worth of their jobs, or to pay every two jobs of equal 
value the same. 197 Although most employers increase the wage 
196. U.S. CoMM'N ON C1v1L RIGHTS, supra note 61, at 34, 36, 70; O'Neill, An Argu-
ment Against Comparable Worth, in 1 U.S. CoMM'N ON C1v1L RIGHTS, supra not~ 56, at 
173, 181; Statement of Alvin Bellak, supra note 77, at 68; Statement of Brigitte Berger, 
supra note 86, at 29; Statement of Claudia Goldin, 2 U.S. CoMM'N ON C1v1L RIGHTS, supra 
note 60, at 2, 8. 
197. The courts are thus quite correct in stating that plaintiffs cannot base a claim of 
discrimination on the employer's failure to pay employees in accordance with their com-
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rates of both male and female jobs as the worth of those jobs 
increases, Title VII does not mandate this result. 198 An employer 
can pay his least valuable job the most, or he can pay all jobs 
the same, regardless of their worth. Or the employer can disre-
gard job content altogether, and base pay on some other fac-
tor-such as seniority, 199 or some other individual characteristic, 
or by the first letter of the employee's last name. All that Title 
VII requires is that the same system_:_whatever it is-be used in 
establishing the wage rates for both the male-dominated and fe-
male-dominated jobs. Thus, if the evidence establishes that the 
male-dominated jobs are paid in accordance with job worth, with 
their pay rates increasing as the worth of their job increases, the 
female-dominated jobs must also be paid in accordance with job 
worth. Moreover, job worth for each group of jobs must be de-
termined under the same criteria, so that, for example, math 
skills are given equal weight regardless of whether those skills 
are found in a male-dominated job or in a female-dominated job. 
2. The "unexplained" factor- The multiple regression anal-
ysis used in a comparable worth study, which is undertaken to 
expose the employer's implicit pay structure, adjusts both for 
job content and for human capital characteristics such as senior-
ity, prior experience, quantity and quality of production, and 
merit. 200 As already noted, when the salaries for the male-domi-
nated, integrated, and female dominated jobs are plotted on a 
graph, and a line of best fit drawn for the male-dominated and 
integrated jobs, and a second line drawn for the female-domi-
nated jobs, there is a substantial gap between the two lines. The 
proponents of comparable worth contend that this gap is due to 
sex, because any differences in job content (including surround-
ings and working conditions) or human capital characteristics 
have already been adjusted for by the regression analysis. The 
opponents of comparable worth argue that there is some other 
unidentified factor, not included in the regression analysis, that 
can explain the gap. Significantly, the opponents to comparable 
parable worth. See, e.g., American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 723-24 (7th Cir. 
1986). 
198. Similarly, the Equal Pay Act does not require that an employer pay all employ-
ees engaged in equal work the same wage. The employer may use a random rate struc-
ture, or may pay within a fixed range of rates, so long as his compensation policies do not 
result in women being paid less than men with comparable levels of seniority, and qual-
ity and quantity of performance. 
199. D. TREIMAN, supra note 11, at 30-31. 
200. Alternatively, the regression analysis can use the minimum rate for each job (or 
the entry rate), which would make it unnecessary to adjust for variations in the human 
capital characteristics of those who at any given time are employed in those jobs. 
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worth are unable to suggest what this unidentified factor might 
be. 
The existence of any such factor is highly unlikely and cer-
tainly too speculative to rebut the prima facie showing of dispa-
rate treatment established by the regression analysis. In the first 
place, this unexplained or unknown factor would have to be one 
that is not correlated with any of the identified factors, includ-
ing sex. In other words, it would have to be a factor that was 
present in almost all of the male-dominated or integrated jobs, 
but in almost none of the female-dominated jobs. Thus, while 
there are factors other than job content and human capital that 
affect wage rates, such as supply and demand imbalances, union-
ization, tradition, and "creaming" to fill specific jobs with indi-
viduals who are overqualified, none of these factors are corre-
lated with sex. They explain the differences in the pay rates that 
exist among male-dominated and integrated jobs of equal value, 
just as they explain the differences that exist among female-
dominated jobs of equal value. For example, in the Wisconsin 
study, three of the male-dominated jobs with 953 job worth 
points received annual salaries of $19,500, $22,000, and $24,500, 
whereas two of the female-dominated jobs with 953 job worth 
points received $15,000 and $15,500. At 1336 job worth points, 
the two female-dominated jobs received $19,000 and $24,000, 
whereas the three male-dominated jobs received $27,000, 
$27,500, and $32,500. Thus, while there were annual disparities 
in the wage rates for jobs of equal value performed by the same 
sex, which ranged from $500 to $5500, there were additional sex-
based wage differentials in the average salaries paid to the male-
and female-dominated jobs at each of these two point values, 
over and above any other variations, that ranged from $6750 to 
$7500.201 
In the second place, the "unidentified factor" theory simply 
ignores the long history of direct discrimination in the establish-
ment of wage rates for women.202 Not only was it common prac-
tice to pay women less than men for the exact same work, but 
employers regularly used lower entry-level rates in establishing 
their female wage structure (as at Corning Glass),203 reduced the 
201. WISCONSIN TASK FORCE ON COMPARABLE WORTH, FOR WHAT h's WORTH (May 
1985), reprinted in WISCONSIN TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 179, at 117. 
202. See supra text accompanying notes 87-106. 
203. The sex-based wage differential for the inspector jobs at the Corning Glass 
plants originated in 1925, when men, who were employed to work on the night shift, 
refused to do inspection work at female rates. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 
188, 191 (1974). The differential continued even after Corning implemented a job evalua-
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rates to be paid to women by some fixed percentage designed to 
compensate for the assumed special needs of women workers (as 
at Westinghouse and General Electric),20" or paid them less be-
cause it was assumed that women have fewer dependents (as in 
Australia).2011 Moreover, in every case where a job that was once 
performed by men became female-dominated, it lost both in 
wages and in its relative ranking with other male-dominated 
jobs. 206 These practices resulted in the almost universal under-
tion plan that rated the two jobs identically. The reason for the continuing pay disparity 
was that under the job evaluation plan, which had been developed for Corning by the 
commercial firm of Stevenson, Jordan and Harrison, the men's wage rates were to be 
established by multiplying their total job points by the prevailing community rate for 
unskilled male labor, whereas the women's wages were calculated by multiplying their 
total job points by the lower prevailing community rate for unskilled female labor. See 
Hodgson v. Corning Glass Works, 341 F. Supp. 18, 25 (M.D. Pa. 1972), a/f'd sub nom. 
Brennan v. Corning Glass Works, 480 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1973), reu'd, 417 U.S. 188 
(1974). 
204. In International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. Westing-
house Electric Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 967 (1981), the 
lower rates for the women's jobs had their origin in a compensation system that paid 
women less than men for jobs rated equally under the company's job evaluation plan and 
assigned to the same labor rate. The company justified this system on "the more tran-
sient character of the service of the [women), the relative shortness of their activity in 
industry, the differences in environment required, the extra services that must be pro-
vided, overtime limitations, and the general sociological factors not requiring discussion 
herein." Newman & Vonhof, supra note 48, at 293 (quoting Westinghouse's Industrial 
Relations Manual). 
205. Australia has state and federal wage tribunals that set minimum rates of pay for 
almost all occupations. Gregory & Duncan, Segmented Labor Market Theories and the 
Australian Experience of Equal Pay for Women, 3 J. PosT KEYNESIAN EcoN. 403, 404 
(1981). Until 1975, the sex of the occupation was a relevant factor in the institutional 
wage-setting process. Id. at 406. Originally, tribunals categorized occupations as either 
male or female. When an occupation was determined to be male, the minimum was set so 
as to support a man, his wife, and their children; when the occupation was determined to 
be female, the minimum was set so as to support a single woman. The result of this 
process was that female-dominated occupations were paid considerably less than male-
dominated occupations that were determined by the tribunals to have the same work 
value. Id. Over time the tribunals began to use a percentage of the equivalent male rate 
in establishing the rate for female occupations with the same work value. During the 
period before World War II, the minimum rates for female occupations were generally • 
set at 54'.'i, of the equivalent male rate. Id. at 407. After World War II, the tribunals 
began to set the minimum rates for female occupations at 75% of the male wage 
equivalent. Then in 1969 the federal tribunal established the principle of equal pay for 
equal work, and in 1972 it adopted the principle of equal pay for work of equal value, 
which was to become fully effective in June 1975. Id. at 407-08. While the actual rates 
paid by most employers substantially exceed the minimum rates set by the tribunals, the 
average pay rates for male- and female-dominated occupations reflect the same relative 
relationships as were established by the tribunals' minimums. Id. at 404, 408. As a result, 
the gap between the wage rates for male- and female-dominated occupations of 
equivalent value has narrowed considerably since 1975. Id. at 408-12. 
206. A good example of this phenomenon was uncovered in the EEOC's investigation 
of AT&T. AT&T had 23 operating companies prior to its break-up. In all but one of 
these companies the job of "Frameman" was performed by men; it was a craft job and 
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valuation of wage rates for female-dominated jobs, which was 
then perpetuated by uniform annual wage increments,207 by job 
segregation208-which made it unnecessary to make any wage 
adjustments when the Equal Pay Act was passed-and by area 
wage surveys, which report separate and lower rates for female 
labor.209 
3. The "innocent" employer- Contrary to the notion im-
plicit in this argument, it is not necessary in a disparate treat-
ment case to establish any evidence of malice or prejudice. What 
has to be shown-through either direct or circumstantial evi-
dence-is that the disparate treatment is intentional-Le., that 
there is disparate treatment based on sex.210 The opponents of 
comparable worth argue that if the employer does not have a 
formal job evaluation plan that establishes the disparate treat-
ment (as in Corning Glass or Westinghouse),211 or that is sex-
was paid at craft rates. At Michigan Bell, however, the work was assigned to a female job 
classification, entitled "Switchroom Helper," and was paid a clerical rate rather than the 
higher craft rate. See EEOC Prehearing Analysis and Summary of Evidence, A Unique 
Competence, A Study of Equal Employment Opportunity in the Bell System, In re Peti-
tions filed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Before the Federal Com-
munications Commission, No. 19143, at 32-64 (1972), reprinted in A. BABCOCK, A. FREED-
MAN, E. NORTON & s. Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 288 (1975). 
207. Cf. Bazemore v. Friday, 106 S. Ct. 3000, 3006 (1986) (finding a Title VII viola-
tion where present pay disparities between black workers and white workers were a lin-
gering result of prior segregation). 
208. See generally Blumrosen, supra note 108; Newman & Vonhof, supra note 48. 
209. See Blumrosen, supra note 108, at 441-45; Newman & Owens, supra note 60, at 
144 n.64. These authors note that the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and the U.S. Bu-
reau of the Census report national and area wage data by sex and occupation. See also 
N. TOLLES & R. RAIMON, SOURCES OF WAGE INFORMATION: EMPLOYER ASSOCIATIONS (3 
Cornell Studies in Industrial and Labor Relations, 1952), which describes the wage 
surveys conducted by 120 employer associations; a large number of these surveys re-
ported separate salary data by sex, including separate wage rates for male and female 
unskilled labor. 
210. See supra text accompanying note 164. One district court has explained the re-
quired element of "intent" as follows: 
Despite the many analyses of the wide variety of discrimination cases, the out-
come of all of them inevitably depends on the element of intent, and a causal 
relation between that intent and the consequence complained of. The "intent" 
referred to is not by any means confined to actual, subjective, individual intent 
of a purposeful nature. It refers to the legal concept of intent which also em-
braces subconscious ... intent as well as an intent inferred from purposeful ... 
action .... 
The legal concept of "intent" is to be distinguished from "motive" .... For-
bidden discrimination in employment may be the consequence of the highest 
and most salutary motives, but the legal "intent", not the motive, is what 
controls. 
McNeil v. McDonough, 515 F. Supp. 113, 129 (D.N.J. 1980), aff'd, 648 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 
1981). 
211. See supra notes 203-04. 
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biased in design, 212 the disparity in treatment disclosed by the 
regression analysis is not based on any conscious (or uncon-
scious) decision by the employer to treat the female-dominated 
jobs less favorably, but simply reflects the historic ranking of 
male- and female-dominated jobs in the community. In other 
words, the employer, in adopting the prevailing community wage 
rates for each of his male- and female-dominated jobs, is not 
responsible for any discrimination that results from the adop-
tion of these rates. Indeed, the suggestion is made that the em-
ployer would not even know about the disparate treatment un-
less he conducted his own job evaluation study and regression 
analysis, and that while his lack of knowledge would not negate 
a disparate impact claim (where no intent is required), it does 
negate a disparate treatment claim.213 
There are at least two problems with this kind of argument. 
The first is that it rests upon an erroneous interpretation of the 
intent requirement in Title VII disparate treatment litigation. 
The second is that, contrary to the arguments made by compa-
rable worth's opponents, an employer's pay structure is always 
the result of conscious pay decisions made by the employer and 
not just the result of the employer's having passively accepted 
the prevailing wage rates in the community. But even if this 
were not so, the employer can hardly be said to have no involve-
ment in the establishment of discriminatory wage rates. The 
market is not an institution driven by factors entirely outside of 
the employer's control. On the contrary, the market is in large 
part determined by the collective wage behavior of all employers 
in the community. In addition, because there is no single rate in 
the market for each occupation, the individual employer must 
still decide what specific rate to pay. Thus, it could be argued 
that just this act of selecting a discriminatory wage rate, even if 
the rate were one established by another-e.g., the mar-
ket-violates the employer's duty of nondiscrimination under 
Title VII. This conduct would be like the employer conduct in-
volved in Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris. 214 In that 
case, the employer disclaimed any responsibility for the discrim-
inatory terms on which the tax deferred annuities were offered 
to its employees by the insurance companies it had selected, on 
the ground that all of the annuities available in the open market 
were based on sex-segregated actuarial tables. In holding that 
212. NRC REPORT, supra note 57, at 73; D. 'fREIMAN. supra note 11, at 13-15, 34. 
213. American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 720, 722 (7th Cir. 1986). 
214. 463 U.S. 1073 (1983). 
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the employer was guilty of intentional discrimination, the Court 
stated: "Since employers are ultimately responsible for the 'com-
pensation, terms, conditions, [and] privileges of employment' 
provided to employees, an employer that adopts a fringe-benefit 
scheme that discriminates among its employees on the basis of 
. . . sex . . . violates Title VII regardless of whether third par-
ties are also involved in the discrimination."215 Clearly, the em-
ployer's responsibility for nondiscriminatory compensation ex-
tends as well to the selection and establishment of the wage 
rates paid to their employees. 
a. The meaning of the "intent" requirement- Title VII's 
requirement of "intent" does not mean that the plaintiff has to 
show that the employer knew the exact extent of the disparate 
treatment, or that he initiated the disparate treatment. It is 
enough if it can be inferred from the plaintiff's evidence that the 
employer must have known that its pay system undervalued the 
female-dominated jobs in relation to the male-dominated jobs. 
The employer may well have believed that this undervalua-
tion-Le., disparate treatment-was justified by the prevailing 
market rates or by some other factor. But such a belief does not 
negate the existence of intentional disparate treatment; on the 
contrary, it concedes the disparate treatment but then attempts 
to explain it, in the same way that an employer might try to 
justify unequal pension benefits or restrictive hiring rules. 
The employer does not need a regression analysis to know if 
the female-dominated jobs are undervalued. Although the em-
ployer may not be able to specify the characteristics he values 
with mathematical exactitude, he certainly has some general 
idea as to which characteristics he values the most, how much he 
pays the male-dominated, integrated, and female-dominated 
jobs, and what the general characteristics of each of these jobs 
are. The regression analysis is for the trier of fact who typically 
would not be in a position to know what job content characteris-
tics-many of which would be unique to a particular industry or 
employer-were present in the different jobs, or how these con-
tent characteristics were generally valued by a specific employer 
in his male-dominated and integrated jobs-skill over effort, sci-
entific skills over verbal skills, skill over responsibility, responsi-
bility over skill, etc. 
The notion that conscious or unconscious disparate treatment 
is not the same as intentional disparate treatment is based on 
several misconceptions. The first, discussed previously, is that 
215. Id. at 1089. 
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the element of intent requires a showing of malice. This seems 
to be the view expressed by Judge Posner in dicta in American 
Nurses' Association v. Illinois, 216 where he wrote that the intent 
required by Title VII "implies more than ... [an] awareness of 
consequences;"217 it requires that the employer "select[] ... a 
particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not 
merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable 
group," or, in the case of a sex-based wage claim, "by a desire to 
benefit men at the expense of women."216 In support of this 
statement, Judge Posner relied on Washington v. Davis219 and 
Personnel Administrator v. Feeney.220 But neither of these cases 
was tried under a disparate treatment theory. On the contrary, 
the employers in both cases used the exact same criteria in con-
sidering women and minorities for employment and promotion. 
In other words, these were cases of identical treatment, not dis-
parate treatment. But the effect of these criteria-exam scores 
in Davis, 221 and veterans' preference points in Feeney222-was to 
disqualify disproportionately women and minorities-Le., to 
have a disparate impact. Although it would have been possible 
to invalidate such criteria under a Title VII disparate impact 
analysis, assuming that the use of such criteria was not neces-
sary to the accomplishment of legitimate business purposes, 223 
the Davis and Feeney suits were brought under the fourteenth 
amendment to the United States Constitution, and "intent" to 
achieve the disparate results was an additional requirement. 224 
In a disparate treatment case, however, the intent to achieve 
different results can be inferred from the disparate treatment 
itself, which in wage cases consists of the use of different criteria 
in establishing the wage rates for male- and female-dominated 
jobs. It is not necessary also to show that the employer wanted 
the different result as part of a scheme to benefit one group over 
another. Thus, the courts have found intentional discrimination 
in a number of cases where there was no finding or suggestion 
that the employer's policy of disparate treatment was designed 
to injure or disadvantage women. So, for example, in City of Los 
216. 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986). 
217. Id. at 722 (quoting Personnel Admin. v. Feeney, 422 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). 
218. Id. (quoting Feeney, 422 U.S. at 279). 
219. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
220. 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
221. 426 U.S. at 234-35. 
222. 442 U.S. at 260, 263, 265, 267-69. 
223. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 428, 430-31 (1971). 
224. Dauis, 426 U.S. at 238-44; Feeney, 442 U.S. at 274-75, 279. 
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Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart, 22r, the em-
ployer, in requiring women to make greater monetary contribu-
tions to the pension fund than similarly situated men, simply 
adopted the "common practice" of using sex-based actuarial ta-
bles;226 in other cases, the employer excluded women from cer-
tain jobs because of a belief that the work was too arduous for 
women,227 or too dangerous to unborn children.228 Despite the 
absence of any evidence that the employer was motivated by 
malice or prejudice, the courts found a violation of Title VII 
based on the disparity in treatment. 
Of course, it is axiomatic that the disparate treatment has to 
be based on sex-and not on some factor other than sex. As al-
ready discussed, it is this element of "intent" that must be es-
tablished in the plaintiff's prima facie case. But the argument 
advanced by comparable worth's opponents seems to confuse the 
employer's knowledge of the disparate treatment (whether spe-
cific or general) with his knowledge that a violation has occurred 
(which the employer may not have because of the way in which 
he interprets the law) or with his knowledge concerning the ex-
tent of the injury (i.e., which jobs are affected by the disparate 
treatment, and by how much). Obviously, knowledge of each of 
these facts is quite different, and the intent requirement refers 
only to the existence of disparate treatment based on sex, and 
not to a knowing violation,229 or to a violation of some specified 
amount. Indeed, one of the more common reasons for treating 
women differently from men is the employer's belief that women 
are unable to perform the job, or at least cannot perform it 
safely, and that as a result the disparate treatment is authorized, 
under either the bona fide occupational qualification excep-
tion, 230 or as a business necessity.231 Nor does an employer typi-
cally know the full extent of his liability once a violation has 
been established. Liability questions are often quite complex, 
and the courts have typically bifurcated a Title VII proceeding. 
225. 435 U.S. 702 (1978). 
226. Id. at 710. 
227. E.g., Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969). 
228. E.g., Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982). 
229. See Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1194, 1201 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 
U.S. 991 (1971); McNeil v. McDonough, 515 F. Supp. 113, 129 (D.N.J. 1980), a/f'd, 648 
F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1981). 
230. Civil Rights Act § 703(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982). 
231. The business necessity defense is not set forth in Title VII but was created by 
the courts for use in disparate impact cases. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 
431-32, 436 (1971); see also Nashville Gas Co. v. Setty, 434 U.S. 136, 143 (1977); Dothard 
v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329, 331 n.14 (1977). 
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They determine first whether a violation has occurred and then, 
if that question is answered affirmatively, schedule additional 
and often lengthy proceedings in which to determine the extent 
of the employer's liability.232 
Nor is it necessary that the employer actually initiate the 
challenged disparate treatment. It is enough that the employer 
continues or maintains a pay system based on disparate treat-
ment even though that system might have been introduced by a 
predecessor employer or by earlier management. In other words, 
while Title VII does not impose any liability for actions that oc-
curred prior to the Act's effective date, or that are protected by 
the Act's short statute of limitations, wage discrimination is a 
continuing violation. As a result, the employer's failure to cor-
rect a discriminatory wage structure once an employee has com-
plained or once the business has come under the employer's con-
trol is as much a violation of Title VII as is the action of a new 
employer who establishes a discriminatory pay system for the 
first time. 233 
b. Institutional or direct discrimination?- The other broad 
response to the ''innocent employer" argument is that the em-
ployer-whether considered generically or individually-is not 
in fact so innocent. The premise underlying the "innocent em-
ployer" argument is that the employer makes no discriminatory 
pay decisions himself, but simply adopts the prevailing wage 
rates determined for each job by cultural and psychological fac-
tors having nothing to do with the employer.23' In other words, 
any undervaluation in the establishment of pay rates for female-
dominated jobs is the result of institutional discrimination, and 
not direct employer discrimination. 2311 
232. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 360-61 (1977). 
233. Bazemore v. Friday, 106 S. Ct. 3000, 3006-07 (1986). 
234. As expressed by Judge Posner in American Nurses' Association v. Illinois, 783 
F.2d 716, 720 (7th Cir. 1986): 
An employer (private or public) that simply pays the going wage in each of the 
different types of jobs in its establishment, and makes no effort to discourage 
women from applying for particular jobs . . ., would be justifiably surprised to 
discover that it may be violating federal law because each wage rate ... [has] 
been found to be determined by cultural or psychological factors attributable to 
the history of male domination . . . . 
235. A variation of this argument is that women are paid less than men because of 
the occupations they are in and not because of wage discrimination. Those who make 
this argument acknowledge that women have not always been able to select the occupa-
tion of their choice. They contend, however, that unless the employer himself has been 
guilty of job discrimination, he "should not be held accountable for the discrimination of 
others, including employers who discriminated in the past, State legislators who enacted 
State protective legislation, and educators who discriminated or continue to discrimi-
nate." U.S. CoMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS. supra note 61, at 71. In other words, there is no 
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The weakness of this argument is apparent. Pay decisions are 
not like employment decisions, where an employer's effort to lo-
cate and hire women for particular occupations can be frustrated 
by institutional misconduct, as well as by employer bias. For ex-
ample, the schools or union apprenticeship programs may have 
excluded women from the courses or training programs required 
for them to qualify for particular occupations. Or the now-re-
pealed state protective laws236 may have made it impossible for 
employers to hire women for any jobs where they would be re-
wage discrimination; there is only job discrimination. And women are paid less than sim-
ilarly qualified men, either because of the difference in the job content of their occupa-
tions (with women working in the less productive jobs), or because of the overcrowding 
of the female-dominated occupations, which has lowered the pay rates. This argument is 
easily refuted. First, when women selected male jobs they were paid less than the men 
(at least until the Equal Pay Act of 1963), so that historically a primary reason for lower 
female rates has been sex and not occupational choice. Second, women who are employed 
in female-dominated occupations are typically paid less than the lesser valued or less 
productive male-dominated jobs, as demonstrated by the female "selector-packers" in 
Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970), 
who were paid less than the male snap-up boys, see supra text accompanying notes 144-
46, or the female jobs in Corning Glass and Westinghouse, see supra notes 203-04. And 
third, female-dominated jobs that were in short supply (e.g., nurses and stenographers), 
while they were paid more than other female-dominated jobs of comparable or equal 
value, were generally paid less than male-dominated jobs of comparable or equal value, 
including those that were not in short supply. 
236. The so-called protective laws existed in every state and were not finally re-
pealed or nullified until the 1970's, after the enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Hughes, 454 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1972); Rosenfeld v. 
Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971); LeBlanc v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. 
Co., 333 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. La. 1971), aff'd, 460 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 
U.S. 990 (1972). These laws prescribed the number of hours per day and days per week 
women could work, the time of day women could work, the number and length of rest 
periods required for women workers, and the maximum amount of weight that women 
could lift (ranging from 15 to 35 pounds, depending on the state). Other laws barred 
women from jobs requiring night work, heavy lifting, or constant standing. Women were 
also prohibited from entering certain occupations, which typically included bartending, 
mining, and smelting. A few states also precluded women from engaging in a longer list 
of occupations, including bellhop, gas or electric meter reader, pin setter in a bowling 
alley, crossing watchman, section hand, jitney driver, freight handling and trucking of 
any kind, or from working in poolrooms, bar rooms, and saloons that catered to male 
customers exclusively. See, e.g., OHIO STAT. ANN. § 1008-1 (Baldwin 1948). Other laws 
stated that "no female shall ... be employed in any place detrimental to her morals, her 
health or her potential capacity for motherhood." M1cH. COMP. LAWS § 750.556 (1948); 
see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 107 (Purdon 1952); Wis. STAT. § 103.65 (1949); Wvo. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. § 58-105 (1951). For a discussion of the state protective laws, see generally 
J. BAER, THE CHAINS OF PROTECTIONS: THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO WOMEN'S LABOR LEGIS-
LATION 42-67 (1978); E. FISCH & M. SCHWARTZ, STATE LAW ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF 
WOMEN 9 (1953). 
In employment discrimination cases, the influence of the now-repealed state protective 
laws, and of various other institutional factors, on the number of women in particular 
occupations, is measured by reference to the employer's applicant pool or to labor force 
availability data. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); 
Davis v. City of Dallas, 777 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1972 (1986); 
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quired to go underground, to lift more than fifteen or twenty 
pounds, or to stand on their feet for longer than two hours. And, 
finally, society's role conditioning, which will have affected 
women almost from the moment of their birth, may have de-
terred women from either seeking or accepting certain types of 
jobs. In contrast, wage decisions are not directly affected by the 
behavior of institutions like schools, unions, and family-except 
of course to the extent that their restrictive entry requirements 
or socializing pressures may have increased or decreased the 
supply of workers for certain occupations. These decisions are 
always made by the employer, either through negotiations with 
the union, or by the establishment of a company wage scale, or 
by making individual pay decisions at the time of each em-
ployee's hire and/or promotion. 
Even if the employer has based these pay decisions on the 
"market," they are still his decisions. If these decisions reward 
job characteristics differently when performed as part of female-· 
dominated jobs than when performed as part of male-dominated 
jobs, they constitute disparate treatment based on sex. The rea-
sons that the employer has for making these decisions-e.g., a 
claimed need to remain competitive-do not alter the fact of 
disparate treatment, any more than do the reasons behind an 
employer's decision to exclude women from specific jobs. 
Whether these reasons justify the disparate pay treatment for 
female-dominated jobs is a separate issue that is discussed in 
the next section. What needs to be shown here is the employer's 
direct involvement in the disparate pay treatment. 
Moreover, it is difficult to see how the market can be viewed 
as a separate institution distinct from the employer. The market 
is what employers pay; together, they make up the demand side 
of the market wage formula. If employers have consistently un-
dervalued job characteristics when performed as part of female-
dominated jobs, that undervaluation is reflected in the existing 
market rates. 237 And, indeed, if one employer is large enough, or 
the exclusive employer of a particular occupation-e.g., cable 
splicer, telephone operator, archivist-then one employer, and 
not some remote institutional entity, will have established the 
market rate for that particular occupation.238 While Judge Pos-
ner argues that "[k]nowledge of a disparity is not the same thing 
Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, 708 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1983). See generally D. BALDUS & 
J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION (1980 & Supp. 1984). 
237. See i11fra note 243. 
238. See N. TOLLES & R. RAIMON, supra note 209, at 246; Marshall & Paulin, supra 
note 60, at 205. 
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as intent to cause or maintain it," citing Feeney and Davis,239 
there is a substantial difference between basing employment de-
cisions on neutral factors over which the employer has no con-
trol-e.g., educational qualifications, height,240 veteran status,241 
exam performance242-even with knowledge that the factor will 
have a disproportionate impact on a sexual or racial group, and 
basing employment decisions on a factor that is tainted by the 
combined impact of employer discriminatory behavior. It was 
not the market that created a dual wage structure based on 
sex.243 It was the employers-although they may have been 
urged to do so by the unions representing their male employ-
ees,244 and although their ability to maintain the dual structure 
may have been facilitated by state laws and other institutional 
practices that restricted women to a limited number of occupa-
tions.245 The market is merely a reflection of this past and con-
tinuing discriminatory behavior on the part of employers. 
In addition, the notion that it is the market, and not the em-
ployer, that sets wage rates suggests that there is a single entry-
level rate for each occupation, determined by the automatic 
239. American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 722 (7th Cir. 1986). 
240. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-29 (1977). 
241. See Personnel Admin. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 259-60 (1979). 
242. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 234-35 (1976); Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426-28 (1971). 
243. Some commentators have suggested that the lower wages paid to female-domi-
nated jobs result not from any undervaluation or disparate application of the employer's 
criteria for establishing pay, but from the "crowding" of women into a few occupations, 
which caused a surplus of available workers and resulted in reduced wage rates for fe-
male-dominated jobs. See B. BERGMANN, supra note 10, at 125-26. But this argument 
does not explain why women were paid less when employed to do the same work as men 
or when employed in male-dominated jobs (because the supply factor for the men and 
women would be the same). Nor does it explain why female-dominated jobs with serious 
shortages of qualified workers are paid less than male-dominated jobs-albeit more than 
other comparable female-dominated jobs-that require equivalent levels of skill, effort, 
and responsibility but that have an abundant supply of available workers. While the 
repeal of the state protective laws and the prohibition of discrimination in hiring and job 
assignment may give women an alternative when faced with an unreasonably low wage 
offer-assuming they can afford the time and money required to qualify for different 
work-these changes in the law have done very little to change the relative pay status of 
female-dominated and male-dominated jobs. 
244. Several authors have noted that, historically, organized labor did not want 
women on an equal footing with men. See, e.g., C. LYTLE,.Joe EVALUATION METHODS 68, 
app. A at 287 (1946); Benge, Can We Pay Women Same Wage Rates as Men?, reprinted 
in C. LYTLE, supra, app. A at 288, 288-89. It should be noted, however, that much of 
organized labor, including the AFL-CIO and a number of the major international unions, 
had supported equal pay legislation since it was first proposed in 1945. See, e.g., 1945 
Hearings on S. 1178, supra note 13, at 33-34, 180-82, 184-86; 1963 Hearings on H.R. 
3861, supra note 13, at 108-20, 123-36, 178-81. 
245. See supra note 236. 
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forces of supply and demand, which the employer must adopt if 
he is to remain competitive and in business. The reality of the 
labor market is quite different. In the first place, there is no sin-
gle rate for each occupation or job. On the contrary, the entry-
level wage rate for a single occupation in the same locality can 
vary by 200% to 300% or more. 248 Nor is there any consistency 
in how different employers rank the various occupations; some 
value technical skills over verbal skills, and others value verbal 
skills over technical skills.247 In other words, the "market" pro-
vides a wide range of rates to choose from. As a result, it does 
not relieve the employer from having to make individualized pay 
decisions for his particular work force. 
Second, most employers (at least those of any substantial size) 
do not use the market in establishing the rates for each of their 
jobs. Instead, they determine the relative ranking of each job 
based either on a job evaluation study, on collective bargaining, 
or on unilateral decisionmaking. 248 After this "internal" wage 
structure has been set, the employer will then refer to the "ex-
ternal" labor market for the purpose of fixing a floor for the in-
ternal wage structure (as in Corning Glass),249 or for the purpose 
of fixing the wages for a number of entry-level positions;2110 but 
wages for all other jobs are determined by their relative position 
in the employer's internal wage structure. An employer may also 
compare the wages of certain "key" or "benchmark" jobs with 
the wages paid by other employers in the community for the 
same or similar jobs to assure the comparability or adequacy of 
his own wage structure. m 
Once the internal ranking of an employer's jobs has been es-
tablished, whether explicitly or implicitly, and whether through 
collective bargaining, job evaluation, or management decision, it 
is likely to remain fixed for a long period of years. m Thus, while 
246. NRC REPORT, supra note 57, at 49; N. TOLLES & R. RAIMON, supra note 209, at 
240, 243; Dunlop, Industrial Relations and Economics: The Common Frontier of Wage 
Determination, in IRRA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 59, at 9, 11, 18 (distinguished speaker 
address), reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) D-1 (Jan. 3, 1985). 
247. NRC REPORT, supra note 57, at 70, 73; see also D. TREIMAN, supra note 11. 
248. C. LYTLE, supra note 244, at 10; N. TOLLES & R. RAIMON, supra note 209, at 247; 
Dunlop, supra note 246, at 13-16; Marshall & Paulin, supra note 60, at 205. 
249. See supra note 203 (discussing Corning's use of male and female unskilled labor 
rates in establishing the rates for its evaluated jobs). 
250. Marshall & Paulin, supra note 60, at 205. 
251. L. THUROW, GENERATING INEQUALITY: MECHANISMS OF DISTRIBUTION IN THE U.S. 
ECONOMY 51-52 (1975); D. TREIMAN, supra note 11, at 21-22; M. WALLACE & C. FAY, COM-
PENSATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 111-13, 269 (1983). 
252. See N. TOLLES & R. RAIMON, supra note 209, at 240-41; Dunlop, supra note 246, 
at 17-18. 
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wage rates may increase, the relative rankings of the jobs will 
remain the same, unless the employer conducts a complete new 
job evaluation study or engages in some major restructuring of 
his business. This means that an employer usually will not re-
duce the relative ranking of a specific job simply because there is 
a temporary surplus of qualified workers in the market. Of 
course, an employer, to avoid employee turnover, may occasion-
ally have to increase the wage for a particular occupation when 
there is a shortage of workers, but that wage would be treated as 
an exception. The main point is that wage structures, once es-
tablished, are surprisingly rigid.2113 
Finally, the employer, in determining the wage rates for each 
occupation, or in fixing a floor and a ceiling for the internal wage 
structure, will consider a number of factors other than the mini-
mum rate that must be paid to attract or retain employ-
ees-what the economists call the "market clearing rate."2114 Em-
ployers want to maintain the relative wage rankings established 
by their internal structure.21111 They are thus bound in large part 
by tradition and custom, and will adhere as much as possible to 
the existing wage structure.2116 Employers also typically share a 
portion of their profits with their employees, either out of some 
sense of social responsibility or to maintain a stable and produc-
tive work force. 2117 As a result, firms that can afford to pay more 
usually will, whereas other firms that are in economic distress or 
in a highly competitive market will generally pay less.2118 
In other words, it is not generally the external labor market 
that fixes wage rates for the male- and female-dominated jobs in 
a particular firm; it is the employer himself. If the employer's 
wage decisions treat male- and female-dominated jobs differ-
ently, the plaintiff who demonstrates this has made out a prima 
facie case of wage discrimination. It is therefore of fundamental 
importance in a wage discrimination case to focus on the em-
ployer's pay decisions, and not on some other aspect of the em-
ployment relationship. Proof of an employer's discriminatory 
hiring and assignment practices may be some evidence of the 
employer's tendency to undervalue the worth of women's work, 
and may help explain how a dual wage structure has been main-
253. Dunlop, supra note 246, at 13, 20; Hartmann, supra note 59, at 179. 
254. U.S. CoMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 61, at 23, 25; M. WALLACE & C. FAY, 
supra note 251, at 25-44; Dunlop, supra note 246, at 9-23. 
255. NRC REPORT, supra note 57, at 62. 
256. Id. at 56; Marshall & Paulin, supra note 60, at 205. 
257. Dunlop, supra note 246, at 19-20. 
258. Id. at 19; N. TOLLES & R. RAIMON, supra note 209, at 300. 
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tained over a number of years. At the same time, it detracts at-
tention from the basis of the Title VII charge, and leads many 
judges and commentators to suggest that the cure for wage dis-
crimination is for women to take men's jobs.2119 To the extent 
that women are in the least productive and least skilled jobs, it 
is of course true that the only way for them to effect any real 
change in their economic condition is to do just that. But to the 
extent that women are paid less for their work than they would 
259. See American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 719 (7th Cir. 1986); U.S. 
CoMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 61, at 74; MINORITY REPORT OF THE WISCONSIN TASK 
FORCE ON COMPARABLE WORTH [hereinafter WISCONSIN TASK FORCE MINORITY REPORT) in 
WISCONSIN TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 179, at 83, 96; Killingsworth, supra note 83, 
at 188; Statement of June O'Neill, supra note 85, at 114-15. A classic example of the 
view that job access is the only equal employment issue for women is the statement of 
President Reagan's nominee for general counsel of the EEOC, Jeffrey I. Zuckerman, that 
blacks and women could overcome discrimination by offering to work for lower wages 
than white males. See EEOC Aide Saw Lower Wages as Way to Beat Discrimination, 
Wash. Post, Mar. 5, 1986, at AZ0, col. 1. 
The fallacy in the argument that greater job access is the single solution to sex-based 
wage disparities is its assumption that the only reason for the disparities-once adjust-
ments are made for seniority, years of experience, breaks in service, etc.-is that women 
are employed in a larger number of less productive jobs. This assumption is refuted by 
the history of wage discrimination and by the fact that every study of pay disparities 
within a single firm or governmental unit has concluded that female-dominated jobs 
were paid less than male-dominated jobs of equal or lesser value. R. STEINBERG, 
L. HAIGNERE, C. Poss1N, C. CHERTos & D. TREIMAN, THE NEw YoRK STATE COMPARABLE 
WORTH STUDY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7-8 (Center for Women in Gov't, State Univ. of N.Y. 
at Albany, 1985) [hereinafter R. STEINBERG); see COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S., supra 
note 5, at 36-39; D. TREIMAN, supra note 11, at 27-28; WISCONSIN TASK FORCE REPORT, 
supra note 179, at 5-9, 53. In other words, it is a combination of factors-unequal job 
access, the undervaluation of women's work, and the early socialization/family responsi-
bilities that limit women's career choices-that results in women earning less than men. 
Wage discrimination can be corrected only by increasing the wage rates for female-
dominated jobs, not by moving women out of these jobs. This of course does not mean 
that job discrimination and wage discrimination are not integrally related. On the con-
trary, as women's job opportunities increase, they can demand higher wages for tradi-
tional female jobs. Moreover, as their wage rates increase, perceptions will change about 
the ability of women to handle increased responsibility. And as both the wages and job 
status of women improve, employers will be more receptive to child day care and paren-
tal leave practices. Finally, as women's jobs improve both in status and pay, more men 
will choose these jobs, which in turn will lead to greater occupational integration. This is 
important because while there has been a fairly significant movement of women into 
men's jobs as a result of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Blumrosen, Expanding the 
Concept of Affirmative Action to Address Contemporary Conditions, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. 
& Soc. CHANGE 297, 298-300 (1984-1985); Jones, The Genesis and Present Status of Af· 
/irmatiue Action in Employment: Economic, Legal, and Political Realities, 70 loWA L. 
REV. 901, 914-19 (1985), there has been almost no change in the female composition of 
women's jobs. So, for example, the percent female in the occupation of "secretaries, ste-
nographers and typists" increased from 96.9% in 1970 to 98.3'1;, in 1980; "information 
clerks," from 80.6~;. in 1970 to 85.3% in 1980; and "financial records processing occupa-
tions," from 80.2~;, to 88.C;,. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1980 
CENSUS OF POPULATION, DETAILED OCCUPATION OF THE EXPERIENCED CIVILIAN LABOR 
FORCE BY SEX FOR THE UNITED STATES AND REGIONS: 1980 AND 1970, at 10 (1984). 
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be paid if such work were performed primarily by men, the cure 
is to remove the sex bias from the wage rate. Thus, the main 
task of a plaintiff's attorney in a Title VII comparable worth 
case is to expose the employer's discriminatory pay decisions. 
A good place to begin is to find out how women were paid 
when first employed. This means obtaining pay information as 
far back as possible.260 Specifically, when were women first em-
ployed? Were they employed in jobs that previously had been 
performed by men and, if so, what happened to the pay and rel-
ative ranking of those jobs once they became women's jobs? 
Were men and women ever employed in the same or similar 
work and, if so, were they paid the same or differently? How 
were the initial pay rates for women established? For example, 
is there any evidence that male workers demanded a lower wage 
for women?261 Or that the employer considered the lower un-
skilled community labor rate for women in establishing their pay 
rates? Or that the employer relied on the willingness of women 
to work for less than men?262 Or that the rates set for the 
women's jobs were below the lowest rate for any male job and/or 
below the rate for which men would have been willing to 
work?263 
The easiest type of case will be one where the employer used a 
job evaluation plan that established the equal or proportionate 
worth of the male and female jobs, as in Corning Glass264 and 
Westinghouse, 26"' but then set a lower or disproportionately low 
rate for the female-dominated jobs, either because of the lower 
unskilled labor rate for women,266 or because of an unsubstanti-
260. In Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974), and International 
Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 631 F.2d 
1094 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 967 (1981), pay information dating back to 
before World War II was obtained. See supra notes 203-04. While it has not always been 
clear that courts would allow discovery this far back, Local No. 104, Sheet Metal Work-
ers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 439 F.2d 237, 243 (9th Cir. 1971); Dunlop v. J.C. Penney Co., 10 
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ~ 10,346 (M.D.N.C. 1975), the Supreme Court's decision in 
Bazemore v. Friday should remove any question concerning the necessity for and rele-
vance of such information. Bazemore v. Friday, 106 S. Ct. 3000, 3005 (1986). 
261. See, e.g., Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 262 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
398 U.S. 905 (1970); supra note 244. 
262. See, e.g., Corning Glass, 417 U.S. 188, where the employer used the lower un-
skilled female community wage rate in establishing a separate and lower floor for its 
wage structure for women's jobs. See also JENCKES REPORT. supra note 14, at 34, where 
the Librarian of Congress referred to the willingness of women to perform the same work 
as men for substantially less pay. 
263. See supra note 203. 
264. 417 U.S. 188. 
265. 631 F.2d 1094. 
266. See supra note 203. 
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ated assumption that women would be more costly to employ. 267 
In other cases it may be possible to show that the men would 
not work for the rates paid to the women, or that the entry rates 
for the lowest skilled male and female jobs bore a direct rela-
tionship to the community unskilled labor rates for male and 
female workers. 
Even where there is no information explaining the original ba-
sis of the employer's female wage structure, it is still important 
to establish the historic ranking, by wages, of the employer's 
jobs, the sex of those jobs and, if possible, a description of each 
job. This information can be used in several ways. First, it may 
reveal that, for at least some point in time, women were paid 
less than men for equal work-either because they were paid 
less than men when employed in the exact same job, or because 
the "female" job they performed was "equal"-as that term has 
since been defined by the courts268-to a separate "male" job, 
but was paid less. Such data would constitute a prima facie 
showing that sex had been a factor in the establishment of the 
employer's wage rates. It could also reasonably.be inferred that 
if the rates of "equal work" jobs were depressed because of sex, 
so were the rates of all other female-dominated jobs. 
This search for equal work information can be very rewarding. 
If the pay rates for the equal work jobs were never equalized, 
there would be (1) a present violation of the Equal Pay Act, and 
(2) prima facie evidence that the wage rates for all female-domi-
nated jobs are likewise depressed because of sex. And even if the 
pay rates for the equal work jobs have been raised to comply 
with state or federal law, or with the employer's own equal pay 
for equal work policy, the plaintiff may find that the rates for 
the other female-dominated jobs, which did not have any male 
counterpart jobs, were not similarly increased. This is particu-
larly significant where the plaintiff has demonstrated that the 
employer had, either explicitly (through a job evaluation instru-
ment) or implicitly (through consistent pay practices), ranked 
his female-dominated jobs in the order of their value to the em-
ployer. If the female-dominated jobs, which historically had 
been paid the same as or more than the female equal work jobs, 
are now paid less, the inference is that these jobs are still paid 
on the basis of a separate wage structure for women, and that if 
267. See supra note 204. 
268. The courts have held that the phrase "equal" work, as used in the Equal Pay 
Act, does not require that the jobs be identical, but only that they must be substantially 
equal. E.g., Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 
U.S. 905 (1970). 
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their rates were set without regard to sex, they would once again 
be paid the same as or more than the equal work jobs. In other 
words, if the rates for the equal work jobs were increased by ten 
percent to eliminate the sex bias, the rates for the other fem ale 
jobs that the employer had previously rated as being of equal or 
greater value than the equal work jobs-as evidenced by the em-
ployer's own wage payments-should also have been raised by 
ten percent. Similarly, if the wage rates for the equal work jobs 
were only ten percent more than the wage rates for the less val-
ued jobs, and the adjustment in the equal work jobs increased 
this differential to twenty percent, it is obvious that a substan-
tial part of the new differential is due to the uncorrected sex 
bias of the employer's original wage structure, and not to the 
differences in job content. 
This was in effect how the court approached the wage discrim-
ination issue in Taylor v. Charley Brothers Co.269 In that case, 
most of the male jobs were paid one rate ($4.80 per hour), and 
all of the female jobs were paid another, lower rate ($3.10 per 
hour).270 Once the Title VII plaintiff had established that three 
of the female jobs had "equal work" counterparts among the 
male jobs, and that the wage rate for the three female jobs was 
$1.70 per hour less than the wage rate for the three male jobs, 
there was at least a presumptive showing that all of the other 
female jobs would likewise have been paid that much more if 
they too had been performed by men.271 
Even if there is no direct evidence of sex bias in the establish-
ment of the employer's wage structure-i.e., no manuals or other 
instructions directing the reduction of wage rates for women 
workers, or the use of a lower base rate in setting the salaries for 
female-dominated jobs, or the payment of lower wages to women 
for equal work-the plaintiff in a Title VII case can use stan-
dard job evaluation techniques and regression analysis to expose 
the criteria that determine the pay rates for male-dominated 
and integrated jobs, and contrast these findings with the dollar 
values attached to the same criteria in establishing pay rates for 
the female-dominated jobs. 272 
269. 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 602 (W.D. Pa. 1981). 
270. Id. at 608. 
271. Id. at 609-14. This presumption was overcome in part by a study prepared by a 
job evaluator hired by the employer just prior to trial. Thus, while some of the female 
jobs would have been paid $4.80 per hour but for sex, other lighter jobs would have been 
paid $4.32 per hour. Id. at 611-12. 
272. This is a policy capturing method of evaluation. See supra text accompanying 
notes 190-92. 
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Critics of comparable worth argue that intentional discrimina-
tion cannot be established solely on the basis of such statistical 
data.273 But these "statistics" are different from those used in a 
discriminatory hire or promotion case (comparing applicant flow 
and hire data by sex). Even where there are substantial statisti-
cal disparities by sex or race between the number of applicants 
and the number of hires, it will still be necessary to establish 
through other proof that the women and/or minorities are 
equally qualified, or that the employer has expressed a bias to-
ward women and/or minority employees. Similarly, statistical 
data that disclose substantial disparities between the earnings of 
male and female employees, even when adjusted for education 
and experience, does not conclusively establish sex-based wage 
discrimination, because there may be material differences in the 
skill and productivity levels of the male and female jobs. 
The kinds of statistics contemplated here, however, are not 
used simply to demonstrate a wage disparity based on sex, but 
are designed instead to show the court how the employer's pay 
system rewards the various components of the male-dominated 
and integrated jobs, and to compare that with how the em-
ployer's pay system rewards those same components when per-
formed as part of the female-dominated jobs. In other words, the 
purpose of the statistical showing, when used in conjunction 
with standard job evaluation techniques, is not to demonstrate 
the statistical probabilities of such a wage structure existing by 
chance, without regard to sex, but rather, through a form of re-
verse engineering, to expose the employer's current pay system 
and to demonstrate its disparate application to female-domi-
nated jobs. 
While plaintiffs in Title VII cases have used regression analy-
ses to establish intentional disparate treatment, they typically 
have had their expert witnesses select the factors or variables 
against which to measure value-what has been referred to ear-
lier as an a priori approach to job evaluation.274 What is being 
suggested here is that the expert instead use the regression tech-
niques to determine what the factors and weights are that are 
273. The Supreme Court rejected just this argument in Bazemore v. Friday, 106 
S. Ct. 3000 (1986), where it said that "[a] plaintiff in a Title VII suit need not prove 
discrimination with scientific certainty" and that "a regression analysis" may "in a given 
case" be sufficient to carry the plaintiffs' ultimate burden. Id. at 3009. 
274. See supra text accompanying note 190. This was the approach used in the State 
of Washington study, N. WILLIS & Assocs., STATE OF WASHINGTON COMPARABLE WORTH 
STUDY (1974), see COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S., supra note 5, at 36-37, which was then 
unsuccessfully relied upon by the plaintiffs in AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 
(9th Cir. 1985). 
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used by the employer in establishing wage rates for the male-
dominated and integrated jobs-i.e., a policy capturing ap-
proach. 2n Although it is true that the results under these two 
approaches may not be too different, the use of a policy captur-
ing model relieves the court of having to decide, on the basis of 
conflicting expert testimony, which factors would be most appro-
priate for determining the value of work. This is so because the 
policy capturing approach exposes for the court those factors 
that the employer believes are most appropriate. While the de-
fendant's experts may challenge the reliability and accuracy of 
the plaintiff's policy capturing model, disputes over methodology 
are disputes that the courts have had to resolve in a variety of 
technical areas. 276 Moreover, the purpose of the testimony is to 
expose the employer's value system277-i.e., reverse engineer-
ing-and not to persuade the court to adopt the expert's value 
system-Le., what the opponents of comparable worth refer to 
as social engineering. 278 
There have been a number of Title VII cases in which the 
plaintiff did not attempt to establish sex bias throughout the 
employer's wage structure, but instead based the claim of wage 
discrimination on a comparison of selected female-dominated 
jobs with the job content of higher paid male-dominated jobs.279 
The court in such a case is asked to find, on the basis of the 
testimony of the employees or, in some cases, of a job evaluation 
expert, that the male and female jobs are "equal in value" and 
that the employer's payment of a lower wage rate to the female 
jobs is based on sex. 
Although a court has occasionally found such evidence suffi-
cient for a prima facie case,280 most courts will not infer discrim-
ination from such limited information, unless the jobs are very 
275. See supra text accompanying notes 190-92; see also COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE 
U.S., supra note 5, at 34-36. 
276. See Finkelstein, The Judicial Reception of Multiple Regression Studies in 
Race and Sex Discrimination Cases, 80 CoLUM. L. REV. 737, 738-42 (1980); Fisher, Multi-
ple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 CoLUM. L. REV. 702 (1980); see also EEOC v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986); R. MELNICK, REGULATION AND 
THE COURTS 151-53, 294-98, 342-59, 372-73, 388-89 (1983). 
277. As Ms. Hartmann noted in her discussion of the 1981 National Research Coun-
cil study on comparable worth, while " 'worth' is ultimately a matter of values, ... once 
criteria of worth are agreed to [by the employer], the establishment of job-worth hierar-
chies is amenable to technical solutions." Hartmann, supra note 59, at 176. 
278. Statement of Jeremy Rabkin, supra note 78, at 118. 
279. Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 
1036 (1984); Lemons v. City & County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 888 (1980). 
280. Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435, 441-42, 445-46 (W.D. Wis. 1982). 
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much alike. There are at least two reasons why a court would be 
unwilling to base a finding of discrimination on job evaluation 
evidence alone. First, the fact that two jobs are of equal value 
does not by itself establish that the employer would have paid 
the two jobs the same if they had both been male, because wages 
can be based on factors other than job content and human capi-
tal characteristics, including custom, unionization, or simply the 
randomness of the employer's wage structure. Second, the fact 
that a job evaluation expert would rate the two jobs as being 
equal in value does not mean that the employer would have. 281 
Accordingly, it will usually be necessary, where there is no di-
rect evidence of bias, to develop a regression analysis of the em-
ployer's entire wage structure. The development and presenta-
tion of such evidence is undeniably costly. On the other hand, it 
can be assumed that if the plaintiff does not make this kind of 
showing, the employer will use selected job evaluation data to 
rebut the plaintiff's case, assuming that the plaintiff's more lim-
ited showing was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. At 
this point the plaintiff will be required to do a complete analysis 
if she hopes to carry her burden of persuasion. In other words, it 
is doubtful that this cost can be avoided-whether incurred dur-
ing the plaintiff's prima facie case or, subsequently, m 
rebuttal. 282 
Finally, because of the claim that wage inequities are due to 
institutional discrimination and not to any employer discrimina-
tion, the plaintiff will want to offer all the evidence possible of 
281. These concerns were expressed in Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 700, where the plain-
tiffs based their wage discrimination claim on a comparison of wages paid to the nursing 
school faculty (almost all female) with wages paid in two other departments (almost all 
male). The court noted first that the plaintiffs' "evidence of comparable work, although 
not necessarily irrelevant in proving discrimination . . ., will not alone be sufficient to 
establish a prima facie case." Id. (quoting Gunther v. County of Washington, 623 F.2d 
1303, 1321 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 452 U.S. 161 (1981)). It also complained that the plain-
tiffs had "never compared female nursing wages to wages of female faculty in other de-
partments" and that "[w]ithout such a comparison, we have no meaningful way of deter-
mining just how much of the proposed wage differential was due to sex and how much 
due to [academic] discipline." Id. at 704 (emphasis in original). The evidence offered by 
the plaintiffs in Spaulding is thus very different from the evidentiary showing suggested 
here, which would include an examination or description of the job content of all-or a 
sample of all-of the employer's jobs (male-dominated, integrated, and female-domi-
nated), a multiple regression analysis to determine the factors and factor weights that 
are used by the employer in establishing the wages of the male-dominated and inte-
grated jobs, and a comparison of the application of these same values to the employer's 
female-dominated jobs. 
282. See supra text accompanying note 165. 
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specific discriminatory pay decisions.283 I have already men-
tioned information about the original structuring of the em-
ployer's pay scale. The plaintiff may also be able to obtain infor-
mation about how wage rates for newly created jobs are 
established. It is highly likely that the employer will have based 
these wage rates on internal equity considerations,284 with the 
caveat that if the job is female-dominated, the wage rate will 
have been based on comparability with the other female-domi-
nated jobs, and that if the job is male-dominated, the wage rate 
will have been based on comparability with the other male-dom-
inated jobs. 
Another instance of this kind of behavior can be found where 
the employer conducts market surveys for a select number of 
jobs, called "benchmark" jobs. An example of this was brought 
out in AFSCME v. Washington,28 r, where the State testified that 
it surveys three percent of its jobs every year prior to making 
any salary recommendations to the legislature. The salary rec-
ommendations for the nonsurveyed jobs are tied to the recom-
mendations for the surveyed jobs through a process of indexing, 
under which the nonsurveyed jobs are all grouped with one of 
the benchmark jobs. This indexing was designed to maintain the 
internal wage structure, which means that sex as well as job con-
tent determines how the jobs are indexed. For example, the po-
283. This task will probably be easiest in a case where the employer does very little 
hiring from the external labor market (except at entry levels), trains and promotes its 
employees from within, and has a large number of jobs that have no counterpart in other 
work places. In such a case the wage decisions are more clearly those of the employer and 
not of the external labor market. Employers who would appear to meet this description 
include telephone and communications companies, public employers. electronics firms, 
insurance and banking companies, and the aerospace industry. 
284. A plaintiff in a Title VII case may want to use the testimony of a labor econo-
mist to explain the importance of the internal labor market, its relationship to the exter-
nal labor market, and the types of pay decisions that employers can be expected to make 
in view of the internal labor market. Such testimony was used by the plaintiffs in 
AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985). 
The importance of the internal labor market, which determines the relative ranking of 
an employer's jobs, has been recognized by Congress in the Davis-Bacon Act of 1931, 40 
U.S.C. §§ 276a to 276a-5 (1982). This Act, among other things, requires government con-
struction contractors to pay at least the wage rates determined by the United States 
Secretary of Labor to be "prevailing" for each class of laborer and mechanic employed 
on similar types of construction projects in the locality. Id. § 276a. The Department of 
Labor has promulgated regulations that require contractors who use classes of laborers 
or mechanics that are not included in the prevailing wage determination to pay wage 
rates that conform to the specified rates. If the union or employees disagree with the 
wage rates established by the contractor, the Department of Labor will conduct a con-
formance hearing at which it will decide the appropriateness of the contractor's sug-
gested wage rates. See 29 C.F.R. § 5.5(a)(l)(ii)(A)-(C) (1986). 
285. 578 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Wash. 1983), reu'd, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985). 
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sitions of campus police assistant and fish warden, which are fe-
male jobs, are indexed to the clerical job rather than to the 
security guard position; the job of game warden, however, which 
is a male job, is indexed to the security guard position, although 
the game warden, like the fish warden, is not authorized to carry 
a weapon. Similarly, the female jobs of drug room clerk, stock 
clerk, and store clerk are indexed to the clerical position rather 
than to the male position of warehouse worker.286 
Of course, in all of these examples, it is likely that the em-
ployer will contend that the salaries were set to reflect the exter-
nal market rates, and were not explicitly designed to undervalue 
women's work. It is this point that is addressed next. 
4. The market made me do it- The basic argument against 
comparable worth is that it interferes with the operation of the 
market, and that by forcing employers to pay more than the 
"market" wage, it will (1) leave the employer without any mech-
anism for determining pay rates, and (2) force the employer into 
a competitive disadvantage. 
The first contention has already been dealt with in the pre-
ceding section. As noted there, most employers do not use the 
market to fix the pay rates for each occupation in their work 
force; rather, these rates are determined by the employers' own 
implicit or explicit job rankings. This is not to say that the mar-
ket is irrelevant. Employers generally ref er to the external labor 
market in establishing the top and bottom of their wage struc-
tures, taking into account their position in the market, and the 
importance they attach to employee stability and work quality. 
Nor is there anything in Title VII that prohibits an employer 
from using the market to determine the relative ranking of a 
male-dominated job versus other male-dominated jobs, or the 
relative ranking of a female-dominated job versus other female-
dominated jobs.287 The only restriction is that the employer can-
not use the market's lower prevailing wage rate for women as a 
justification for paying female-dominated jobs less than they 
would be paid if they were male-dominated or integrated jobs. 
This restriction on the use of the female labor market does 
not require that every employer institute a formal job evaluation 
system. No one suggests that the employer's pay decisions must 
be made with the precision of the theorems of Euclid. It is 
286. Petition of Appellee Class for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc 
at 4 n.4, AFSCME. 
287. Typically, of course, employers do not rank all similar occupations the same, 
because the value of specific job characteristics will vary from employer to employer. 
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enough if the wage rates for female-dominated jobs appear con-
sistent with the value judgments implicit in the employer's wage 
structure for male-dominated and integrated jobs. Only when 
this is not the case will there generally be any employees willing 
to undergo the expense of litigation, · or will there be evidence 
that is sufficiently compelling to make out a prima facie case of 
discrimination. 
The market defense is not a new argument that employers 
have adopted in response to comparable worth claims. The same 
argument was initially made in the Equal Pay Act cases, al-
though employers are now almost unanimous in their verbal 
support for the Act. 288 The motivation and legal justification for 
the market argument were the same then as they are now-that 
it was possible to fill the jobs at less than the rates being paid to 
male workers. Thus, employers who after the Equal Pay Act 
wanted to continue to take advantage of the lower costs for fe-
. male labor and, at the same time, avoid unequal wage payments 
to men and women employed in the same work, devised three 
solutions. 
The first was to terminate or transfer the male employees in 
the equal work job, so that the job was then performed only by 
women, and to continue the preexisting lower rate for women 
workers.289 The second was to open up the female job to men, 
and the male job to women, and pay them the preexisting rates 
for those jobs; under this approach, the two equal work jobs 
were paid differently, but, or so the argument went, not because 
of sex, because women were paid the male rate when employed 
in the old male job, and men were paid the female rate when 
employed in the old female job.290 A variation on this approach 
was to give smaller than average wage increases to the now-inte-
grated old male job, so that the differential between the two jobs 
would diminish over time.291 A third method, used by employers 
who did not maintain a fixed wage structure, was simply to pay 
what the employees demanded, assuming that the employees' 
demands fell within some acceptable or predetermined range. 292 
288. See WISCONSIN Ass'N OF MFRS. & COMMERCE, SPECIAL REPORT ON COMPARABLE 
WORTH #1, at 1 (Jan. 11, 1985); cf. WISCONSIN TASK FORCE MINORITY REPORT, supra note 
259, at 95 (urging vigorous enforcement of the Equal Pay Act as an alternative to compa-
rable worth); Williams, supra note 56, at 161. 
289. See Hodgson v. Miller Brewing Co., 457 F.2d 221, 223 (7th Cir. 1972). 
290. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 205-06 (1974); Shultz v. 
American Can Co.-Dixie Prods., 424 F.2d 356, 359 (8th Cir. 1970). 
291. Corning Glass, 417 U.S. at 208 n.29. 
292. See Brennan v. City Stores, 479 F.2d 235, 241 n.12 (5th Cir. 1973); Hodgson v. 
Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719, 726 (5th Cir. 1970). 
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Alternatively, these employers might base wage rates on a per-
cent increase over the employees' prior wage rates.293 
While the employment effects of these three practices were 
different-with the first two removing most men from the equal 
work jobs (either directly or indirectly through the market 
mechanism because very few men would continue to work at fe-
male wage rates), and the third retaining both men and women 
in the equal work jobs but paying them disparate wages because 
the wage demands of applicants and employees would typically 
reflect the market's dual wage structure for male and female em-
ployees-the effects on the employer's wage bill, and on the 
women's paychecks, were the same; that is, there was no signifi-
cant increase in wage rates due to the Equal Pay Act. 
The courts rejected all three of these approaches on the 
ground that the purpose of the Equal Pay Act was not simply to 
eliminate the inequality in wage payments, which could be ac-
complished by reducing the wages of the men, but to raise the 
earnings of women workers to where they would .have been but 
for sex, and to thereby increase the economic well-being of 
women workers.29' Admittedly, the courts' rejection of a practice 
that transferred men out of the equal work jobs, or paid them 
the old female rate, was facilitated by explicit language in the 
Equal Pay Act prohibiting the reduction of any male wages. 2911 
The courts' decisions, however, placed equal emphasis on the 
Act's purpose to remedy the effects of prior wage discrimination 
by rlirecting an increase in the wage rates of women. 296 The 
courts also rejected the argument that basing pay on an em-
ployee's or applicant's wage demand was a factor other than 
sex.297 As Justice Marshall wrote in Corning Glass Works v. 
Brennan,298 the wage differentials between men and women in-
spectors "reflected a job market in which [the employer] could 
pay women less than men .... That the [employer] took advan-
tage of such a situation may be understandable as a matter of 
economics, but its differential nevertheless became illegal once 
293. See Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 874-75 (9th Cir. 1982) (a Title VII 
equal work case). 
294. E.g., Corning Glass, 417 U.S. at 206-08; Hodgson v. Miller Brewing Co., 457 
F.2d 221, 225-26 (7th Cir. 1972). 
295. Section 3 of the Equal Pay Act included the following proviso: "Provided, that 
an employer who is paying a wage rate differential in violation of this subsection shall 
not, in order to comply with the provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of 
any employee." 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(l) (1982). 
296. E.g., Corning Glass, 417 U.S. at 206. 
297. E.g., Brennan v. City Stores, 479 F.2d 235, 241 n.12 (5th Cir. 1973). 
298. 417 U.S. 188 (1974). 
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Congress enacted into law the principle of equal pay for equal 
work."299 
The Supreme Court has thus explicitly rejected the employer's 
reliance on the market and the market's lower prevailing wage 
rate for women employees as justifications for paying women 
less than men for jobs that are equal. Moreover, the employer 
representative who testified before the United States Commis-
sion on Civil Rights conceded the correctness of this ruling with 
respect to Equal Pay Act cases. 300 The question remains then as 
to why the market should be a defense to pay differentials ex-
isting between male- and female-dominated jobs of equal value, 
but not for pay differentials existing between men and women 
employed in the same job. 
One possible answer is the one already addressed-namely, 
that in equal work cases the rates for women workers can be 
determined by reference to the rates for men workers, but in a 
comparable worth case, where there is no male rate for the fe-
male-dominated job, there is no "market" wage, untainted by 
sex, that the employer can use to establish a proper wage rate. 
But there frequently is no "market" rate for a particular job, as 
for example when an employer creates jobs that are unique to 
the employer's business. The employer simply fixes the rate for 
these new jobs on the basis of their relative value to other jobs 
in the workplace.301 The same can be done with respect to fe-
male-dominated jobs. This was graphically illustrated in the 
Corning Glass and Westinghouse cases, where the employers 
had ranked a number of female jobs as being equal in value to a 
number of male jobs, but had then paid the female jobs less-in 
Corning Glass, because of the lower prevailing market rate for 
women workers, and in Westinghouse, because of an unsubstan-
tiated assumption that women were less productive workers 
than men. 302 
Another possible answer is that in an equal work case the only 
reason for the wage differential between the men and women 
workers, assuming that their human capital characteristics are 
the same, is the willingness of women to work for less than 
men-i.e., the existence of a dual wage structure based on sex. 
But when the jobs of the men and the women are different, even 
though of equal value, there may be other explanations for the 
299. Id. at 205. 
300. See Williams, supra note 56, at 155 & n.65. 
301. See supra text accompanying notes 248-53. 
302. See supra text accompanying notes 203-04. 
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difference in pay other than sex or any differences in human 
capital characteristics or in job content. One such explanation 
would be where there was a shortage of skilled workers able to 
do the male-dominated job. Another would be a particular bar-
gaining history under which the incumbents of the male-domi-
nated job had been able to obtain a favorable wage status in 
relation to other male-dominated jobs, which could not be ex-
plained by any difference in job content or by any labor 
shortage. 
Admittedly, the principle of nondiscrimination does not 
render such wage differentials illegal.303 Men in other male-dom-
inated jobs are likewise paid less than these particular male em-
ployees. But the fact that there may be factors other than sex 
that account for part of the wage differential between a particu-
lar male-dominated job and female-dominated job of compara-
ble value does not automatically immunize that differential from 
attack under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. It simply requires 
plaintiffs to distinguish between those wage differentials that are 
based on the difference in the prevailing market rates for men 
and women workers-the sex-based market factor that the Su-
preme Court condemned in Corning Glass-and those wage dif-
ferentials that are based on true labor shortages and factors 
other than sex. 
The importance of distinguishing between wage differentials 
based on differences in the prevailing wage rates for men and 
women, which differences simply reflect the market's dual wage 
structure based on sex, and wage differentials based on a 
shortage of labor is well illustrated by Christensen v. Iowa. 304 In 
that case, which was decided before the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Gunther, 306 the employer had instituted a formal job 
evaluation system that determined the relative value of each job 
classification. Pay, however, was determined by community wage 
surveys, so that the pay rates for the female-dominated jobs, 
which were all in the clerical department, were significantly less 
than the pay rates for equally valued male-dominated jobs, 
which were all in the plant department. In 197 4, the employer 
adopted a new system under which all jobs with the same point 
total were to be placed in the same labor grade. Each labor 
grade was divided into sixteen pay steps that reflected a range of 
about forty percent from the minimum to the maximum pay in a 
303. See supra text accompanying notes 65-68, 246-58. 
304. 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977). 
305. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981). 
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labor grade. Under the terms of the plan, new employees were to 
begin at step one and subsequent step increases were to be 
awarded on the basis of seniority.306 In fact, however, a majority 
of the employees in the male-dominated jobs were started at 
steps much higher than were their counterparts in the female-
dominated jobs. 307 
Although the employer argued that the reason for the differ-
ence in wage treatment was that there was a shortage of labor 
for the male-dominated jobs, the record established that there 
was a surplus of experienced labor in the community for the 
male-dominated job classifications.308 The real reason for the 
employer's having to place employees in the male-dominated 
jobs at a higher step than equally rated employees in the female-
dominated jobs was that the men would not work at the new 
salary scale, which was based in part on the prevailing wage 
rates for women. In other words, the male-dominated jobs went 
unfilled, not because there was a shortage of available male la-
bor, but because men were unwilling to work for wages below 
those prevailing for men in the community. 
The employer in Christensen had thus adopted a variation of 
the employer's Equal Pay Act responses similar to the one used 
in the Corning Glass case.309 The employer established an 
"equal" wage for the comparably valued male and female jobs, 
which was more than it had previously paid to the women, but 
less than it had previously paid to the men, and, rather than 
transferring the men as in Miller Brewing Co.310 or "red cir-
cling" them as in Corning Glass,311 attempted to justify their 
continuing higher wage rate on the ground that men would not 
work for less, and that the male-dominated jobs would go un-
filled unless the court authorized the higher rate. 
The court's error was not in authorizing the higher rate, but in 
failing to see that the employer had not in fact eliminated the 
sex-based differential between the equally valued male- and fe-
ma,le-dominated jobs when in practice it continued to pay the 
prevailing "male" wage to the male-dominated jobs, while pay-
ing a wage less than the prevailing "male" wage to the female-
dominated jobs. To eliminate the disparate treatment, the em-
ployer had to raise the wages of the female-dominated jobs to 
306. Christensen, 563 F.2d at 354-55. 
307. Brief of Appellants at 13-18, Christensen. 
308. Id. at 18-22. 
309. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 208-09 (1974). 
310. Hodgson v. Miller Brewing Co., 457 F.2d 221, 223 (7th Cir. 1972). 
311. 417 U.S. at 208 n.29. 
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the equivalent male standard. As in Corning Glass, if the em-
ployer can use the "market" to justify continuing a differential 
between equally valued male- and female-dominated jobs-
where the "market" refers not to any shortage of labor, but sim-
ply to the difference in the prevailing wage rates for male- and 
female-dominated jobs-the intent of Congress to eliminate 
wage disparities based on sex would be defeated. This is so be-
cause the "market," if defined as it was in Christensen, would 
always justify a higher rate for the male-dominated jobs. 312 
A more rational approach, which would also be consistent with 
a policy of nondiscrimination, would be to restrict the definition 
of "market" to wage differentials resulting from true shortages 
of labor and differences in bargaining history or employer and/or 
community wage practices that are completely divorced from 
sex. The use of a policy capturing approach, which exposes the 
employer's current pay practices with respect to its male em-
ployees, permits just such distinctions. It does not mandate a 
fixed rate for each job of equal value-where the employer has 
not voluntarily adopted such a system-but instead permits the 
employer to continue to pay different rates for equally valued 
male-dominated jobs and for equally valued female-dominated 
jobs so long as the differences in rates are not based on sex, but 
on some factor other than sex. 
III. THE OBJECTIVES FOR COMPARABLE WORTH 
While I am satisfied that Title VII's prohibition against sex-
based wage discrimination would, if properly interpreted, com-
fortably accommodate a "comparable worth" suit, comparable 
worth legislation is probably inevitable-in part because of the 
politics involved, and in part because the lower courts have been 
so reluctant to use Title VII to remedy pervasive wage discrimi-
nation. Indeed, the legislative process has already begun. It is 
therefore useful to consider what form such legislation should 
312. The War Labor Board rejected a similar "market" argument in its intraplant 
inequality cases. For example, when the defense was raised in the General Electric Co. 
case, the Board dismissed it, stating: 
We have previously indicated that the claim of community and industry practice 
cannot be advanced as a sound reason for doing nothing to correct an injustice 
which patently exists. Moreover, these companies, as the whole or dominant em-
ployer in the community in many instances, may have themselves initiated or 
supported the practice. 
In re General Elec. Co., 28 War Lab. Rep. (BNA) 666, 690 (1945). 
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take. What are the clear objectives for such legislation?313 What 
issues will have to be addressed, either in the enabling legisla-
tion, or in its subsequent administration and enforcement? And 
how can such legislation be best administered? 
Obviously, the overriding objective of any comparable worth 
legislation is the elimination of wage disparities based on race, 
color, sex, religion, or national origin. But if this were the sole 
objective, new legislation would hardly be necessary because 
that objective is already met by Title VII, at least since Gun-
ther. 314 Other goals, therefore, could include the following: (I) 
creating a presumption of violation, rebuttable by the employer, 
where there are wage disparities based on sex, race, color, reli-
gion, or national origin that, when equitable job evaluation tech-
niques are used, cannot be explained by the differences in job 
content; (2) defining and limiting the factors that an employer 
might raise as a defense, and specifically eliminating the "mar-
ket defense" to the extent that it is based on lower prevailing 
wage rates for any racial or sexual group; (3) prohibiting the re-
duction of wage rates for any employee as a means of eliminat-
ing illegal wage differentials; ( 4) prohibiting the use of any pay 
practice unrelated to job content or to individual job perform-
ance or seniority, such as the use of prior salary or head-of-
household status, that would result in disproportionately lower 
wage rates for any racial or sexual group; (5) directing a govern-
ment agency to develop equitable job evaluation techniques that 
could be used by courts or by employers in monitoring their own 
pay practices; and (6) requiring government contractors to moni-
tor regularly their pay practices, identify any wage disparities 
based on sex, race, and other impermissible factors, and submit 
a plan to the government contracting agency or to the Office of 
Federal Contract Compliance and Procurement for the immedi-
ate elimination of these disparities. 
All of these objectives-with the possible exception of (5) and 
(6)31~-are consistent with a notion of civil liberty that would 
313. I agree with Professor Jeremy Rabkin that it is necessary to have clearly defined 
objectives before enacting any new comparable worth legislation. I believe, however, that 
those objectives exist and that the concerns Professor Rabkin suggests are avoidable. See 
Rabkin, supra note 67, at 187; Statement of Jeremy Rabkin, supra note 78, at 115-18. 
314. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 168, 180-81 (1981). 
315. It should be noted, however, that Congress has regularly authorized extensive 
intervention by the government in the pay practices of federal contractors. For example, 
the U.S. Department of Labor is required by Congress to specify the minimum "prevail-
ing" hourly wage and fringe benefits that must be paid to each class of worker, by occu-
pation and experience level, in each industry and for each geographic area, if the worker 
is employed on a government contract for service, or for construction or repair. Davis-
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restrict government intervention to the prohibition of wage dis-
crimination; they closely parallel several provisions of the Equal 
Pay Act, and in my view are fully consistent with Title VII and 
are added only to simplify litigation and to resolve the market 
defense and reduction of rates issues by legislation. Although it 
is true that in 1963 Congress refused to extend the "equal pay" 
requirement to "work of comparable character," on the ground 
that Congress did not want the government to tell private busi-
nesses how to value jobs and how much to pay,316 it is now clear 
that job evaluation techniques are reliable, and can be used to 
capture the employer's own implicit value system, without im-
posing on employers the government's view as to what factors 
should be considered and how much monetary weight each fac-
tor should be given.317 
In addition to these objectives, many legislators at the federal 
and state levels would add two others, applicable only to the 
public sector: (7) the mandatory use of job evaluation in estab-
lishing pay rates for jobs, and (8) the payment of the same wage 
rate for all jobs of equal or comparable worth. Both of these 
objectives constitute a much more significant intrusion into the 
pay practices of an employer, and would certainly be bitterly op-
posed if any effort were made to extend such requirements to 
the private sector. But several of the recent legislative enact-
ments or proposals (applicable only to state or federal employ-
ees) have contained one or both of these requirements. 318 There 
can hardly be any objection on interventionist grounds, because 
Bacon Act of 1931, 40 U.S.C. §§ 276a to 276a-5 (1982); Service Contract Act of 1965, 41 
u.s.c. §§ 351-358 (1982). 
316. During the 1963 debates, Congressman Goodell explained this rejection of the 
"work of comparable character" language as follows: 
We do not expect the Labor Department people to go into an establishment 
and attempt to rate jobs that are not equal. We do not want to hear the Depart-
ment say, 'Well, they amount to the same thing,' and evaluate them so they 
come up to the same skill or point. . . . 
. . . [W]e want the private enterprise system ... to have a maximum degree 
of discretion in working out the evaluation of the employee's work and how 
much he should be paid for it. 
109 CONG. REC. 9197-98 (1963). 
317. See supra text accompanying notes 190-92. 
318. See, e.g., lowA CODE ANN. §§ 79.18, 475A.3(3), 602.1204(2) (West Supp. 1986); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 43A.05, 471.992-.996 (West Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§§ 28B.16.020(5), 28B.16.116, 41.06.020(5), 41.06.155 (West Supp. 1987); Act of July 17, 
1985, No. 29, § 3019(2), 1985 Wis. Legis. Serv. 20, 474 (West) '(No. 3); see also H.R. 5680, 
98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (proposed Federal Pay Equity and Management Improve-
ment Act of 1984); H.R. 4599, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (proposed Federal Employees' 
Pay Equity Act of 1984); S. 1900, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (proposed Pay Equity Act 
of 1983). 
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the legislature is the paymaster for the executive branch, and in 
that role has always determined the types of pay practices that 
the executive branch must follow. Indeed, these principles, or 
some version of them, have been part of the federal civil service 
law for over 100 years.319 The more relevant questions concern 
the extent to which either of these requirements should be ex-
tended to other subdivisions of the state, or to the private sec-
tor, and whether they are necessary to full eradication of sex-
based wage disparities. 
IV. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPARABLE WORTH 
Two major issues have been raised by the case law and legal 
and economic commentary concerning the implementation of 
comparable worth. First, what is the appropriate remedy for sex-
based wage discrimination affecting dissimilar jobs? This in turn 
has raised a number of subsidiary questions: How are nondis-
criminatory wage rates determined? Can large numbers of wage 
rates be determined without direct reference to the market? Can 
the wage rates for the male-dominated jobs be reduced, and the 
monies used to increase the wage rates for the female-dominated 
jobs? The second major issue is whether comparable worth can 
be implemented without imposing unacceptably high costs in 
terms of worker displacement, reduced earnings for blue collar 
families, employer/union autonomy, and economic efficiency. 
A. How To Remedy Sex-Based Wage Discrimination 
Wage discrimination, as was discussed in Part I of this Article, 
is a structural problem. In other words, if the employer has used 
different criteria in establishing the wage rates for male- and fe-
male-dominated jobs, that disparate treatment will, presump-
tively at least, have affected all female-dominated jobs and not 
just some of them. As a result, any remedy will likewise have to 
be a structural one. Of course, if the alleged discrimination is 
based on a claim that the employer is paying lower wages for 
female-dominated jobs that are equal or similar in job content to 
a higher paid male-dominated job-as, for example, in Laffey u. 
Northwest Airlines320 and Briggs u. City of Madison321-or that 
319. D. TREIMAN, supra note 11, at 1, 17. 
320. 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978). 
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have been rated as equal by the employer's own job evaluation 
plan, as in International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine 
Workers u. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,322 the remedy would 
simply be to raise the wages of the female-dominated job to the 
appropriate male-dominated job counterpart.323 But if the al-
leged discrimination is based on the use of different criteria in 
establishing the wage rates for male- and female-dominated 
jobs, the remedy should properly include all female-dominated 
jobs in the unit of analysis. 
In those cases in which the employer pays the same wage rate 
to all male-dominated and integrated jobs at the same point 
value, the remedy is an easy one: raise the rates of the female-
dominated jobs to the rates of the correspondingly valued male-
dominated jobs. More typically, however, the employer will not 
pay the same wage rate to all male-dominated and/or integrated 
jobs at the same point value. The reason is that job rates are 
often determined by factors other than job content and human 
capital, the most common being the scarcity or surplus of partic-
ular job skills, differences in respective union strengths, historic 
bargaining positions, and custom. These same factors will also 
have influenced the wage rates for the female-dominated jobs at 
the same point value. 824 But because sex is an additional factor, 
the rates of the female-dominated jobs will almost always be be-
low the rates of the correspondingly valued male-dominated and 
integrated jobs. 
In determining an appropriate remedy for such cases, it is 
helpful to examine a number of possibilities: (1) raise the rates 
of the female-dominated jobs to the rate of the lowest paid 
male-dominated or integrated job; (2) raise the rates of the fe-
male-dominated jobs to the rate of the highest paid male-domi-
nated or integrated job; (3) raise the rates of the female-domi-
nated jobs to the average or mean rate of the male-dominated 
and integrated jobs; or (4) raise the rate of each female-domi-
nated job by a fixed percentage, equal to the percent differential 
between the average rate of the female-dominated jobs and the 
average rate of the male-dominated and integrated jobs. 
The first approach assumes that the sex bias in the employer's 
wage structure affects each of the female-dominated jobs differ-
ently. Thus, if some of the female-dominated jobs are paid at or 
321. 536 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Wis. 1982). 
322. 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 967 (1981). 
323. See supra text accompanying notes 152-58. 
324. See supra text accompanying note 201. 
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near the rate of the lowest paid male-dominated or integrated 
job, those female-dominated jobs are assumed to be unaffected 
by any sex bias. This assumption is wholly inconsistent with 
what we know about the origins of the dual wage structure and 
its effect on all female-dominated jobs.325 Moreover, this first ap-
proach would eliminate those wage disparities among the fe-
male-dominated jobs that are based on factors other than job 
content. It would mandate that all female-dominated jobs at the 
same point value be paid the same, even though the wage dis-
parities that had previously existed among these jobs could not 
have been based on sex, or on any other illicit factor. Such an 
approach would thus constitute disparate treatment based on 
sex, because these other factors would continue to influence the 
wage rates of the male-dominated and integrated jobs, but not 
the wage rates of the female-dominated jobs. 
Finally, it is difficult to see how this first approach would 
eliminate the sex bias. The purpose of the remedy is to imple-
ment the wage rates that would have been paid to the female-
dominated jobs had they been male-dominated. It would seem 
highly unlikely that all of these jobs, had they been male, would 
have been paid no more than the rate paid to the lowest paid 
male-dominated or integrated job. Some jobs would presumably 
have been paid less; some the same; and others more. If an em-
ployer were to adopt this first approach, and, after implementa-
tion, draw a salary line for the female-dominated jobs and an-
other salary line for the male-dominated and integrated jobs, the 
line for the female-dominated jobs would still be substantially 
below the line for the male-dominated and integrated jobs. 
The second approach would have many of the same defects as 
the first, except that now the employer would be overcompensat-
ing for any sex bias. In other words, it would assume that any 
differential between the rates of the female-dominated jobs and 
the highest paid male-dominated or integrated job was due to 
sex, and not to the presence or absence of those factors, unre-
lated to job content, that have influenced the wage rates of the 
male-dominated and integrated jobs, and have resulted in dis-
parities in the wage rates for these jobs. Moreover, if one were 
again to draw two salary lines, one for the male-dominated and 
integrated jobs, and one for the female-dominated jobs, there 
would still be a large disparity, only this time the disparity 
would be in favor of the female-dominated jobs-thus setting up 
the employer for a reverse discrimination claim. 
325. See supra text accompanying notes 107-23. 
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The third approach is far superior to the first two. By using an 
average rate, it more clearly attempts to isolate the sex taint 
from any of the other factors resulting in varying wage rates for 
the male-dominated and integrated jobs at the same point value. 
But this approach, like the other two, would still eliminate any 
wage differentials between the female-dominated jobs. As a re-
sult, a number of the female-dominated jobs would be placed in 
a better position than they would have been in if they were 
male-dominated, where the absence of specific factors (e.g., 
union representation, skill shortages, or custom) would result in 
that job being paid less than other jobs at the same point value. 
And, of course, a number of the female-dominated jobs would be 
placed in a less favorable position than they would have _been in 
if they were male-dominated, where the presence of these same 
factors would have resulted in their being paid more than other 
jobs at the same point value. 
The fourth approach, which would increase the rate for each 
female-dominated job by the amount of the percent or dollar 
difference between the two salary lines, is the one most clearly 
designed to remedy sex discrimination. This approach eliminates 
only the sex bias and nothing else; it leaves in place the existing 
wage differentials between equally rated female-dominated jobs 
(which differences are due to factors other than sex) and simply 
superimposes the pay structure for the male-dominated and in-
tegrated jobs. There will thus be female-dominated jobs above 
the line, just as there are male-dominated and integrated jobs 
above the line; and there will be female-dominated jobs below 
the line, just as there are male-dominated and integrated jobs 
below the line. But although the rates for these equally valued 
jobs remain varied, there are no longer two distinct salary lines 
based on sex. This approach is similar to the one used under the 
Equal Pay Act in those cases where the employer has a random 
rate structure, under which employees who perform equal work 
are all paid differently, although the female employees are gen-
erally paid significantly less than the male employees. In such a 
case, the employees would be divided into separate groups based 
on their experience, seniority, and quantity or quality of produc-
tion, and the average wage would be determined for the male 
and female employees within each group. The difference be-
tween the male and female average would then be added to the 
wage rate of each female within that particular group, thereby 
eliminating the sex taint from each of their wage rates. 326 
326. See supra text accompanying notes 128-31. 
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B. The Cost of Implementing Comparable Worth 
An increasing number of commentators argue that comparable 
worth is too costly to be implemented and that any benefits that 
it would obtain for women workers are more than outweighed by 
the "extraordinary and unwarranted costs" that would result 
from comparable worth's "massive intervention in the market 
economy," including the loss of employer/union autonomy, eco-
nomic efficiency, and jobs.327 This assessment of the unwar-
ranted costs of comparable worth is based on three precepts, all 
of which I believe to be flawed: (1) the courts, even with modern 
job evaluation and regression techniques, will be unable to de-
termine with sufficient accuracy the extent to which an em-
ployer's wage structure is biased by sex; (2) the relative benefits 
to the economic status of women will be minimal; and (3) the 
disemployment effects of comparable worth will be dispropor-
tionately borne by the economically disadvantaged, and will re-
sult in the loss of family income for blue collar workers. 
This Article has already dealt with the first premise, and has, 
I believe, established the ability of the legal process to expose 
disparate treatment based on sex. Moreover, because the typical 
remedy for comparable worth violations will be a structural wage 
adjustment affecting all female-dominated jobs, the court or leg-
islature need not displace employer/union judgments concerning 
the relative ranking of female-dominated jobs vis-a-vis other fe-
male-dominated jobs, or the relative ranking of male-dominated 
and integrated jobs vis-a-vis other male-dominated and inte-
grated jobs, thereby preserving not only employer autonomy but 
also any wage distinctions between equally valued jobs that re-
flect differences in their market rates (or some other factor unre-
lated to job content or to the individual worker's human capital 
characteristics) where those differences are not just the result of 
sex. 
Second, while it is certainly true that the correction of dis-
criminatory wage practices will impose additional costs on em-
ployers ( unlike nondiscriminatory hiring and promotion prac-
tices), it is far from clear that the resulting disemployment 
327. See, e.g., G. JOHNSON & G. SoLON, supra note 86, at 16; Bartholet, Pay Equity: 
The Concept of Equal Pay for Work of Comparable Worth, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW 
YORK UNIVERSITY THIRTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 8-1, 8-6 (R. Adelman 
ed. 1985); Killingsworth, The Economics of Comparable Worth: Analytical, Empirical, 
and Policy Questions, in COMPARABLE WORTH: NEW DIRECTIONS FoR RESEARCH 86 
(H. Hartmann ed. 1985); Northrup, Comparable Worth and Realistic Wage Setting, in 
1 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 56, at 93; Weiler, supra note 68, at 1771-78. 
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effects will be as substantial as the critics of comparable worth 
have projected, or that the effects will fall disproportionately on 
women, and/or the disadvantaged.328 Some of the increase in 
wages should be offset by productivity improvements resulting 
from reduced turnover, lower training costs, etc. Employers 
might also secure cost reductions in other areas such as health 
care and workers compensation by implementing, for example, 
cost-control procedures and early return to work programs. 
While these costs are not related to comparable worth, they are 
mentioned to illustrate that job reduction is not the only possi-
ble response to increased costs. 
Moreover, even if the unrelated cost reductions were to affect 
employment in other sectors of the economy (e.g., a loss of jobs 
in the health care industry), a broad redistribution of the costs 
of comparable worth-through price increases, cost savings, in-
creased productivity, and reduced profits329-would also spread 
its effects. In addition, most of the disemployment projections 
assume instant compliance with comparable worth, which, how-
ever desirable, will not occur.330 Even employers who initiate 
voluntary corrective action will typically phase in the wage ad-
justments over a period of years, as was done for public employ-
ees in San Jose, Washington, Minnesota, and Wisconsin.331 
Significantly, the studies of those systems that have imple-
mented comparable worth do not support the thesis that an in-
crease in the relative wage rates of female-dominated jobs will 
have substantial disemployment effects. Thus, a 1985 study of 
Australia's experience following the implementation of compara-
ble worth by the federal and state wage tribunals in the period 
from 1972 to 1975332 found that the actual wages of women 
328. See, e.g., B. BERGMANN, supra note 10, at 194-96; Gregory, McMahon & Whit-
tingham, Women in the Australian Labor Force: Trends, Causes, and Consequences, 3 
J. LAB. EcoN. S293, S294 (1985) [hereinafter Gregory]; S. Kahn, Economic Implications 
of Comparable Worth: The Case of San Jose (unpublished paper, Feb. 1987). 
329. See B. BERGMANN, supra note 10, at 173-98. 
330. Id. 
331. A. COOK, supra note 58, at 140-41, 226; WISCONSIN TASK FORCE REPORT, supra 
note 179, at 69. Many equal pay settlements, even after the expiration of the Equal Pay 
Act's statutory grace periods, provided for the gradual equalization of wage rates. For 
example, in 1977 the Chicago office real estate firms negotiated a collective bargaining 
agreement with the Service Employees International Union under which the substantial 
wage differential between male and female maintenance employees was eliminated over a 
three-year period. Most female employees, particularly if the relationship with their em-
ployer is a good one, will consider an immediate, and voluntary phase-in of comparable 
worth more desirable than having to obtain the same relief, albeit with back pay, only 
after extended and expensive litigation. 
332. Gregory, supra note 328, at S294, S298-99, S300, S304, S306. 
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workers (and not just their award rates) increased thirty percent 
more than the actual wages of men workers, and that women 
workers are now paid substantially more than their market 
rate. 333 At the same time, the study reveals that women, during 
this period, increased their share of the labor market. The study 
concludes that comparable worth can be implemented without 
any serious relative employment effects for women, "at least 
over a period of a decade or so. "33' 
A recent study of the economic effects of the implementation 
of comparable worth by the city of San Jose, California, found 
similar results. In San Jose, where the comparable worth adjust-
ments were made in five stages from July 1981 to July 1984, the 
wages in the jobs that received comparable worth adjustments 
increased by 73.9% over a six-year period, whereas the wages in 
all other jobs increased by only 50.4 % . 3311 The study also estab-
lished that the relative wage increments for the female-domi-
nated jobs were the result of the comparable worth adjustments 
and not of any general increase in the wages for these occupa-
tions. 338 Despite the increased costs resulting from the imple-
mentation of comparable worth, employment in the comparable 
worth jobs increased more than twice as fast as employment in 
the other city jobs. 337 Of course, as the authors of both the Aus-
tralian and San Jose studies note, it is possible that employment 
would have increased even more significantly if comparable 
worth had not been implemented. 338 But these studies should at 
least cause us to question some of the projected disemployment 
effects of comparable worth. 
Moreover, even if there is some disemployment effect, the 
question still is whether that effect is warranted or unwarranted 
by the benefits of comparable worth. In this connection, there is 
considerable disagreement as to just how much the full imple-
mentatio:n of comparable worth will cost.339 But even if compa-
rable worth were to reduce the total gap between men's and 
333. Id. at S294, S299-300, S304. 
334. Id. at S306. Gregory's earlier studies had reported similar findings. See, e.g., 
Gregory & Duncan, supra note 205, at 404; Gregory & Ho, Equal Pay and Comparable 
Worth: What Can the U.S. Learn from the Australian Experience? (unpublished draft, 
1984). Gregory and Ho also reported that the United Kingdom, in implementing its vari-
ous equal pay policies, which were broader than the Equal Pay Act, also experienced a 
large increase in women's wages with little relative employment loss. 
335. S. Kahn, supra note 328, at 8-9. 
336. Id. at 9-10. 
337. Id. at 10-11. 
338. Id. at 11-12; Gregory, supra note 328, at S306 n.16. 
339. Cf. B. BERGMANN, supra note 10, at 194; G. JOHNSON & G. SOLON. supra note 86, 
at 15; Weiler, supra note 68, at 1803. 
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women's earnings by only a few percentage points, because of 
the higher concentration of women in the more marginal firms 
and industries, and because of differences in women's human 
capital, it is undisputed that in every study of a public sector 
pay system, all of which made adjustments for differences in job 
content and human capital, the sex-based wage differential has 
averaged somewhere between ten and twenty percent. 340 It is 
also estimated that this sex taint would be even greater in the 
private sector. Moreover, in at least the Wisconsin study, the 
largest percent disparities occur in the lower salary ranges. 341 
Thus, although the more skilled female-dominated jobs may re-
ceive larger pay increments in terms of dollar amounts, the com-
parable worth adjustments for the lower skilled jobs-because 
they involve a larger percent increase-will have a more signifi-
cant impact on the economic condition of women in the lower 
salary levels. 
It is difficult to believe that these women would not be sub-
stantially better off after the implementation of comparable 
worth. As one economist noted, if the unemployment rate for 
women were to increase by ten percent, raising their average 
length of unemployment from 11.5 weeks to 12.5 weeks, their 
yearly wage loss would be only two percent, and less if they were 
eligible for unemployment insurance-which is the loss that 
must be balanced against a ten to twenty percent wage in-
crease. 342 This assumes, of course, as the Australian and San 
Jose studies have already demonstrated, that the number of fe-
male-dominated jobs will not be disproportionately affected by 
the implementation of comparable worth. 
Nor does the documentation support the suggestion that mi-
nority and/or blue collar families will bear a disproportionate 
share of the cost of implementing comparable worth. 343 The as-
sumption seems to be that if the average employer's male-domi-
nated and integrated jobs were grouped by job point value, using 
340. COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S., supra note 5, at 36-39; R. STEINBERG, supra note 
259, at 7-8; D. TREIMAN, supra note 11, at 27-28; WISCONSIN TASK FORCE REPORT, supra 
note 179, at 5-9, 53. 
341. DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS, STATE OF WISCONSIN, REPORT TO THE 
JOINT COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS ON A PROPOSAL FOR CORRECTING PAY INEQ-
UITIES, attachment 1 (Dec. 4, 1986); see also WISCONSIN TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 
179, at 57-58. 
342. B. BERGMANN, supra note 10, at 191. 
343. Rabkin, supra note 67, at 192, 194. For a contrary view concerning the impor-
tance of comparable worth to minority households, see Equitable Pay Practices Act 
Hearing, supra note 77, at 5-7 (statement of Eileen Stein, Chairman, National Comm. on 
Pay Equity), and Scales-Trent, supra note 57. 
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a policy capturing method, and a salary line drawn, the blue col-
lar jobs would tend to be above the line and therefore have the 
wage rates that would be most at risk if comparable worth were 
implemented. Of course, wage rates above the salary line are at 
risk only if the employer freezes (i.e., red circles) or reduces 
those wage rates to pay for the costs of comparable worth. It is 
my view that any such action would be illegal under Title VII. 344 
But even apart from this argument, the Wisconsin study does 
not confirm that it is the blue collar jobs that are the highest 
paid. On the contrary, in Wisconsin, the blue collar jobs are 
often among the lowest paid. For example, the power plant su-
pervisor, a job that was valued at 953 points, is paid less than 
the public defender investigator 3 and purchasing agent 2, jobs 
that were also valued at 953 points, and a plasterer is paid less 
than a real estate manager 1, although both jobs are rated the 
same.3411 
The Wisconsin study also identifies a number of male-domi-
nated and integrated jobs that are so substantially above or be-
low the salary line that they should be examined to determine 
whether their wage rates are based on some other recognized 
factor, or are the result of the employer having failed to adjust 
344. Although Title VII has no explicit language prohibiting an employer from reduc-
ing its wage rates in order to achieve compliance with the Act's nondiscrimination provi-
sions, unlike the Equal Pay Act, see supra note 295, it does prohibit disparate treatment. 
An employer who adopts new criteria for establishing wage rates that are less generous 
than those that were previously used in establishing the wage rates for non-female-domi-
nated jobs, when threatened with a lawsuit, is no different than an employer who simply 
refuses to extend the same treatment to female-dominated jobs. Courts should not allow 
employers to escape their obligation to extend the same benefits to female-dominated 
jobs as to male-dominated jobs by withdrawing those benefits that they had previously 
provided only to the male-dominated and integrated jobs. Any such response would vio-
late the principal purpose of Title VII's prohibition against wage discrimination-to re-
quire that female and minority jobs be paid what they would have been had they been 
male and white jobs. 
This kind of employer response would also create other problems. First, it would result 
in the difficulties experienced in Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977), where 
the employer could not maintain the new reduced wage rates for the male-dominated 
jobs. See supra notes 304-12. Second, it would place the full cost of Title VII compliance 
on the shoulders of employees in the male-dominated and integrated jobs, whereas an 
increase in the wage rates for the female-dominated jobs only would spread the cost of 
compliance more evenly to include consumers and business owners. Third, it seems de-
liberately designed to promote employee divisiveness, particularly against those in the 
female-dominated jobs. Finally, any such response misconceives the nature of the two 
salary lines. There is no basis for assuming that jobs above the male salary line are over-
paid, or that jobs below the line are underpaid. The salary line is only a line of best fit, 
which, by definition, will have salaries above and below it. See Gray & Scott, A "Statisti-
cal" Remedy for Statistically Identified Discrimination, 66 ACADEME 174, 178 (1980). 
345. DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS, supra note 341, attachment 4; WIS-
CONSIN TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 179, at 117. 
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the wage rates following some change in the content of the job, 
or reflect some other error. As a result of this process, the State 
has increased the salaries for a number of blue collar jobs, in-
cluding cook 1, cook 2, fire control dispatcher, recreation assis-
tant, and utility plant operator. Most of the jobs that were above 
the line were professional or supervisory 1n nature, including an 
administrative officer, civil engineer, electrical engineer, and ra-
diation consultant. There were only a few jobs above the line 
that might be classified as either blue collar or craft jobs-
typographer, printing technician, and superintendent of build-
ings and grounds. 346 
Finally, the Australian and San Jose studies seem to refute 
the argument made by the critics of comparable worth that its 
implementation would discourage women from seeking male-
dominated jobs.347 So, for example, in San Jose, during the pe-
riod when the wage rates for female-dominated jobs were rising 
relatively faster than the wage rates for male-dominated jobs, 
the number of women in male-dominated jobs increased by 
eighty-six percent.348 Interestingly, men did not increase their 
representation in the female-dominated jobs, despite the im-
provement in wage rates. 349 This would suggest, as the authors 
of the Australian and San Jose studies conclude, that employers 
will generally select applicants of the sex identified with a par-
ticular job, except where this bias has been overcome by the 
kind of affirmative action program in effect in San Jose for 
women in traditional male jobs. 3110 
CONCLUSION 
The primary purpose of this Article has been to demonstrate 
that comparable worth, defined as a wage discrimination claim 
346. WISCONSIN TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 179, at 117. 
347. See, e.g., Nelson, Opton & Wilson, Wage Discrimination and the "Comparable 
Worth" Theory in Perspective, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 233 (1980). 
348. S. Kahn, supra note 328, at 16-17, 19, 26. 
349. Id. at 15-19. 
350. Id.; see also Gregory, supra note 328, at S306. Even if the proportion of men in 
female-dominated jobs did not increase over the short term, I am still convinced that any 
long-term integration of the occupations is dependent upon improving the status and 
wage rates of the female-dominated jobs. All the San Jose study shows is that, if the goal 
is to integrate the female-dominated jobs, it is not enough to raise the wage rates for 
these jobs; it will also be necessary to overcome the strong tradition that favors the em-
ployment of women in these positions. This tradition can perhaps only be overcome by 
the adoption of self-conscious hiring policies that are designed to overcome the effects of 
traditional hiring practices. 
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based on the employer's implicit or explicit use of different cri-
teria in establishing the wage rates for male- and female-domi-
nated jobs, requires no new legal theory or justification but is 
simply an application of the disparate treatment model of dis-
crimination. The Article therefore proposes a very traditional 
approach to comparable worth cases, in which the plaintiff (1) 
establishes, wherever possible, the employer's historic basis for 
compensating female employees; (2) uncovers any specific in-
dicators of an early dual wage structure, including equal pay vio-
lations before or after 1963, and/or disparities in the rates for 
unskilled male- and female-dominated jobs, that reflect the dis-
parity prevailing in the community for unskilled female and 
male labor; and (3) demonstrates, through job evaluation and 
statistical regression techniques, that the employer uses differ-
ent criteria (either explicitly or implicitly) in establishing the 
wage rates for male- and female-dominated jobs. The Article 
also discusses the critical difference between a market rate de-
fense based on true labor shortages, or differences in the bar-
gaining strengths and objectives of different unions, which, in 
the author's view, would be legal, and a market rate defense 
based on the lower prevailing wage structure for fem ale labor, 
which, under any reasonable application of Corning Glass 
Works v. Brennan,sr,i should be illegal. 
The Article then reviews the content and objectives of re-
cently proposed and/or enacted comparable worth legislation, 
and examines critically what the objectives of such legislation 
should be. The Article notes that the comparable worth laws en-
acted by the states for application in the public sector do not 
define discrimination, nor establish any procedures for deter-
mining discrimination, but are rather the legislative enactment 
of pay systems for the civil service-similar to a private em-
ployer's adoption of a pay plan for its employees. For this rea-
son, such laws contain provisions that would be inappropriate in 
legislation regulating conduct in the private sector. Therefore, 
the critical question is what kind of legislation would be appro-
priate for the private sector. First, it is my view that any new 
legislation should be limited to those objectives that are firmly 
rooted in a policy of nondiscrimination ( except possibly in the 
area of government contracting), and not in any broader policy 
of social justice. Second, the most important objective of such 
legislation, other than the elimination of discrimination, should 
be to reduce the complexity of wage discrimination litigation, 
351. 417 U.S. 188 (1974). 
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thereby minimizing both the time and cost of such litigation, 
and, of equal importance, making enforcement and voluntary 
compliance realistic expectations. 
Finally, the Article has attempted to refute the currently pop-
ular view that comparable worth, even were it to remedy some 
sex-based wage discrimination, cannot survive a cost-benefit 
analysis. In making this argument, the critics have, I believe, 
both overstated the costs of comparable worth and understated 
its benefits. Its benefits cannot be measured solely in terms of 
how much of the wage gap will be eliminated by its implementa-
tion, or in terms of what it will accomplish for women employed 
in marginal jobs. The importance of comparable worth is three-
fold: it can eliminate the continuing persistence of a dual wage 
structure based on sex; it will significantly increase the wages of 
women employed in the primary labor sector; and, most impor-
tantly, the improved economic stature of women's work can have 
a significant impact on how women are perceived in the work-
place, and on what potential employers will infer about their 
abilities. 
Comparable worth is not a flawed policy because it will not 
substantially affect the economic condition of women employed 
in the textile and clothing industries, any more than Title VII is 
a flawed policy because, despite the dramatic benefits it ob-
tained for qualified minorities, 3112 it did not improve the eco-
nomic condition of disadvantaged minorities who had few, if 
any, marketable job skills.3113 No one law or policy can ever cure 
the effects of two centuries of racism and sexism. The impor-
tance of establishing the principle of comparable worth, like the 
importance of having achieved the enactment of Title VII, and 
its implementation, can never be measured simply in terms of 
numbers. Law is an educator, and the most important effect of 
establishing that existing practices are discriminatory and unjust 
is in how it affects future behavior and social morality. 
352. See supra note 252. In particular, see Jones, supra note 259. 
353. Others do not share this view concerning the importance of Title VII. See, e.g., 
T. SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY? 133-34 (1984). 

